PART III: SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

171 Some aspects of the social organization of the Amhara resemble those of medieval Europe at early and middle periods; others the ancient and not so ancient Middle East; still others, perhaps a smaller part, parallel patterns in other parts of Africa. It is an "old-world" pattern of human relationships, both in structure and function, and the noteworthy fact is that much has survived, due to comparative isolation, that has changed elsewhere.

186 Amhara attitudes, concomitant with their social organization, recall the attitude of the "Neolithic pattern of human relations" in Coon's terminology.[69] This pattern is characterized by the attitude: "You stay in your village, and I stay in mine. If your sheep eat our grass we will kill you. Anyone who tries to change our ways is a witch and we will kill him."

In Amhara rural areas--and most Amhara are rural--this attitude still seems to dominate human relations, be they structured as territorial, class, military, legal, ethnic, religious or racial. Feuds between kin groups often last for several generations; loyalties are intensely regional and ethnocentric.

178 While all this can still be observed, change in the direction of modern occidental patterns has begun to seep in very recently, affecting various phases of social organization in varying degrees. Sometimes the structure

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[69] Coon: The Story of Man. 1954.

178 is more affected because of orders sent with increasing rapidity and urgency from the central government at Addis Ababa. Sometimes the central government itself gives conservative lip service to some old structure, while quietly modernizing the function.

1. Land Tenure

A. Political Aspects of the Old Tradition:

631 For many centuries Abyssinia was a confederation of states governed by princes, who recognized the superiority of one of them--the "king of kings"; except for occasional centralization of power in the hands of a particular monarch. Only in very recent times, since the late 19th century, does centralization seem to have developed with greater permanency.

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423 As a result of this social structure, every subject is in some way a functionary of the ruling power. This may infringe on his private property at any time, and he is bound to various labors and obligations. In principle, all land is considered the ultimate property of the power ruling at the top of the social pyramid.

423 All land tenure is therefore considered subject to the final approval of the "king of kings". This [671] principle was recognized in the ancient law code "Fetha Nagast", which, however, formally recognized the principle of private land property, to be expropriated only in case of rebellion. Private land property was further reaffirmed by clause 9 of the Penal Code of 1930, and

423 566 701 "gulteñña" and his family might try to become squatters, "chesañña", on someone's fallow land, and risk being chased away by a kin unit claiming that territory. Or, permitted to remain on his old lands,a "gulteñña" might suddenly find that the new feudal lord of the province was enclosing ("kelkel", declared forbidden) land formerly used as pasturage or for agriculture, to give to his own successful soldier veterans, and exacting quotas of oxen, mules and honey from the former "gulteñña".

178 423 As long as the "gabbar" system was still in full force, the "gulteñña" at least had someone to exploit in turn, to ease his own burdens. Now that the present emperor has declared the "gabbar" system ended (though much of it survives), even this relief is passing. Furthermore, the new army is salaried, so that the basic function of the "gult" system has already disappeared. The only hope the sons of "gulteññas" have is to have their lands declared "rest", private property, for otherwise they will become landless. This means that they must work the land themselves and pay tithe on the produce; otherwise squatters can alienate it from them.

D. Endowed Lands -- "rest-gult".

423 The many variations of regional "rest"and "gult" lands sometimes crystallize to a combination type referred to as "rest-gult".

725 and left flanks.

701 Fanning out in all directions, detachments of light cavalry and foragers on foot, "fano", could destroy and plunder enemy land to do as much damage as possible while on the march. When re-encampment was ordered, the tent of the king or field commander was set up first, and the army divisions and followers, seeing this, grouped themselves accordingly and settled in their proper locations, distances, areas and relative positions. The quartermaster thereupon took over the functions of maintenance and supplies.[74]

[554] This pattern of "relative positions" and functions carried over into civilian life, and dominated land tenure, administration, law, social structure, organized religion, the life cycle, artistic expression, and a multitude of human relations.

C. Significance of the old Military Organization in Modern Change.

178 The spear, the rhinoceros shield and armies paid by land grants have now become memories of the past, [554] though recent past. Yet most of the attitudes and many of the roles that accompanied the old military organization still linger and dominate social organization.

[423] Much of the old land tenure is still little changed in the old-Amhara provinces, as has been pointed out.

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[74] Eadie: An Amharic Reader, 1924, pp. 86-7.

178 631 3. Public Administration and Territorial Organization

The social structure supported by the pillars of traditional land tenure and feudal army organization, is maintained by a third pillar, public administration and the old territorial organization. However, all three are now in process of gradual, and uneven, transition, partly resembling analogous developments in Europe at the end of the feudal Middle Ages.

A. Rural Administration

622 Much as the hierarchical pyramid of land tenure and the old army of the Amhara rested on the broad back of the "gabbar", so does rural organization still rest ultimately on the broad base of the rural official known as "c̣heqa shum" (lit. appointee over the soil). He might be regarded as village headman, though in view of the residential pattern of scattered hamlets ("ṭis"), his area includes a collection of them, collectively known as "mändär" (village). This may coincide, in the old-Amhara provinces, with the church parishes known as "ānd debber agär".

Although appointed by the governor of the province, and supervised by the intermediate district chief ("woräda gäj", or "woräda shum", or "mislanē", i.e. governor's deputy, or lieutenant), the cheqa shum is regarded as the agent of the highest administrative power, formerly the "ras" of the province; or the king ("negus"); now the emperor. In thetraditional pattern

632 Since the town attracted the most clever "däbtära",
[759] many of whom were herbologists, it was also a center where "medical aid", sometimes quite effective, could be obtained, and attracted patients from far and wide.

[463] Ethnic craftsmen would settle in hamlets within walking distance of the town, to provide iron tools, tanned leather, sun umbrellas, etc., without, however, exposing themselves to mockery, insults and occasional assaults by living in the town itself.

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517 The town developed as a social center, and center for entertainment, almost inevitably. First, religious feasts such as the Epiphany parades and the tournaments on the public commons on "ganna" (Christmas) attracted the populace; and youngsters as well as adult loafers found themarket scenes fascinating. Secndly, the Arab traders liked to discuss business and news over tea or
[265] coffee. So "teahouses " (shay bet") sprang up near the Saturday market, serving snacks also to many a male at
632 odds with his wife, and excluding all womenfolk. Con-
648 versely, the mead house, ("tej bet") provided evening
588 entertainment with female singers and dancers (azmari) for the all-male clientele, and waitresses easily available for sexual entertainment. Moreover, every town had at least one "street of unattached women", who catered to travellers or visiting peasants as innkeepers, restaurateurs, and as temporary wives; they were usually divorcees, who hoped to find another husband, and to settle down again to regular married life.

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178 Except for some of the feudal arrangements, most of this town pattern of social organization is still

632 [178] little changed. Modern developments are merely superimposed on this pattern, mostly due to recent decrees 633 of the central government at Addis Ababa. This city had itself grown out of a modest village on top of Entoto mountain in the 1880's, when Menelik II transferred it to the hilly floodplain just below because the population flocking to his court soon after his early military victories had caused a severe fuel and water shortage on the hilltop. The fondness of the empress for the hot volcanic springs at the somewhat lower water table were another reason for the transfer.

The old title of "kantiba", mayor, was given only to those of most important urban centers, notably Addis Ababa and Gondar, and this traditinn has also been maintained. Although the mayors are now supervised by a young, modern-educated "Director of Municipalities" located in the Ministry of Interior in Addis Ababa, who may visit them or call them in for conferences and instructions, the appointment to "kantiba" is still made directly by the emperor.

[625] The urban chief of police is still called "ahalä-qa after the former title of the chief of bodyguard, and his subordinate officers are called "shambäl", the title used by Emperor Menelik II for the chidf of his most select bodyguard("zebaña") of 300 men.

The kantiba can convene a traditional council of elders, called "chilot" (now often referred to as "commissions", after the Italian occupation), which includes the chief of police and top judges, to hear and discuss

661 694 this would almost certainly happen in case of repeated absences;

To prevent the ruler from forgetting, or to pretend having forgotten, a position of favor promised to the applicant. This follow-up also indicates tenacity, a positive point.

To keep the ruler from thinking that the office-holder has become so proud and independent that he has forgotten the "father" from whom all good things come.

To counteract plots being hatched in his absence, which would not benefit him.

661 178 Another old requirement in appointment to office, which now is in force primarily in the district capitals and rural areas only, is the gift, "shum gänzäb" (lit. money for appointment), paid to the chief at the time of application.

Until very recently , the newly-appointed governor-general of a province would decree a "shum shir", a general, automatic abrogation of all office holdings left by the preceding regime; this enabled the new governor to appoint his own followers, courtiers, retainers, poor relations, etc., in office; but in practice he usually reappointed most of the former officials, down to the many "c̣heqa shum" headmen, on payment of an appropriate "shum gänzäb". In recent years this practice has been curtailed at the upper levels; for both the director-general of the province, and the secretary-general are now appointed by the central government in Addis Ababa.

661 178 But on lower levels the old practices continue, though more subtly and through indirect negotiations.

661 642 In decision-making, nothing seems to have changed. The paternalistic attitudes continue, and only very few of the modern-educated young aspirants really hope for and expect a modernization in the direction of greater efficiency. Only European advisors are outspoken on the subject, among themselves. Ethiopian students who return from university study abroad, return immediately to the "däj tenat" pattern. Twice a week they bow before the emperor as he leaves the High Court. Very kindly he greets them, usually by name, asks each after his well-being and that of his family. Later when a job has been assigned them, he asks whether they are satisfied, sometimes even inviting them to tell him if they are worried about something. The "father" role is taken literally on both sides.

Office-holders rarely make even petty decisions themselves. Instead, they take the matter to their superior, who is thus swamped with little details which waste his time. But it enables him to keep control through frequent personal contact and reaffirmation of the superordinate-subordinate relationship, and he in turn does "däj tenat" to his superior.

Office-seekers in the provincial capital maintain a grapevine service for information on the infrequent return of the governor-general from residence or "conferences" in Addis Ababa. Then they besiege his head-

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It is noteworthy that in this structure the Governor-general of the province is the only administrator permitted to appoint the next two highest officers of his own staff (since 1942). This is in line with the consistent development since 1916, when the present emperor, then regent, began the process of sweeping away the power of the top of the feudal-provincial pyramid. The "ras" gradually lost their private armies, and were expressly forbidden, by decree in 1942, to make treaties between provinces regarding boundaries or political or military matters.

[648] Contact with foreigners was also taken out of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Governor-general of the province, since foreigners going tothe provinces require permits issued by the Ministry of Interior in Addis Ababa; these permits have to presented to the provincial administrators before local travel is allowed . Even the control over the "Kantiba", the mayors of the major towns, was taken from the Governor-general of the province, and invested, by decree of 1942, in the "Director of Municipalities" in the Ministry of Interior. This central control over municipalities was evident in 1953, when mayors were called to Addis Ababa by the Director of Municipalities, for a reprimand from the emperor for having permitted his boarding establishments at elementary schools, intended for war orphans, to become filled with the sons of well-to-do feudal nobility.

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The feudal nobility, though much less powerful than in the past, plays a more informal, but still

631 dominant role in the rural administration. Most of the
565 "awraja gäj" and "woräda" chiefs are from medium and
646 lower provincial nobility. In Addis Ababa, the "Senate"
565 or Upper House of the Parliament instituted by Emperor Haile Selassie, is appointed from the higher nobility, the "Mäkwonent", while the Deputies of the Lower House are selected, with imperial approval, from the lower country gentry, largely from the Amhara, Tigre, and Shoa areas.

643 Many special privileges of regional nobility have
631 been abrogated by the present Emperor: The Wag Shum",
●178 hereditary ruler of the sub-province of Wag since the
565 Zagwe dynasty of the 13th century, has been abrogated by him; also the "Behēr Kagash", the "King of the Sea", hereditary ruler of the Red Sea coast, was abrogated; also the Muslim Ethiopian dynasty of Jimma, which Menelik II had permitted to continue in accordance with the treaty of peaceful surrender (ostensibly because the present heir had joined the Italians).

The least changed position in the structure of administration is that of the c̣heqa shum, who forms its broad base.

4. Customary Law and Justice

671 The foremost characteristics of traditional Abyssinian law and justice seem to be that they are based on the power hierarchy of social structure; that they permit and even encourage considerable subjective inter-

F. Law and Justice in Transition.

178 671 Emperor Menelik II had tried to limit what Europeans considered draconic penalties and procedures. Emperor Haile Selassie I continued to adjust tribal law to modern conditions, and, as his power increased, expressed the principle, in the Penal Code of 1935: "By learning European practice, (the people) may attain to higher degrees of knowledge, because the basis of our code of laws in many places fits with the European code". Both emperors, while introducing modern acculturation in law and justice, quite consciously, did not, it is clear, abrogate the old tradition. They could not have done so in practice, despite the growing power of the central monarchy. For the traditional values and attitudes, particularly among the Amhara, are still largely intact.

The transitinn can be analyzed as proceeding in four phases: (a) The abrogation of draconic penalties and procedures; (b) continuing customary law and justice, (officially and unofficially); (c) Modernization from the top down; (d) Sectarian privileges to resident minorities.

681 178 671 (a) During the reign of Menelik II enforcement of the old draconic penalties continued. The hand of a thief was cut off, and he was thereafter called "dush" (lit. stump). Cattle rustlers, "dandā," were punished the same way. It was not rare to see mutilated persons, hand or foot or both, in those days. It was not until the coronation of Emperor Haile Selassie I that the Penal Code of 1930 could have been decreed and enforced.

681 178 671 According to this change, mutilation of thieves was forbidden; the chaining of debtor to creditor was abrogated; flogging was reduced in frequency and quantity; the area that could fall under collective arrest, "afärsata", was limited; the legal validity of evidence from the "lebāshay" was indirectly abrogated. In 1933, the emperor further limited days, hours, and distances of the "afärsata". Capital punishment had been centralized in 1930.

It is noteworthy that in several cases old practices were for the first time acknowledged in writing, despite the continuing hesitancy to admit publicly any practice that European observers might regard as primitive. Thus, blood-money in place of blood-feud was decreed legal in 1930

426 671 178 Liberalization was also legalized by regarding civil law. In 1923 the Law of Loans fixed maximum interest at 9%. As usual , this was found to be too far a departure from practice for enforcement, and it was later raised to 12%. One of the last decrees prior to Italian hostilities, provided, in May 1935, for the abrogation of statute-labor, permitting the tenant (gabbar) to make a small payment (resembling a quitrent) instead.

694 661 178 (b) The pattern of judges riding circuit continued unabated, from the end of the harvest in the month of Tahsas (about November) until Easter. Sometimes judicial councils, "gubaē" were available in towns for appeals. But the old custom of bringing a gift to the "great man" to interest him in the indivi-

694 [661] 178 dual's case, the "gubba" gift, continued, and it is often identical with a bribe. At the same time, the old custom which served as a last resort to a poor person to have his injustice rectified, by appearing with a heavy stone perched on the back of his neck almost crushing him, was abrogated because Europeans looked on this as primitive. The poor man thus has lost his few safeguards, and now is losing evan the right to beg and to create a traffic hazard by throwing himself before the vehicle of [171] the great man and shouting "abyet". (The practice of carrying the rock resembles that of innocently accused Arab Beduin who appear pressing a blade against their necks to demonstrate and shout their innocence.

178 671 643 Transition thus proceeds in unequal shifts, with many culture lags. Modernization of law and justice proceeds from the top, Addis Ababa, down the pyramid. One of the reasons for the circuit-riding of the emperor himself is to remind the chiefs of his realm of his all-seeing and all-hearing power, just as was done in the past. He acts as inspector-general.

The Emperor and his High Court in Addis Ababa stil give lip service to the Fetha Nägäst Code. But in practice, this amounts to little more than rationalization for the benefit of the ultra-conservative Amhara nobles. 693 The position of the "afä negus" (lit. Mouthpiece of the King), who traditionally was the guardian of theFatha Nägäst code, has now become honorary in practice. In the past he was the second-most powerful person in the realm, trusted partly because he was not of the ruling family

779 the nation in Western patterns.
659 (1) The use of the church in promoting Amhara-
[721] dominated Ethiopian nationalism. This was recognized and
promoted by Emperor Menelik II who had priests carry the
"tabot" into newly conquered Galla, Sidamo and other pa-
gan and semi-Muslim areas of his new empire, giving his
[566] military conquests the character of a crusade. Churches
were built in these areas, guarded by troops of occupa-
tion, made permenent by feudal grants under which the
local population, made "gabbar" serfs, was permitted to
remain on the land as sharecroppers and peons of the feu-
dal church.

This use of the church has been continued, though
with reduced feudal emphasis, by the present emperor.
[212] The Geez alphabet of the church, modified in Amharic usage,
is the only alphabet even non-Amharic-speakers may use,
if they wish to write their languages, particularly in
[643] print. By taking on the name "Haile Selassye" (Power of
the Trinity), upon coronation, the present emperor re-
emphasized the power of the church. Finally, on November
4th 1955, when the new liberalized Constitution of 131
articles was proclaimed, it reaffirmed that the Ethio-
pian "Orthodox" Church, founded in the 4th century on
the doctrines of St. Mark, is the established church of
the state.

659 Phase (2), begun by the present emperor as his
178 power increased, was a concurrent weakening of the tempor-
al power of the church. At first this was gradual. In

659 178 In many criminal cases, culprits who had sought asylum [696] from the police of the state by entering a churchyard and sounding the resonant stone bells to announce to the pursuers that they had placed themselves under the protection of the church, were taken away by force, despite the protests of the priests. This so deteriorated some of the temporal power of the church that persons involved in kin bloodfeuds were also no longer safe in [688] church confines. Conversely, the traditional request of priests to law enforcement agencies of the state to arrest violaters of church rules (e.g. adulterers) now go unheeded except in remote rural areas, and even there such a prisoner is no longer held and sentenced to an [688] indefinite term on such a charge. Fines and imprisonment for violation of the Sabbath or for working on a saint's day, also are no longer enforceable.

An official extreme in this direction was reached in 1942, when, a year after his victorious return, Emperor Haile Selassie issued a series of decrees stripping the church of all feudal power, and most of its temporal power, except in the town of Aksum. Under these decrees, church land could henceforth be taxed by the state, though the taxes were to be used to administer church maintenance and education; church courts could levy only spiritual penalties, not money fines; the Central Treasury of the state was to administer rents from church lands. All statute-labor ("gabbar") rights of the church over sharecropping peasants living on its former feudal estates were abrogated.

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It took two years for the leadership of the church to recover from this shock and to bring pressure on the emperor, through his kinsman, the aging but still powerful Ras Kassa. In 1944 further decrees partly returned certain limited temporal rights of the church (such as the right to ask sharecroppers on church land for food supplies, fuel, repair of the local churches) in return for religious services and church education. Little actual change has taken place in the rural, old-Amhara provinces, but even there the priests now enforce their demands in subtler fashion, usually making heavier demands on recent peasants in their areas rather than on old-established families.

Thus, in effect, the state now rules the church from the top. Both Emperors Menelik II and Haile Selassye I refused to be crowned in the church capital, Aksum, preferring their own state capital, Addis Ababa.

Phase (3) represents the more subtle handling of the relations with the church by the present emperor, to utilize the church's structure and function to promote his policies of centralization and modernization.

Already mentioned, the request of the emperor to the sacerdotal church to copy from the Western church the function of preaching ethics to the common lay people, has had little effect. Somewhat more successful has been his repeated request, passed informally through the church hierarchy by word of mouth rather than published decree, to restrain the excesses of the "täzkar" memorial feast. These excesses include both the public

659 178 spectacle of self-abandon of the mourners, who scream, roll on the ground, cut themselves bloody, etc.; and the financial burden of excessively elaborate memorial feasts which were and sometimes still are fuinous to the families involved. To teach by example--a most effective way in a country where everyone imitates the "great man"" --the emperor himself ordered that no memorial feast be given for his own daughter who died in 1933; just some money donations were made to the priests reciting prayers for her soul.

[874] More recently, the emperor founded the Theological College of Addis Ababa, headed by an Egyptian Coptic president and some faculty members from among Egyptian Copts, to modernize the curriculum of the future leaders of the church among whom he hopes, for the first time, to find allies rather than permanent foes. The probable successor to the present Abuna (archbishop) of Ethiopia, Theophilus, is believed to share the emperor's views and has already travelled abroad several times. The emperor wishes the younger clergy to become more learned and to be able to translate the Bible from [198] Geez into Amharic for the lay populace. He has promoted the printing of bibles in Amharic, rather than Geez, thus using religion to promote the official, national language of the state.

6. The Fraternal Association called "mähabbär".

575 This "voluntary" association of individuals, growing out of the "private communion" of the Abyssinian

596 (private freehold), most common in the old-Amhara provinces (and in Tigre). "Rest" land is inherited only [428] by sons, not by daughters, except in the relatively rare case when a family short of young men permits a son-in-law to settle in its hamlet, whereupon some land may be inherited by the daughter who is consanguinal kin. Daughters may inherit movables such as cows, sheep, some personal belongings of their mother or father (of the father if there are no sons).

601 Kinship terms do not often differ between terms of address and reference, but often between formal and informal terms which are applied in a variety of ways ranging from authoritarian familiarity to endearments. Differences of gender are also expressed.

The generic term for kinfolk is "zämäd". Consanguinal kinfolk, on both the father's and mother's side, are called "wägän", and if they reside far away and are rarely seen the kinship is re-emphasized by the term "yäsega zämäd" (lit. kinship of one flesh). Consanguinal families sharing the same residential hamlet [178] are called "betä zämäd" (lit. kinfolk of the house). It [572] is noteworthy that in very recent times, in urban areas where kinship functions are somewhat attenuated, the term "zamäd" has become extended to include a close personal, though not related, friend.

The affinal relationship is generically called "amachenät", a male affinal relative is addressed and referred to as "amach", a female as "ancha"; whether ego is male or female.

565 In the past, the traditional desire for personal independence of the Amhara, particularly the Amhara noble, led him to prefer residence in his own province or district, where he could rule from the apex of local hierarchy. There he imitated the emperor as much as his means permitted.

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854 Children of nobles imbibed the tremendous pride of Amhara nobility from the time servants carried them about so that their noble feet would not be dirtied by walking, or else had their hands and feet washed by servants regularly. Boys, at about 7, would be given a private tutor, usually a young priest. At 10, when other boys are still in rags or at most wear tattered shorts, the young "bäläw" (aristocrat) already was wearing full, white jodphurs.

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178 In the provinces this pattern is still largely unchanged. But with the increase in central government power, feudal nobles find it advisable to spend the greater part of the year in Addis Ababa--more than the emperor himself desires. Young nobles who graduate from the provincial elementary schools, where their Indian teachers deferred to them as much as their Amhara teachers, have a considerable adjustment to make when they enter High School in Addis Ababa, where the European instructors grade them on individual merit alone.

b) The Peasant Class.

565 In the peasant class there is a wide distinction between the landowning ("rest") peasants who are freemen

000 prevail.

871 465 Most elementary school graduates from the provincial capitals do not continue to Addis Ababa for a high school education, for they can obtain good and honorable positions, paying ETH$125.- (US $50.-) per month in the same town, as teachers, municipal clerks, with a good chance to be appointed to judgeship soon if they cultivate the right persons in power with "daj tenat". Even Students who "flunk out" in the 7th or 8th grade can earn ETH$100.- as teachers of lower grades, or as low-grade clerks.

872 212 178 One old tradition which has broken down in the modern elementary schools but not in most church schools, is the prohibition of extra-curricular writing. In the higher church grades, in which students' piety was already confirmed, especially in the monastery schools, copying psalms, gospels, (and by extension, government documents), was permitted, practiced, even regarded as praiseworthy. But there was, and in rural areas still is, fear that less pious students would use their knowledge of writing to experiment with magical formulae, doodlings, etc., creating dangerous mischief.

Therefore, parchment goatskins and writing equipment were carefully kept away from students of village church schools, and they were not taught to write. Thus, achievement of the skill of a scribe, "däbtära", required considerable individual initiative and study away from home.

212 857 However, boys at the "experimental" age of childhood, would amuse themselves with the forbidden game of writing and doodling in secret, and they still do. Their work can be seen scribbled even on the outside walls and posts of some churches, a daring prank, sometimes in imitation of the church painter. More often

588 The "damoz" temporary wife is usually recruited from a lower
class than that of the man, of landless family. But often she is
merely a divorcee, who "lives alone" in a street inhabited by women
of similar status in the town, who are in-between marriages, and
make a living serving transients with bed and board, giving them
548 the comforts of home, cooking, baking, cleaning. They are not considered good-time prostitutes of the mead-houses ("tej-byet"), and
are therefore much more respected.

588 487 178 Respectably-married ("semanya") men would, in the past, take
on a "damoz" wife to accompany them on caravan trips, to spare the
"semanya" wife the discomforts and perils of the journey. Now that
trucks travel comparatively fast from province to province, the
travelling "damoz" wife has become rare, but the residential "damoz"
wife continues in the towns much as before, and "semanya" wives
are therefore not as tolerant of them as they once were when they
appreciated their husbands' efforts to spare them discomfort. For,
they reasoned, "who else will cook for him, how will he eat?".
588 848 The "damoz" wife's children are fully legitimate. She is far higher
in status than the simple concubine ("yächen gäräd"), lit. the
servant-maid of the thigh), who was and is often a permanent member
of the household, often of doubtful or half-Shanqalla ancestry, who
has no damoz rights, and whose children have no rights of recognition
beyond what the master cares to give them. (The concubine is also
called "tara" or "tarata" in some districts).

588 171 The respectability or semi-respectability of the "damoz" wife
compares to the Persian "sighe", and the Arab Muslim temporary wife
permitted in the Quran (IV:28 - "And in so far as you have derived
pleasure from these women for a stipulated time, give them their

583 184 pecting this, screams loudly, making the "capture" official. After some days or weeks, the husband officially informs the bride's parents that he has consummated the marriage and intends to keep the bride as his wife; whereupon the bride's kin can pretend to "give in" and make the best out of the "damage done" without much loss of face, by agreeing to an official "semanya", without a big feast or cows, or "boasting" the "fukkara". But otherwise the legal procedure is that of "semanya", with the cheqa shum present.

[589] A spinster is so rare that she seems non-existant, unless sick and handicapped so that she cannot function as a wife. Therefore, a spinster would be mocked and suspected of hidden ailments. To prevent this, a poor or unpopular girl might ask her kin or spokesman to seek a poor man and ask him "to abduct" her.

582 656 The new, modern laws have made little attempt to change these traditional forms of marriage, beyond trying to acknowledge and "normalize" them. The new minimum age of marriage is legal at 15 for girls, 18 for boys, but this is generally ignored and evaded in [584] the rural areas where girls still marry at 13 and 14. Through indirect means, the Emperor Haile Selassie has also urged that boys and girls should see more of each other before marriage, have a longer and formal courtship.

●178 871 581 Very recently, two differing attitudes have developed among young men educated in the modern school system, toward marriage with educated girls. In the provincial towns, the (semi-educated) young men, who have finished elementary school or 7 grades, say that girls who have finished as little as 4 or 5 grades of elementary school consider themselves "educated", are proud, and tell their

178 581 871 husbands "Who are you to give me orders - I can read as well as you". Therefore such girls are avoided as brides.

But fully educated young men, in Addis Ababa, especially those who have returned from abroad with graduate degrees, complain that there are not enough educated girls for them to marry. There is now a girl's high school in Addis Ababa, but the supply of educated girls is still far below the demand by educated men who do not wish their wives to sit shy and wordless in modern-urtan, international social gatherings.

Another modern difficulty arises in cases where the modern-educated young man is the son of an illiterate peasant, or a "rustic" one, and is ashamed to ask his father and similar kinfolk to negotiate the marriage. For even in the city the traditional "semanya" is the basic and most common form of marriage.

584 a) "Semanya" Marriage Negotiations.

Sometimes the young man decides on a girl and asks his father to begin negotiations. Or the parents, feeling that the time has come, begin to send out feelers. In either case, it is the young man's father who initiates formal negotiations with the father and kinfolk of the bride; though not, at first, directly.

The father of the young man may gather his "enjä̈ra"-friends, "who dine at each other's table", or kinsmen, or both, and appoint a "nä̈ggä̈r abbat" (lit. father of the affair) as intermediary.

Before matters go further, the kin group tries to find out and examine three factors of the prospective match:

1) Health of the family, such as absence of leprosy, venereal disease and other diseases belived to be inherited; 2) Land property -

197 in the neighboring Sudan, for Muslim traders even today mix more Arabic loanwords into their Amharic than do Amharas. Areas conquered by slightly islamized Galla and held from the 16th to the 19th centuries were affected to varying degrees by several Galla (Cushitic) dialects.

196 Semantic drift is now in the direction of the Amharic speech pattern of Shoa province, which replaces the dominance of former aristocratic Gondar, thus introducing many more Galla traits into the language. This change is concomitant with the increasing political [191] dominance and centralization of the Shoan dynasty and power. Proclamations emanate from Addis Ababa in Shoan Amharic, and schoolchildren are increasingly taught this "standard" Amharic. Old terms of other provinces are often falling into disuse.

Sometimes this process is conscious, particularly in matters of national pride. Thus, the old word "tuqul" for the primitive, round, thatched, wattle-and-mud hut, is now replaced, through influence directed from Addis Ababa, by "sar byēt" (lit. thatched house), considered more polite, for it denotes a house not yet covered by a corrugated iron roof, without the connotation of the mud walls; or, for similar reasons, by "goja" (lit. simple residence).

The use of the call "Guragē" for laborer has been expressly forbidden, because it is now considered insulting to that hardworking ethnic group, and the call "coolie" has been purposely imported. Furthermore, increased use is made in Shoan Amharic of Geez abstracts for modern purposes, such as the suffix "nät", which can be attached [178] to any Amharic verb to render it into an abstraction. Modernization, which has recently introduced such new cultural phenomena into Addis Ababa as the adult, unmarried "Miss", has, within the past decade, amended an old term to describe the new phenomenon: the old "woyzäro" (married, noble lady; Mrs.) is amended to the new concept "woyzarit" (adult though unmarried Miss). This term is still unknown in the rural

291 Men doing physical labor - "boddana" - lift toga above shoulders to free arms;

- "adagaddaga" - knot toga across chest; wrap-around. (also to tie shammas of debtors to creditors, or prisoners to guard's).

[411] To parry blows - "makkata" - wrapping toga around left forearm, as shield.

Preparing for battle - "adagaddaga" (see above): knotting shamma across chest, after wrapping it tightly around the waist.

When cold - "zeqzeq labbasa" - doubling a heavy shamma (called "kuta" or "derreb") to wrap oneself in completely, even covering covering head, at night.

When hot - a light shamma of muslin ("natala") may be rolled around the head - "tamattama". Hence, the turban of priests is called "matamtamiya", a tight wrap-around of the head by muslin.

[535] When dancing - before "dabtara" (scribe-choristers) begin to dance, in church, they first drape the toga tightly ("shabashshaba"), so that the flaps will not drop from the shoulders during the motion.

[765] In mourning - while dancing the funeral motion, accompanying the improvised eulogy, women approach each other holding their own togas outward and horizontal, like huge wings, (as if they were holding a spear like men dancing the "fukkara" boast dance).

201 Some of these expressive ways of draping the shamma are falling into
291 disuse in the towns where the people are more affected by what passes as
● 178
685 "modern dress". However, an interesting increase in one way of draping the shamma can be noticed in recent years: Now that debtors are no

201 291 178 685 longer chained to creditors, more frequent knotting-together of the *shamma* is taking place, instead.

G. Dance, Chant, Musical Instruments.

535 Amhara dancing falls into three categories: religious dancing, military dance, and the entertainment dance performed by professionals. The first type has already been described in the section on the church.

Military dancing falls into two main categories: the "*fukkara*" boasting dance accompanied by boasting chant; and the "*hotu*" loyalty dance accompanied by shouts.

The "*fukkara*" is the war-boast, before or after battle, and on other occasions, of the *individual* warrior boasting of himself, sometimes of his kin group. It used to be danced with a spear, now with a stick or rifle. This is held horizontally over the shoulders. During the dance the head moves sideways, right and left. Defiance is shouted at the enemy, be it human, animal, or a supernatural spirit.

In the *zar* cult, the victory dance ("*gurri*") of the spirit just after he has entered the body of the possessed, is regarded so much as the"*fukkara*" type of dance, that the *zar* gives his identity away by his own version of "boasting" - whereupon the "disease" is diagnosed.

The *hotu* loyalty dance, by contrast, is a *collective* dance, most often a jump-dance, in which the multitude of warriors, brandishing their weapons, try to cast fear on the enemy by numbers, sound, and expression of intense loyalty to their common leader. The name itself is composed of "*ho*", onomatopoetic for shouting, "*ta*" signifying the collective suffix (all together). The following are common variations:

"*Cho - cho*" - simple shouting in unison, ("qärärto").

"*Yebähalal Jeb-o*" - "The hyena will swallow him (i.e. the enemy)."

"*Wardaw sheb-o*" - "crow's beak" (i.e. the vultures will feed on the enemy).

"*Addis Ababa*" - (lit: "New Flower", name of capital) - shout of

533 To European ears the music of the Amhara sounds like a continuous cacophony, like the tuning up of a Western orchestra. But once accommodated to it, the sentiments expressed in the high-pitched chanting, the ecstatic pitch of emotions of the priests and däbtära, is recognized, when they sing for hours the chants they know so well by heart.

One foreign musicologist characterizes the timbre of voice in some Abyssinian chants as "harsh, forced and strident, unlike the singing in Negro Africa which is usually soft and rounded" (footnote 96). But he appreciates the artistry by which boy singers change the register, dropping from the usual falsetto to chest voice, and octave below, then move back into the falsetto; also, the interesting polyphonic technique, in which the second voice sings the melody introduced by the first voice, in the same pitch, but with delayed entry, so that a "canon" or "round" results, which is abandoned toward the end, the two voices ending in unison. Thirds seem to be preferred, though fourths and fifths occur among the voices.

Dabtara are always at work experimenting with minor alterations, [178 which may in time accumulate. Furthermore, certain regional specializations exist: Arabic music affects Abyssinian music wherever Muslims live in sizeable numbers, especially in Tigre province, and near the Sudanese border. Here the wailing Arabic chant that breaks off abruptly, has infiltrated.

533
178 Modern, national Ethiopian music dates only to the 1920's. It includes the modern national anthem and other patriotic songs such as "Lion of Judah". The music, often composed on order, by foreigners or

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Footnote 96 - George Herzog, quoted by Leslau: Chansons Harari. Rassegna di Studi Etiopici VI, p. 161, Rome 1947.

533 resident Armenians, ranges from vague "oriental" melodies to European
178 melodies of the marching variety. But secular songs, grassroots folk-songs, are increasing with the use of public loudspeakers and growing up of a somewhat more modern educated generation singing love songs with less restraint than in the past, such as "yännē shega, yännē qonjo" (my peach, my beauty).

534 Musical instruments are largely divided into two categories in the mind of the Amhara; those used for the church service, notably percussion instruments; and those used for entertainment, notably string instruments, and wind instruments. Drums are used in both categories, however.

The reason percussion instruments predominate in church, is that musical instruments used in church have the role of marking time, in the chant-dances. Moreover, there is no independent instrumental music in the Abyssinian tradition, not even in organized entertainment.

Percussion instruments include the following:

Drum - "nägarit", the huge, barrel-like symmetrical drum over which skins are stretched at both ends, made to accompany rythmic (church) dances. It has a wooden body, 3' to 5' in length. It is considered the aristocratic drum, for in the past it was beaten to assemble the population for war or to hear a royal proclamation. (The modern government publication printing decrees is appropriately called "Nagarit Gazetta"). In the past it was carried on muleback in military expeditions, and preceded the entry of a governor into a province. Since it is heavy, it is suspended from a shoulder strap and carried by the younger men. It is beaten by the flat fingers and half the palm, while the drummer keeps time by swaying his upper body.

000 The patient would recover anyway in due course.

758 The therapeutic value of convalescense ("*gäggäm alä*") is recognized, and patients are told to bask in the sunshine.

562 756 757 Men are more likely to let themselves be treated by the "woggesha"; women, who suffer more frequently from functional ailments, approach the "dabtarä" or "zar" doctor more often and request magical aid.

844 When birth approaches, the midwife is called, almost never the woggesha. If he is, he may not touch the genital parts of the woman, and merely advises the midwife. When labor pains begin, the patient is given a drink of mashed linseed to "relax the birth tract" and to "lessen the pain". The newborn baby is annointed with butter (often rancid), and fed some of it.

759 Other medical helpers, apprentices, or modern "dressers" may be referred to as "healers" ("*fäwash*"), "*balä mädanit*" (lit. medicine man, who knows empirical drugs and cures), "caretaker" ("astabaqi"), male nurse ("mogzit"), modern "dresser" ("astamami"). None of these are respected professions, for they are regarded as too close to manual labor, and such practitioners usually go to other provinces where their work will not shame the family. In recent years, the more skilled ones have been coming from Eritrea.

●178 757 Modern change has been largely indirect and partial. The new laws still permit the "woggesha" to function. Penicillin and other antibiotics can be purchased without a prescription at the big "Saturday markets", for as little as ETh$2.50 (US$1.-), and the patient simply buys it, takes it to a "dresser" in the nearest town, whom he pays 1/2 dollar Ethiopian (US 20 cents), to give the injection. When symptoms disappear, e.g. in syphilis, he believes himself cured.

178 757 This attitude is of course deplored by the Western physicians who know of it. But modern medical treatment is still little available outside the major towns. Patients come to hospitals often only as a last resort, fearing to be separated from kinfolk and exposed to treatment by strangers, so that mortality in hospitals is high, which reinforces
[743] the fears. At present there are probably no more than 50 hospitals in all Ethiopia, and only a few hundred Western physicians. Both are heavily concentrated in Addis Ababa, so that the field of the "woggesha" has not shrunk at all.

164 B. Common Ailments and their Treatment.

757 756 755 The more common ailments and procedures followed by the "woggesha" and "däbtära", (practitioners who occasionally overlap in specialties but almost never in treatment), include the following (see next page):

754 776 753 and are permitted to be dirty most of the time. As for males, the buda also likes to feast on healthy-looking, fat, handsome warriors and chiefs. "Buda" is the general diagnosis when a person always known as healthy suddenly sickens and dies. Therefore it is feared even by the bravest warriors.

754 776 178 Even at present, when "modernization" is proceeding from the central government, "buda" belief has not shrunk. It has simply expanded to take in modern attractions. Thus, police officers in the provincial towns are believed to have attracted "buda", who has developed a taste for officers in nice, new uniforms; and is believed to be "greedy" for healthy-looking boys doing modern gymnastics in their new elementary schools, eager to consume their physical prowess and grace. Even rich, strong, fat, gay, well dressed Europeans are regarded as vulnerable, but less so because "they do not fear him". Fear attracts him too.

821 "Buda" is most active in August, at the height of the rainy season. His favorite time to strike is just after a heavy thunderstorm, when tornado-like gusts of wind seem to pull up the hut and try to pull the roof off. This would enable "buda" to "see" his victims better, and cannibalize them.

751 754 776 Many ways of trying to prevent victimization by "buda", or at least of reducing one's vulnerability, have been devised over the centuries. To reduce vulnerability, one should not appear too happy, too gay. One should not become an object of open admiration, or of envy and jealousy. One should further paraphrase the tabooed word "buda", by saying "watch your eyes". Newlyweds, who are very vulnerable, should cover their glowing faces for ten days, to keep

562 [554] to an almost sub-culture. The result is at least one real sub-culture, that of the "*zar* society". Many women find their way to it either through introduction by a female friend, or, if the husband forbids it, through actual or simulated hysteria or catalepsy.

888 Psychological problems of the aged have not as yet become significant in Amhara society. The male elder, and also the old woman, are respected and cared for even in senility - a stage which only a small minority reach because of the comparatively brief life span.

3. Culture Change and Amhara Society: Inertia versus Modernization; the "Change Agent"; the Amharization of Ethiopia; the New Elite; Old Values; Outlook.

178 In view of the traditional hierarchy of government among the Amhara, any major culture changes could be effectively introduced only from the apex downward. This has been the experience during the reigns of the present Emperor Haile Selassie and of his predecessor, Emperor Menelik II; One might even include the unlucky Emperor Theodore. All three recognized the role of the emperor (King of Kings) as "change agent" in culture change. In Ethiopia it has not been the dissatisfied elements who have acted for change.

The forces resisting culture change in that society were and are powerful, not because they have consciously and purposefully banded together in opposition, but by the resistance of inertia. The silent but fierce opposition, notably from the old feudal nobility, the old and dominant heads of the Abyssinian Coptic church, and the rural elders, has long constituted an ultra-conservative immovable object: self-satisfied, fundamentalist, proud of having defended their mountain plateau for centuries, distrustful of foreign innovations.

178 With the gradual increase in their personal and military power, the imperial "change agents" have been able to introduce certain modern reforms. Their direct orders have been fulfilled in haste, as long as they supervised them personally. This was and is in accordance with the old concept of the government hierarchy, according to which the "great man" at the apex must be quickly obeyed as long as he is on the spot. The moment his attention is turned to some other matter, and he is not physically supervising the change, the status quo is largely resumed. In this connection Chapple and Coon's definition of equilibrium is apt:

> "Equilibrium is that state of a system...such that, when a small force is impressed upon it, a change takes place within it, and once this force is removed, the system returns to approximately its previous state."
> (Footnote 137)

Foreign educated students are largely descendants of the Amhara ruling nobility; although they have been motivated toward certain specific reforms, they fall back into their old noble-family patterns soon after their return.

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643 In order to modernize the country, the Imperial "change agent" is faced with the task of establishing centralized control. For he is not only King of the Amhara, but "King of Kings" of all Ethiopia, a nation still far from homogeneous. Emperor Menelik II started to link the heterogeneous country through military conquest of the Galla and other ethnic entities, and, farsightedly, through the establishment of telegraph and telephone communication with at least his major provincial captials. Emperor Haile Selassie has continued this process, not only through direct orders and proclamations, but by means of the cultural Amharization of Ethiopia.

Footnote 137: Chapple & Coon: Principles of Anthropology, p. 704

563 178 [643 797] Wherever Emperor Menelik II conquered new areas, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, he ordered the local people to build Abyssinian Coptic churches, and the Coptic priests who accompanied the troops with the sacred "tabot", consecrated the new local church and parish. These became centers of political and educational Amhara activities. Amharization was advanced not through large scale direct conversion of what was considered by the Amhara clergy a "lower" ethnic group, but through the establishment of a local, administrative, Amhara hierarchy, which the other ethnic peoples found it in their interest to emulate. They soon learned (particularly the old Galla nobility) that they could advance in the Amhara feudal-army system and regain feudal-land-tenure through loyal military service.

[554] By assimilating to this Amhara pattern, young Galla of the old nobility or of the modern-educated élite have found that they can rise in the hierarchy, and, after conversion to the Coptic Abyssinian faith, even intermarry with the ruling class.

At the same time, ethnic particularism and tribal expression of the subject ethnic groups, including the large Galla population, have been consistently discouraged by the ruling Amhara. [797] Even foreign missionaries, who are still forbidden to convert Abyssinian Copts, but may work on Muslims, "pagans", etc, have been pressed into the work of Amharizing Ethiopia. For they must preach in the Amharic language, and can distribute Bibles only in the Amharic language, even in provinces where the vast majority still understands very little or no Amharic. If they break this law, missionairies can be promptly deported.

000 The present emperor, since his ascendency in 1917 and particu-

178 645 [643] The present emperor, since his ascendency in 1917 and particularly since his return from exile in 1941, has proceeded to build a base for the modernization of his country through the creation of a modern-educated new élite. The only portfolio he holds personally in his own cabinet is that of Minister of Education (though the other ministers ask his guidance on even the most minute matters). It is this group which is beginning to bridge the gulf between the ethnic cleavages, and which is trying to enlarge Amhara loyalty to an Ethiopian nationalism. Its members give lip service to the still powerful Coptic church: they smoke publicly, but they will break the lenten fast only in secret, eat pork only when not in the public eye, and still refrain from walking arm-in-arm with a female in public. But when sent to the provinces to modernize the administration, they quietly make gradual but cumulative inroads against the temporal power of the church and against the feudal landowning gentry, on the basis of imperial proclamations and numerous directives. (Footnote 138)

643 178 779 This change is only in the initial stages. Some of the most fundamental decisions by the present emperor, notably the abolition of the "gabbar" (serf-like) system, and the measurement and registration of the land, have been most strongly resisted in the old-Amhara provinces, where these edicts have still not been enforced.

As a result, the emperor has often tried to proceed by indirect means. Just as he has utilized the foreign missionaries in his Amharization program, so has he tried to utilize the Abyssinian clergy in his modernization program. He has appointed an Egyptian Coptic clergyman-educator to head the new Theological College of

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Footnote 138: For details see: Messing, Simon D.: Changing Ethiopia (in) The Middle East Journal, vol.9, no.4, Autumn 1955, pp. 413-432.

643 Addis Ababa. He has repeatedly urged the Abyssinian clergy to
● 178 take up the practice of preaching in church, on such subjects as
779 reduction of the violent mourning for the dead and the ruinous
"tazkar" memorial feasts; and admission of women into the church
building. In Addis Ababa, a few modern-style churches have agreed
to do this out of respect for his presence. But the provincial
churches have retained their sacerdotal character and have not,
except on occasions of brief imperial visits, adopted these innovations.
The clergy has also resisted (by means of the "inertia"
previously described) the urgings of the emperor to convert masses
[797] of the "lower" ethnic groups to Coptic Abyssinian Christianity.
Only sporadically have small-scale conversions taken place. The
emperor seems to recognize the value of expanding the nominal State
Religion, Coptic Abyssinian Christianity, to a real national church,
as a pillar of national solidarity and national loyalty.

178 The new élite, small in number, but actively supporting the
212 emperor's policies, and even occasionally beginning to become impatient
with the circumspection and quiet, indirect, subtlety of
Emperor Haile Selassie, has for some years raised the issue of the
simplification of the Amhara alphabet. They had assumed that there
would be much less opposition to such a worthwhile change than to
big issues like abolition of the "gabbar" and changes in land tenure.
The present alphabet, which consists of 259 syllables composed of
37 consonants and a minimum of 7 vowels, makes it difficult to
teach writing to illiterate adults, children, and non-Amharic
speakers, or to design typewriters. But the new, young, modern
elite could not have been more mistaken in their optimism. The
matter became a cause celebre, despite the fact that the proposal,
published in 1948 in an Amharic booklet "Reform of the Alphabet",

178 212 and signed modestly and anonymously "The Friends of Knowledge", had been published under the auspices of the Ethiopian Ministry of Education. It had been authored by the Amhara (modern-minded) noble, Ras Imru (later ambassador to the USA), the Amhara historian-grammarian Blatta Marze Hazen, and a Western scholar affiliated with the American National Council of Churches of Christ.

The conflict arose largely from the fact that most Amharic letters are directly derived from the old Geez, considered sacred because church liturgy and literature are written in it. Therefore, the Abyssinian church rejected the idea of alphabet reform as sacrilegeous. The emperor decided to postpone action indefinitely. (footnote 139).

178 563 It is this opposition, concentrated in the old Amhara nobility and clergy that has given opportunity to the loyal Galla to affiliate themselves more closely with the central government. Their modern-educated sons serve in high positions in the imperial bodyguard, army, and provincial administration. By affiliating themselves with the central government, the Galla obtain protection against the exploiting rural Amhara gentry. From the point of view of the modern central government such loyal support is greatly needed. From the point of view of the provincial, traditional Amhara, however, every young modern official sent from Addis Ababa, is now nicknamed "Galla", even if he is an Amhara.

181 178 Meanwhile the new elite has itself developed an indirect means to introduce a new value complex, at least in Addis Ababa. This is called "seltenez", which formerly meant politeness, refined and re-

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Footnote 139: Leslau, Wolf: La Réforme de l'Alphabet Éthiopien. (in) Rassegna di Studi Etiopici, vol.12,1953,pp.96-106. Rome.

181 strained behavior, civilization, but which now has assumed the con-
178 notation of "modern" in the Western sense. It includes the improved
[562] status of the woman, no longer a mere hewer of wood and hauler of water; and it even became formalized in 1942 when an imperial proclamation, in establishing a Consultative Committee on Legislation, gave instruction to draft new laws that would be "not repugnant to natural justice and humanity".

178 But many old values still persist even at the apex of the
576 hierarchy where the prime "change agent", the emperor, resides. Most
644 notable, to foreign observers, is the continuation of the "daj tenat" (faire l'antechambre: lit. waiting at the gate). This is the traditional palace courtyard ceremony of bowing to the emperor at least twice a week. Emperor Haile Selassie has permitted this institution to continue. Every governor-general has his own "daj tenat" court when he returns to his provincial capital; and so on down the line.

195 The traditional oath on the king's life, sworn even in petty matters and everyday affairs ("Hayle Selassye yemut", lit. May the emperor die; i.e. if I lie) is still in common use and no attempt has been made to suppress or reduce its usage. Haile Selassie well remembers that during the first half of his reign his Amhara subjects still used to swear by the name of the dead Menelik or by provincial dynasts such as Ras Gugsa.

178 Outlook: the "culture lag" between material and non-material culture that has created so many social problems in so many parts of the present-day world has not yet taken place in this society. The old attitude of accepting and enjoying trade goods without trying to reproduce what the foreigner has created, still persists. Direct exploitation of what nature provides still fills most physi-

cal needs, and the comparatively rich and complex non-material culture satisfies the need for interpersonal relations and expression. The returning foreign-educated students are still few compared to the size of the population, so that they immediately obtain high positions commensurate with their training, and are therefore generally well satisfied. Until the industrial age brings a cash economy and a modern appreciation of mechanical skills to Ethiopia, Amhara culture will probably remain in its present equilibrium. Meanwhile, however, the Amharization of all Ethiopia is continuing gradually, and can be expected eventually to attain the goal of a culturally homogeneous, predominantly Amhara, nation.

dolphus put it.[4] At length, unable to witness the further decimation of his 175*
people because of religious controversies, Susneyos abdicated in favor of his 648
son Fāsil. Fāsil lost little time in deporting the Jesuits and restoring the 797
Orthodox status quo. 643

Recovery

In the wake of all these collisions, Ethiopia made two valiant attempts to 175*
regain equilibrium and glory: through the splendor of Gondar in the seventeenth 648
and early eighteenth centuries, and through the force of three emperors 643
of the nineteenth century—Tēwodros II, Yohānnes IV of Tigre, and Menelik II of Shoa.

Gondar was founded as a new and stationary capital by Fāsil. It served as imperial headquarters for many generations. Later, the kingdom of Tigre knew a resurgence of power that led to control of the empire under Yohānnes (1872–89). His castle at Makalle symbolized one last rally for the north—after an interregnum of a thousand years—before being eclipsed by the Shoan throne.

The shock which began with the invasions of Ahmad Grañ shattered 175*
Ethiopia's medieval synthesis once and for all. The political consequence of 178 •
those disruptions was an increase in provincialism, reaching its climax in the 635
famous "Age of the Princes" (1755–1855) when each province had its own sovereign and for all practical purposes was a polity unto itself. The Solomonic line, the matrix of Ethiopian political unity, was splintered in several directions, leaving contenders in each of the provinces. Though the official imperial line remained at Gondar, Tigre was able to reassert its ancient claims and Gojjam recurrently voiced its separatism, and what may be called the "House of Manz" came to compete with Gondar as a center of national consciousness.

This political division was accompanied by a peculiar cultural bifurcation. 175*
Elements of the national culture that had been rather evenly distributed before 184
Ahmad Grañ now became relatively specialized in Gondar and Manz. The recovery of Ethiopia produced a geographical division of manners and morals as well as several lines of Solomonic royalty.

HISTORICAL PROFILES

The Role of Gondar 175*

Gondar is the only city in Ethiopia with charm and character expressive of 633
Amhara culture. Even today, despite modern accretions, the remnants of its castles, walls, bridges, and sanctuaries transmit a stately calm, redolent of past nobility and African grandeur. 175*

The town is situated on a flat volcanic ridge at seven thousand feet above 361

[GONDAR]

kindles artistic expression, so the poet could wax eloquent over Gondar's 175* 633
decadence at the close of the eighteenth cntury: 517

> Beautiful from its beginnings, Gondar, hope of the wretched! 538
> And hope of the great, Gondar, without measure or bounds! [539]
> O dove of John, Gondar, generous-hearted, mother!
> Gondar, never bowed by affliction!
> Gondar, with its merry name!
> Gondar, seat of prosperity and of savoury food!
> Gondar, dwelling of King Iyāsu and of mighty Bakāffā!
> Gondar, which emulated the city of David, the land of Salem!
> She will be a myth unto eternity.
> How is it she has been destroyed like Sodom, and without any guilt?[9]

So, while the reputation of the Gondar monarchy grew dim, that of the 175*
town as a center for religious studies continued unabated. Gondar was the 633
most famous place in the country for instruction in art, music, dance, poetry, 517
and the great books of the Ethiopian Church, and young men continued to 53
travel great distances to drink at such sources. The descendants of royalty somehow made their adjustment. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Arnauld d'Abbadie finds them making paintings and illuminating manuscripts.

At this late date, one more personality of stature emerges from Gondar. 175*
This time it is not a king but a *dabtarā,* or man of religious learning—Alaqā 159
Gabra Hānnā. Gabra Hānnā was born in the district of Foggarā on the east 793
coast of Lake Ṭānā. His pursuit of religious studies as a youth took him to 633
Gondar, where he did well and before long became a teacher in the church of Ba'ātā Māryām. Subsequently he was made head of the church, receiving the customary title of *alaqā.*

While at Ba'ātā, Alaqā Gabra Hānnā invented a new style of dance for the [535]
clergy. In the traditional style of *aquāquām,* the bodies and sticks of the [178]
dancers move up and down, punctuating the flow of chant with alternately gradual and abrupt vertical movements. Alaqā Gabra Hānnā, inspired by the lateral movement of the waves at Lake Ṭānā and of the bamboo reeds in the breeze at its shore, taught that bodies and sticks should sway from side to side. This innovation was rejected by the conservative clergy at Gondar, but it was carried by his son Taklē to Dabra Tābor and from there spread elsewhere.

Alaqā Gabra Hānnā became most famous, however, for his quick and
biting wit. So prolific and beloved were his witticisms that in a collection of [214]
some three hundred old parables and anecdotes published in Addis Ababa [538]
in 1955, no fewer than 25 per cent are devoted to stories about him.[10] After reaching prominence through his teachings and sayings, Alaqā Gabra Hānnā

*175 18 flushed with the reports of Menelik's conquests[47] and embellished by the wax and gold of Alaqā Gabra Hānnā, was a kind of traditional climax, a final expression of the integrity of traditional Amhara culture.

THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

633 *Gondar Today*

177 648 A renascence of Gondar began during the Italian occupation, when it was made the capital of Amhara, one of the five large provinces into which the Italians divided Ethiopia. They equipped Gondar with modern buildings and roads, restored parts of the old castles, and made it the transportation center of northwestern Ethiopia.

633 [874] [648] [162] After the liberation, Gondar retained some administrative importance by becoming the capital of Bagemder, one of the twelve provinces of postwar Ethiopia. A further impetus toward development of the town came in 1953 with the selection of Gondar as site for Ethiopia's first public health college. The existence of this college, with its enthusiastic staff of WHO and AID personnel, has stimulated the improvement of transportation and public utilities as well as local medical services. The population has increased to twenty thousand.[48] The progress shown by the city inspired one Ethiopian journalist to write, in the *Addis Zaman* of April 19, 1960: "By virtue of its annually increasing growth, sanitation, and modern appearance, one is emboldened to say that the city of Gondar takes second place only to Addis Ababa."

633 871 178 With the turn of Ethiopia's interest from the old church curriculum to a modern educational program, the traditional importance of Gondar has necessarily declined. It remains the place to go for the study of *aquâquâm* and for a "diploma" in textual studies, but the total number of students now pursuing these subjects is probably less than a hundred. Almost none of the young people of Gondar itself attend the higher church schools. Still in the vanguard of learning, Gondar's youth prefer the currently more advantageous government schools. The elementary schools of Gondar receive many more applicants than they can accommodate each year. Gondar's secondary school is, next to that of Harar, the oldest and largest in the provinces.

633 771 793 Nevertheless, the life of Gondar is still dominated by its clergy. Nine church schools in Gondar are supported by government funds. Unlike other cities in Ethiopia, Gondar is partly governed by a town council of clergymen. The city is divided into districts marked by the location of the churches, and the town council consists of the heads of these churches—some of whose positions are so important that they are assigned directly by the Emperor. This council is convened to handle disputes over land and other matters, and to communicate the mayor's proclamations to the people. An accusation signed for a plaintiff by a priest carries much weight in the local courts. The ecclesias-

impressions conveyed by much of the literature on Ethiopia, is not a normal 621
ecological unit in Amhara society. 602

Each homestead gives the appearance of self-sufficiency and autonomy, but 565*
it is bound to a wider social context in a number of ways. While satisfying 592
most of its consumption needs by its own efforts, every household depends on 438
the market for certain items. The highland peasants must go to market for 443
their chili, onions, peppers, hops, and cotton; while lowland peasants must barter for barley and sheep there. Salt and foreign fabrics must be imported from afar, and iron and clay products must be bought from specialists who
bring their wares. Limited needs for currency—chiefly for rifles and, since [436]
1942, taxes—are also met at the market.

The markets normally are held once a week. Every homestead is within 565*
walking distance of at least one market; though often the trip may take several 443
hours, at times the greater part of a day. Markets in the same region are 484
often scheduled on different days, so that, for example, the family which misses the one five hours to the north on Saturday can catch another four
hours to the south on Tuesday. The virtual absence of roads throughout the [491]
countryside makes travel to market slow and tedious, but wealthier peasants nonetheless manage to transport quantities of grain and livestock to the provincial capitals for better prices and a wider selection of consumers' goods.

The household is linked to a wider world politically as well as economically. 565*
By providing tithes, revenues, military service, and corvée labor, the peasant 641
has traditionally been obliged to support an extensive political hierarchy. In return for this he has received an organization for defending the country against enemies, and a structure of legitimate authority sufficient to maintain order and settle disputes.

The peasant's relations with this political hierarchy have been mediated by 565*
the office of *chīqā shum,* a district headman. This office is circulated, usually 622
annually, among a small number of men whose eligibility is based on their ownership of certain pieces of land. As the land passes from father to son, so does the eligibility for being *chīqā shum.*

Traditionally the *chīqā shum* was a role of considerable importance. It carried the duties of tax collection, adjudication, promulgation of official decrees, supervision of occasional work projects, levying of men for military service,
and officiating at civil marriages and divorces. Through his work the *chīqā* [661]
shum received a variety of fees and bribes. In cases of flagrant misbehavior the
local people were able to dismiss him from office. The reorganization of [178] •
provincial administration since 1942 has deprived the *chīqā shum* of many of his former powers, but the office still exists and plays a modest role in peasant life.

The district over which a *chīqā shum* has authority is the closest thing to a 622
village unit among the Amhara. It is usually coterminous with the area sur- 621 794

games with sticks and cloth, or wooden, balls. The adult males may do odd 565*
jobs around home, such as loading and moving bags of grain, or repairing 512
farm equipment. But they are likely to gather at some convenient spot, perhaps 527
at a boundary between fields, and discuss land disputes, arrange marriages, 462
reconcile quarrels, or tell stories. [517] [521]

The daily activity of the Amhara peasant is somber and severe. It is guided 565*
by the constant awareness that one must provide for oneself everything he 512
needs in this world. His is a life of deadening exertion, devoid of casual gaiety. 181
Even in his diversions the mood is generally serious and tense.

One of the Amhara peasant's principal diversions is litigation. On days 565*
when heavy labor is forbidden the judge's yard is filled; nor is it ever empty 517
on work days. Some peasants spend as much as twenty to twenty-five per cent 691
of their waking days at court. (Because of its importance in Amhara culture,
litigation will be discussed at greater length in later chapters.)

Going to market is another diversion. The trip is made by the peasant or 565*
his wife, or both, according to the needs of the household. The wife usually is 517
responsible for transactions dealing with cooking equipment and spices, the 443
husband for animals and farm equipment, while either is competent to negotiate [462]
about the great common denominator of Amhara life—grain. Exchanges [437]
are made either by barter or currency, which in olden times consisted of salt [436]
bars, pepper, and iron, as well as silver. [178]

The market provides an occasion for seeing distant relatives and friends, catching up on the latest news of the area, and generally countering the normal isolation of the peasant's life. It is especially stimulating for children, who may be treated to a piece of sugar cane if they are lucky. But the marketgoers are less absorbed with being sociable than they are with the serious business of locating the items they lack, haggling over the terms of exchange, and getting on the trail in time to arrive home before dark.

Finally, the peasant's day may be devoted to one of the many celebrations 565*
that constitute the brightest moments in his life. Huge feasts are held on the 527
occasion of weddings, christenings, and memorial anniversaries. Feasts and 796
special festive activities mark the various religious holidays. Indeed, apart [132]
from the alternation of the rainy season (June-September) and the long dry season, and the related alternation of planting and harvesting the different crops, it is the cycle of holidays and weddings that defines the pattern of the Abyssinian year. Yet even these holidays have a fundamentally serious tone. Apart from the feasting, they are chiefly times for the veneration of sacred symbols and the real or symbolic letting out of aggression.

The Yearly Cycle 565*

The new year falls on St. John's Day in September. For this occasion the 796
floor of the peasant's home is strewn with freshly cut grass, tall and green after

*565 hazardous. Moisture and chill lower the resistance of man and beast to re-
796 spiratory infections. The weekly fasting schedule is resumed, and the more
[164] devout observe the thirty-day fast of the Disciples. In August, finally, the
[785] sixteen-day fast in honor of the Assumption of Mary is observed by everyone
older than six or seven years.

*565 On the thirteenth day of that fast occurs the strange holiday of Buhē.
796 Before and during this day, which is marked by the baking of special *dābo* for
526 the shepherds, the countryside crackles with the reports of shepherds' whips.
In this season when the humid air lends an explosive sound, the shepherds crack their whips for fun; but older boys and men join in great whipping battles on Buhē,* in which two teams lash each other until the members of one can stand it no more. On the evenings of Buhē, small bonfires are lit all over the countryside, and more *dābo* is eaten and whips cracked.[5] A few days later the fast of the Assumption is over. Young and old look forward to the end of the rains and the festivities that commence with the new year.

*565 These are the days and years of the Amhara peasant. Some other aspects of his life that come to the fore when more analytic perspectives are applied will be discussed in later chapters. But this calendar of activities forms the immediately observable setting for the "inner world" of the Amhara peasantry: those ideas, sentiments, and values which constitute its outlook on life.

THE WORLD OF MEANING

*565 *The Natural Universe*

772 The Amhara peasant is not familiar with most of the cosmological notions
[538] found in the Great Tradition of Abyssinian culture, as transmitted through
books like *Qalamsis* and *Aksimareos* and the oral traditions of learned churchmen. It is unusual for him to have a precise image of the layers of water, fire, and air beneath the earth, and it is still less likely for him to be familiar with the complicated hierarchy of invisible worlds, watery skies, and seven "real" heavens which are enumerated in the Abyssinian cosmology. He
[821] believes that stars influence human affairs, but leaves the possession of astro-
[756] logical knowledge to the *dabtarā*. The presence of cultural specialists who
know about such matters has relieved him of the burden of dealing with ideas about the cosmos, ideas which are more widely diffused in more homogeneous societies.

The peasant's working conception of the cosmos is thus a very simplified version of that of his Great Tradition, together with certain pagan notions. Like his more learned countrymen, he divides the universe into two main parts: the world, *alam,* consisting of the earth, sun, moon, and stars; and

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• [178] * This custom is now extinct in many Amhara areas.

MODERNIZATION AND THE PEASANT

*565 121 At the beginning of this chapter we alluded to stereotyped views of the peasantry held by modern-educated Ethiopians who have no meaningful communication with them. It may be fruitful at this point to consider the relationship between the peasant's world and Ethiopia's quest for modernity in the form of a series of critical responses to these stereotypes.

Three views of the peasantry are of particular relevance. One sees the peasant as exploited, hence potentially progressive; one sees the peasant as uneducated, hence reactionary; and a third sees the peasant as traditionalist, hence irrelevant to Ethiopia's modernizing culture. In responding to these opinions we shall discuss, first, the peasant's conservatism; second, areas of the peasant's receptivity to change; and, finally, aspects of peasant culture which may have a positive value for Ethiopia in transition.

Peasant Conservatism

Those who eulogize the simple integrity of peasant life and regret the peasant's suppressed condition in a social order pejoratively termed "feudal" at times maintain that with a radical change of leadership in the government the peasantry would respond with renewed economic initiative and progressive orientation. Given leaders they can trust, it is argued, the Amhara peasants would support radical efforts to restructure their lives and would participate meaningfully in democratic political procedures designed to promote social change.

*565 121 • 178 181 This view overlooks the fact, which has impressed travelers of many centuries in Ethiopia, that the Abyssinian peasant clings to his traditional ways with unruffled tenacity. The flavor of his conservatism may be illustrated by the following conversation with an unusually open-minded peasant in Manz. The man was complaining about the dangers presented by a little stream between his home and the local church during the rainy season. "If you can't put up some kind of bridge," I suggested, "why do you not stretch a heavy rope across it so people can hold on to something and not be swept away?" "That is a good idea," he replied, "but we just do not do that sort of thing around here."

Such behavior has been explained by many observers, Ethiopians and foreigners alike, as due to simple laziness. No peasant can afford to be simply lazy, however. The roots of this inertia go deeper. They touch a number of fundamental features in Amhara peasant culture which orient the peasantry against the introduction of novelty.

*565 121 777 178 One of these is the concept of fate (*eddīl*) which the Amhara invoke to account for the ups and downs of their lives. *Eddīl* appears to signify the working of God's will insofar as it affects human purposes, and is to be re-

garded as more important than human effort in attaining one's goals. "If a 565*
man works hard, he may remain poor. If he does not work hard, he may 121
become wealthy. The outcome is due to fate." The peasant is discouraged 777
from determined efforts to make changes in his environment because of the 178
feeling that no matter what he does, God's disposition is what really counts.

In addition to feeling that innovation is ineffectual, the Amhara peasant 565*
tends to feel that it is immoral. Reverence for fathers and forefathers is, we 121
observed, a key element of the Amhara ethos. This patriarchal sentiment informs 178
the Amhara's defense not only of his land and his religion, but of the 181
procedures of daily living as well. It is not good to deviate from the familiar [577]
ways of doing things because they, too, have been handed down by "our [521]
fathers"; this is a phrase which interlards Amharic conversation.

A number of other, more specific, norms have had the effect of discouraging 565*
inventiveness among the Amhara. Experimentation with matter was inhibited 121
by the disdain for puttering about with one's hands—doing anything, 178
that is, similar to the activities of the socially dejected artisans and slaves. 461
Hence the peasant retains the same rudimentary tools for wresting a subsistence [183]
from nature that he has used for millennia, and searches about the
woods for a properly shaped piece of wood rather than improve his art of
carpentry.[16] Experimentation with ideas was inhibited by the anti-intellectual 565*
cast of Amhara culture, which discredits the pursuit of ideas for their own 121
sake. Ideas pertain either to the unchangeable mysteries, as expressed in the 178
religious literature, or to the unchanging verities of human experience, as expressed 181
in folk proverbs. Ideas are not entertained as "adventure," to use 828
Whitehead's term—as a source of novel possibilities in life, a guide rather
than a justification of custom.

Two factors are especially significant in accounting for the Amhara peasant's 565*
reluctance to use ideas drawn from experience and insight for the purpose 121
of reshaping custom. One is the fact that the primary medium for the 178
elaboration and dissemination of such ideas—the written word—was affected 181
by a number of restrictions in Amhara culture.[17]* As a consequence, although 212
writing has been known in Abyssinia for two millennia, it had almost never [828]

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* The act of writing was considered to be inherently shameful: like any manual activity other [461]
than farming and fighting, writing was regarded as degrading work, the business of scribes [554]
whose status was thereby not much higher than that of potters and metalsmiths. Only a small
percentage of the clergy learned to write, and those who did were rarely adept at it. The
products of writing, moreover, were deemed either too sacred or too nefarious to warrant giving
laymen easy access to their medium. Script belonged above all else to the realm of scripture. The
awe felt for holy writs was a deterrent against using that medium for other than devotional
purposes. The chief private use of writing was for the magic formulas of the *dabtarā*, another [756]
connection with the supernatural that discouraged its lay practice. The *dabtarā*'s art served [789]
injurious as well as beneficent purposes, and the fear that those who learned to write might
stumble onto potent phrases was reason for restricting that skill to a small group of the initiated.

*565 been employed as a medium for promulgating new ideas or discussing contemporary
121 problems. Another feature of Amhara culture that helps to account
• 178 for the mental inertia of the peasantry is its emphasis on the value of deference
181 and obedience to authority. The Amhara typically rely on legitimate
[212] authority figures to define appropriate responses to new situations, and regard
[577] the delegation of powers as a diminution of the status of such authorities.
The peasant has thus refrained from initiating changes in the public domain because the prerogative of taking initiative is generally reserved to ecclesiastical and political authorities.

*565 *Receptivity to Change*

121 Consideration of the peasant's readiness to follow the lead of legitimate
177 authorities already points to an inadequacy of the second stereotype we have
178 mentioned: that which sees the peasant as hopelessly ignorant and backward, hence intractable from the viewpoint of a program of modernization. For while the Amhara peasant is likely to resist the efforts of some unknown official from Addis Ababa to introduce change in his local environment, he does tend to follow the directives and imitate the example of the local authorities whom he knows and who shape the course of decisions and sanctions at the
[137] local level. Thus it is, for example, that the eucalyptus tree—imported by Emperor Menelik, taken to the provinces by nobles, and eventually planted by individual peasants—has come to dot the Amhara countryside. How quickly such change can take place is shown by the recent acceptance of photography in many provincial regions. In 1950, peasants in many Amhara areas strenuously objected to having their pictures taken, in part at least for fear of the camera as bearer of the evil eye. By 1960, visitors to some of these same areas were being deluged with requests for photographs. In the interim these peasants had been exposed to numerous photographs of the Emperor and high government officials and had observed their local authorities seizing every chance they could to be photographed.

Yet it is clear that the Amhara peasant will not imitate everything that is accepted by his traditional authorities. When a new custom strikes him as too outlandish his resistance can become adamant, as was abundantly demonstrated when the court of Susneyos carried out its ill-fated conversion to Catholicism. In analyzing the peasant's receptivity to change it is important to distinguish as independent variables: (1) the degree of acceptability of the *agents* of change, and (2) the extent to which the proposed change is congruent with traditional beliefs and values.

The whole question of the nature of peasant opposition and receptivity to modernizing programs may be discussed most realistically by focusing on
[744] a concrete area of attempted change. The material I have assembled is most
detailed for the case of public health, an area to which the government has

paid increased attention in recent years. A new phase of public health endeavor 565* 121 in this decade was marked by the imposition of a nationwide health 177 tax in 1960. 178 •

Health has become a prime objective in Ethiopia's modernization program 744 because of a growing realization that the wide prevalence of malaria, tuberculosis, [651] typhus, intestinal parasites, syphilis, trachoma, leprosy, and other diseases [764] continues to sap the vitality of the nation's productive forces and to visit misery on countless peasant families. The public health forces in Ethiopia (Ministry of Public Health, WHO mission, and AID Public Health Division) [648] have long understood that Ethiopia's health needs cannot be met by piecemeal therapy. They have undertaken a program of preventive measures by preparing public health teams in the medical college at Gondar. The college [874] trains health officers, community nurses, and sanitarians within a common framework, so that when they go into the field they will understand each other's tasks from the start. The first public health center employing such a team was opened in the late fifties; Ethiopia's Second Five-Year Plan envisions one such center for every fifty thousand people by 1967.

The objective of these public health workers is to transmit a number of instructions—concerning personal hygiene, environmental sanitation, early care for illness, and isolation of contagious diseases—which are at variance with customary beliefs and practices. Experience with comparable programs elsewhere suggests that the success of such health teams is by no means assured.[18] What are the forces working for and against the acceptance of these new instructions by the Amhara peasantry? Both negative and positive factors may be identified with respect to each of the three general categories previously referred to: the general outlook regarding change; attitudes toward the agents of change; and degree of compatibility between the new cultural items and the old.

The Amhara peasant's general resistance to change may be presumed operative 565* here as elsewhere, particularly since health practices are often associated 121 with religious beliefs and sentiments. Defense of indigenous therapies has in 177 fact become a significant channel for the expression of traditionalist sentiment, 178 a channel that has even been utilized on occasion in the Addis Ababa 75 newspapers.[19] And a general posture of resistance to changes in the field of health is supported by the interests of traditional practitioners, *dabtarä* and *ṭanquäy*, who are in danger of losing clientele if modern-trained health workers come to win their allegiance.

Counter to this conservative drag, on the other hand, is the peasant's powerful desire for one basic change in his life circumstances, namely, the reduction of morbidity and mortality. Despite his idyllic conception of paradise [761] and his frequent contention that life on earth is something of little value, the Amhara wants to avoid death. Even from the religious point of view he is

*565 motivated to live as long as possible: the monk wants to live longer in order
121 to get closer to God by prayer, and the worldly man wants to live long enough
177 to atone for his sins so that he may enter paradise. Health thus rates as one of
• 178 the most important values. The expressions for greeting and farewell stress
75 health. Most of the prayers and vows offered have to do with achieving health.
761 Long, painful pilgrimages are made for cures, and much money is spent for the remedies of native practitioners and for amulets to ward off illness. This powerful desire for health and life operates as a lever to overcome the resistance to change.

*565 Toward the bearers of new ideas designed to satisfy this desire for reduced
121 morbidity and mortality, however, the peasant's stance is suspicious and un-
177 sympathetic at the outset. He regards Ethiopians who have been educated by
829 Westerners as contaminated by alien norms and beliefs. They appear to him as Ethiopians, but also as strangers—as "black *faranj*"—with their European clothes and their unorthodox eating and smoking habits. He tends to distrust their motives, to suspect them of being out to take advantage of him in some way. And he resents their overt or implicit disparagement of his way of life, particularly his practices in so sensitive an area as sanitation.

*565 Against such obstacles one cultural factor that serves to present the health
121 worker as an acceptable agent of change is the Amhara peasant's deference to
177 the man of learning. The public health worker is in a position to inherit some
177 of the awe felt for the learned *dabtarā*, especially since the health teams
744 operate out of centers which provide therapy as well as instruction, which
(554) gives them the benefit of association with the quasi-magical powers attributed to one who performs successful treatment. In addition, he can be aided by the Amhara peasant's personal devotion to someone who has helped him and won his confidence. Whether this devotion can be stimulated depends, in the last analysis, on the character and resourcefulness of the public health workers themselves. Those who are able to communicate in a dignified manner with the peasants, who avoid dealing with them as an inferior and backward people, who refrain from flaunting the most important local norms, and who are on good terms with local authorities and respected men, have a substantial chance of being accepted after an initial period of suspicion and alienation. Thus it was that a Gojjami peasant, asked why some of the local people were hearkening to the advice of the public health team at Dabra Marqos, explained: "We have come to realize that what you tell us to do is for our own advantage, not yours." Elsewhere in Gojjam, a similar response was the eventual issue of a more pronounced initial rejection of public health workers. In the village of Dajan doors were closed against a venereal disease team which was taking blood samples of the entire population for Kahn test analysis. Popular suspicion was voiced in a number of ways; the health workers were accused of selling blood, of being missionaries, and of otherwise trying

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The Emerging Adolescent

While it is clear, as we have argued thus far, that a modernizing society 121
stands to benefit from retaining or redefining many aspects of its traditional
culture, it is also clear that in certain areas discontinuity is indispensable if
significant change is to be brought about. Just what these areas are is something
which presumably varies from nation to nation, though cross-cultural
regularities may perhaps be uncovered in the course of further research. In the 121
case of Ethiopia's incipient modernization, at least two subsystems of the 178
traditional social system of the ruling Amhara have already undergone some 86
sort of structural change: that of "secondary socialization," the complex of 554
processes whereby skills and values necessary for adult life are imparted to
adolescents; and that of the stratification system—the complex of arrangements
whereby status is allocated to members of a society in accord with the
various values upheld by the society.

An important precondition for the changes which have taken place in both 121
of these areas was the establishment of a permanent capital: Addis Ababa, 178
founded by Menelik in 1887[1] and now home for nearly half a million Ethiopians. 177
Menelik's institution of the first government school in Addis Ababa in 633
1908 marked the beginning of a slow but steady process of introducing some (871)
of Ethiopia's youth to the novel skills and norms of modern Western culture.
The concentration of power in Addis Ababa through the reign of Haile 121
Selassie has diminished the status of the traditional Amhara elites and brought 178
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554 to the fore men whose prestige and influence rest to some extent on new
633 criteria. In this chapter and the one which follows, these two areas of struc-
121 tural change will be examined with respect to their continuity and discon-
128 tinuity with the Abyssinian past.

882 In Amhara culture, adolescence scarcely exists as a concept, let alone as a problem. While there are Amharic words which signify "young person," there is no word in Amharic that specifically denotes a *transitional* stage between childhood and adulthood. The goals of a stage of transition to adult status, which to us have become problematic—continuity of the social order and crystallization of personal identity—are customarily attained among the Amhara as a matter of course.

178 In Ethiopia's modernizing sector, however, society and the individual have
882 been affected by numerous changes all at once. Adult standards have become confused; available roles have multiplied beyond comprehension; new agents and techniques of secondary socialization have supplemented the old. Overnight, adolescence has become both a category and a challenge.

COMING OF AGE IN ABYSSINIA

121 In according the individual recognition as an adult, society tends to bring
881 some of its most powerful and explicit integrative forces to bear upon him. In many societies the transition to adulthood is accomplished in part by means of some formal ceremony in which the society corners the young person and puts its stamp upon him. Whether by way of earlobe piercing or ritual whipping, confirmation or graduation, the adolescent generally undergoes some rite which marks his coming of age and obliges him to fulfil himself as an acceptable member of adult society. In some societies, the rites are so devised that they literally represent the "death" of the child and his symbolic resurrection in a new, adult status.[2]

881 Such transition rites are conspicuously absent from Amhara culture. Quite the contrary: as a young Amhara approaches puberty he is unobtrusively withdrawn from participation in his culture's most solemn ritual, celebration of the Eucharist. Girls of about twelve and boys about fourteen, if they ask for Communion, are simply refused by the priests and told to go away. Thenceforth, until they marry in the church or, if they marry civilly, until their dying hour, they are not permitted to partake of the Holy Sacrament. The only exception to this rule is in the case of some deacons, who earn the right to continued participation in the Mass at the expense of remaining celibate until marriage (a price not always paid in practice).

*883 Another way in which societies tend to mediate the transition to adulthood
561 is through the institution of adolescent peer groups which in various ways help the young person prepare for adult status. Such groups have taken a wide variety of forms. There have been, for example, the several types of age sets in African age-graded societies; mystic orders for youths attached to

a different identity. Religion and warfare were the two spheres most likely to 156
attract him. Although trade and manual arts were possibilities for those whose 554
industry exceeded their status-consciousness, they were considered the business 463
of other ethnic groups and normally rejected by a self-respecting Amhara. [461]
When the Amhara youth left home for a new life, he was usually heading either for the school of some church teacher or the quarters of some chieftain.

Today, as in former times, the role of priest is known from childhood as 793
a possible model for the peasant boy. He and his companions often imitate 554
the clergy and their ceremonies in their play. The wish to become a priest 156
is kindled by a number of interests—desire for the material benefits accorded [178] •
the clergy; curiosity about the mysteries of the church; envy of the great prestige of the clergy; hope for a better chance of going to heaven after death.
During adolescence the outlook of the boy who seeks to become a priest [883]*
deviates from that of the *goramsā* described above. Instead of the shrill, blood-heating *shĭllala* war chants he prefers the gentle hymns of the church; instead of the frenzied dancing and singing of the young braves he prefers the schooled dance of the clergy; instead of pursuing women, he is inclined to turn his head the other way when a girl appears.

The military alternative does not seem to be an ideal of Amhara children. 701
They rarely see soldiers; and when they did in former times, it was usually 156
in the unhappy circumstance of seeing the family's reserves plundered. It is 554
not until the time of puberty and after that the great upsurge of aggressive instinct has turned the thoughts of many an Amhara youth to fighting. Chafing under parental domination or bristling with resentment because of being an illegitimate offspring or a stepchild, he may be anxious to turn his hostility against some enemy. He may imagine the free life of a soldier more attractive than the drudgery of the peasant's lot. In the days of feudal armies, he may have heard news about some warlord on the rise and thus have hopes, by attaching himself as a follower, of winning booty and the laurels of a hero, perhaps eventually the powers of a chieftain.

Whether the peasant boy chooses church school or the warpath, his move 565
has frequently been an all-or-none move. The peasant boy can do nothing 593
without the consent of his father, and normally his father will not permit him 463
to do anything except carry on the farmwork and prepare himself to care for 156
his parents in their old age and to inherit the family land. If there should be some sign that the son does not want to continue in his father's footsteps, the latter will do everything he can short of disinheritance—and ofttimes that—to persuade him otherwise.

And so, some restless day, eyes fixed on some alluring goal, the Amhara youth might run away and not be seen again. If he should return, it would

565 be many years later, as a learned priest or *dabtarā* or as a successful warrior or
593 official, and some sort of reconciliation might be effected with his family. In
463 either case, from a sociological viewpoint, the rebellious youth is merely pre-
156 paring himself to take over one of the more specialized functions on which
[181] the wider social order depends. His break with his parents does not signify a revolt against society, but, if anything, a closer attachment to society through more intimate alliance with its highest values, religion and warfare.

Thus there has always been some room for the attainment of a new social identity in Abyssinia. Although the rigidity of paternal authority often meant that it must be attained through rebellion, the adolescent could eat his cake of defiance and still have his cake of loyalty; and the social system was well served thereby.

ADOLESCENCE IN CHANGING ETHIOPIA

882 The foregoing description of adolescence still obtains for the vast majority of
184 Amhara youth today. Side by side with this traditional pattern of "growing
871 up on the farm," however, a quite different pattern of childhood and adoles-
• 178 cence has been developing in Addis Ababa and in some of the provincial capitals. This new pattern follows the course of experience provided by participation in the government school system. It has radically interrupted the traditional rhythm of growing up and has posed more integrative problems than it has yet been able to solve.

871 *The Welfare School*

175 Public education in Ethiopia prior to the Italian invasion represented a small but significant trickle of activity alongside the mainstream of traditional institutions. Perhaps some six to seven hundred boys and girls received the beginnings of a modern education in the government schools of Addis
[199] Ababa by 1935.[9] Many others received some elementary education in government provincial schools and in schools operated by foreign religious missions, though the latter never played as significant a role in Ethiopia as they did in colonial Africa.

[648] During the occupation, Ethiopians were prevented from acquiring anything higher than elementary education, but the Italians did construct a number of school buildings for their own nationals which facilitated the growth of the Ethiopian school system after 1941. By 1944 there were some 25,000 pupils enrolled in government schools, a figure which rose to 60,000 by 1950 and reached 234,000 in 1963.[10]

872 The base of the Ethiopian educational program has been an eight-year elementary curriculum, the first four years being taught in Amharic and the

second four in English, although Ethiopian teachers often continue to teach 872
in Amharic in the latter years.[*] This standard curriculum is supposed to be
followed by all schools in the country—church, mission, and private schools,
as well as those staffed by the government. In practice, a scarcity of teachers
and materials in the provincial schools means that the curriculum is followed
less closely there than in Addis Ababa. (The exceptional case of Asmara,
capital of Eritrea which federated with Ethiopia in 1952 after sixty-two years
under Italian administration, will not be considered here.) This elementary
program culminates with a general examination that covers the five main
fields of Amharic, English, mathematics, science, and social studies. Successful
completion of this exam has been required for virtually every type of
training beyond the elementary level.

At the secondary level, by contrast, the Ethiopian student faces a bewilder- 873
ing array of educational programs. As listed in the flow chart of the Ministry 874
of Education, they include theological secondary, academic secondary, elementary
teacher training, handicraft teacher training, commercial school,
technical school, agricultural secondary school, nurses training, community
nurses training, sanitarians, naval cadet training, air cadet training, civil aviation,
and inservice technical training. Admission of students to these schools
is the responsibility of the individual directors, who take into account the
students' own preferences when feasible.

A similar procedure obtains at the college level, for which successful completion of the secondary school-leaving examination has in most cases been mandatory. During the 1950's a number of schools were opened at the post-secondary level: the Arts and Science Faculties of the University College of Addis Ababa, the Agricultural College, the Engineering College, the Public Health College, the Building College, and the National Defense Colleges. Some of these have now been combined into a single institution, the Haile Selassie I University.

For students who have gone as far as the upper grades of elementary 883*
school, the desire to get into one of the secondary level schools—no matter 872
which one—has usually become the uppermost concern in their lives. They 873
have become obsessively aware of the "value" (*tiqem*) of further schooling,
namely, as the surest way to a job that pays well. Perhaps they have become
fired with idealism to help advance their country and hope to gain some
special competence that will enable them to do so. Until 1962, moreover, the
rewards of being a secondary school student included material fringe benefits
that gave many a powerful motive for prolonging their education. Above all, [178]

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[*] In 1963–64 the system was changed to one with six years of elementary education followed by two years of junior secondary education.

*883 872 873 • 178 they have come too far along the road of modernity to return to what they regard as the hard and thankless lot of the traditional adolescent, and so are forced to find some place in the modernizing sector of society. Since Ethiopia's modernizing sector has so far provided only the secondary school system as a means of integrating its youth, the eighth-grade examination certificate constitutes a ticket to the future which must be obtained at all costs.

*883 873 At the same time that this examination was acquiring its momentous significance in the lives of Ethiopia's youth, the proportion of students who passed it was becoming progressively smaller. By 1959, efforts by Ministry of Education officials to raise academic standards and to adjust the number of eligible students to the number of openings in secondary schools resulted in the failing of some sixty per cent of those who took the examination, a situation which provoked nearly riotous protests by students in Addis Ababa.[11]

Such conditions have laden the eighth-grade examination with more awesomeness and terror than a puberty rite. Worries about the exam preoccupy most seventh and eighth graders, and their anxiety is compounded by the attitudes of their school directors, for whom the proportion of passing students has tended to become the primary index of success. The weeks before the exam are filled with frantic cramming on the part of teachers as well as students. It is no wonder that such pressures have on occasion led students to purchase actual or alleged copies of the exam in advance from ministry employees or their go-betweens, an offense which has been sternly dealt with by the ministry.

*883 882 873 178 Those students who do not pass the eighth-grade exam or who, because of family pressures, low ability, or other reasons, leave school before completing the eighth grade, move to the margin of Ethiopian society. If attendance at a secondary school or beyond may be taken as the defining characteristic of a "modern adolescent" in Ethiopia, since that signifies their participation in the one institutionalized pattern of secondary socialization in the modern sector, these young people are neither traditional adolescents nor fully modern, but fall in an interstitial category. Having caught a glimpse of some brave new world in their early schooling, they find themselves cast adrift, in the prime of their adolescence, in a no-man's region between traditional society and the promised land. In some cases they manage to make a rapid adjustment; more often, only their youthful energy saves them from total despair.

*883 882 178 These marginal adolescents normally drift to Addis Ababa, if they are not already there, and lead the most precarious sorts of lives. They live as loiterers on the streets and byways of the capital. They go from school to school, begging for a place; or from office to office, looking for some sort of work, which they are unlikely to find if they do not have a relative in an influential position. It is so hard to find employment without at least an eighth-grade certifi-

cate that boys sometimes borrow the certificates of more successful friends 883*
and enter jobs under those assumed names. Often they live for many months 882
with no livelihood at all. Eventually, some find work as houseboys, shine 178 •
shoes, or peddle merchandise on the streets; others, on an impulse, sign up for [464]
life in one of the military services. Still others are reduced to begging, or stealing, or concocting stories with which to extract help from sympathetic foreigners.

The lives of such boys, whose number is large and steadily growing, are among the chief casualties of Ethiopia's transition to date. As they increase, their misery will become more vocal, and they may constitute an element of political unrest. Whether or not they become a political problem, they are already a social problem.

The modern adolescents, by contrast, comprise a small and determinate 883*
number.* In 1958–59, the year in which my research on them began, there 178
were all together about 3,900 students in the academic secondary schools, 873
3,350 in other special schools at the secondary level, and 760 students at the
post-secondary level. One source of information on these students was a [125]
questionnaire which was completed by 700 students: 500 at the secondary
level, including 40 female students, in a total of 15 schools, and 200 male students in five colleges.[12] Some of the findings from this survey will be woven into the following text where appropriate.

Compared to the rest of their countrymen, and certainly those of the same age, the modern adolescents have lived in luxury. Most students at the secondary level, and all those at the college level, have been boarding students. At no cost to themselves or their parents, they have received full board and
room, a token allotment of clothes, and their books. Day students have re- [434]
ceived instead a monthly allowance of Eth$20,† approximately the same
amount that unskilled laborers earn for full-time work. Tuition is also free for all full-time Ethiopian students at all levels.

These "welfare school" conditions were designed to make further education attractive and possible for Ethiopian students, nearly all of whose families either can not or are unwilling to support their children for many years in school. In this, the parents are following long established Amhara custom, for in the traditional society boys who went off to church schools often did so, as we have seen, without the support of their parents, and in any case were expected to gain their livelihood by begging. Nowadays, if their children are admitted to one of the government secondary schools, even tradition-minded

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* And one that grows steadily. In 1958 there were twenty-eight government secondary schools in the empire. By 1964 the number had increased to forty-seven.

† One Ethiopian dollar is equal to (U.S.) forty cents. [436]

*883 parents who may have objected to their children's spending so many years in
• 178 elementary school are not a little proud to have them in so prestigious an
873 institution, and are delighted to have them so well financed by the Ministry of Education.

*883 Needless to say, the students who make the grade into one of the secondary
873 schools are jubilant. The relative hardship of their elementary years gives way to an easy and stimulating life. For those who grew up in provincial schools, the move to Addis Ababa has been an especially exciting prospect—so much so that when secondary schools were newly established in some of the provincial capitals in the late 1950's, a number of students who were supposed to attend them preferred to stop their education instead.[18]

*883 The pattern of adolescence embodied in the government schools differs
882 from that in traditional Amhara society in two fundamental respects. In the
178 traditional pattern, adolescence is a time when the Amhara are subjected to the strictest controls by their parents. At the same time, they are expected to prepare for independence by assuming increasing amounts of responsibility. In the modern pattern, the welfare school has the effect of removing the student as far as possible from parental controls. At the same time, it puts him in a more passive and irresponsible role than ever. He is given virtually everything he needs and obliged to do nothing in return. He is asked only to prepare himself to serve his country well later on. This obligation is in fact firmly implanted in the minds of many students, who acquire the sense of a personal debt to the government which they want to repay in later years. Ethiopian society is not yet organized, however, in a way that will bring such motives to realistic expression. During and after his school experience, little opportunity is provided for the student to mature out of an essentially passive, receptive, dependent posture. Critical of this state of affairs, one Ethiopian college student was moved to declare in an oratorical contest: "Ethiopian students are like college students the world over, with two differences—they get everything free, and their selfishness is pushed to frightening exaggeration."

Be that as it may, modern adolescence in Ethiopia does provide the essential minimal conditions for fulfilling its function. It is a moratorium for the young, in which relative freedom from traditional controls and a relatively carefree existence facilitate the acquisition of habits, beliefs, and values which their fathers never knew.*

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[873] * The above description applies only until 1961–62, after which secondary students no longer received room and board or stipends and Addis Ababa College students were no longer housed in dormitories. Some implications of this change are considered in the concluding section of this chapter.

New Agents of Socialization

In Amhara society, as we have seen, the agents of primary socialization— 86
parents and older relatives—likewise prepare the young person for adulthood, 178
by teaching him work skills, arranging his marriage, and conditioning him to
the mores of adult society. In changing Ethiopia, these traditional managers
of adolescence are unable to impart the skills and values needed for a modern
life. Their role as agents of secondary socialization is taken for the most part [87]
by teachers and peers in the government schools.

Schools at the post-elementary levels in Ethiopia have been staffed mainly 875
by teachers brought under contract from foreign countries—chiefly Canada, 177
England, India, Sweden, and the United States. Together with a growing 873
number of Ethiopians who have studied abroad, and some graduates of Ethiopian colleges, these teachers have been the principal medium through which Ethiopian adolescents have been exposed to Western culture, not only by teaching subjects like science and English literature, and skills like drafting and stenography, but also by imparting attitudes and values important for Ethiopia's modernization.

High among these new values is that of rewarding an individual solely on 177
the basis of performance. Although the long arm of "connections" has 178
occasionally reached into the school system, to save, for example, the relative 557
of some dignitary from dismissal despite substandard performance, the day-to- 555
day operation of school life follows general standards which are applied with- 829
out regard to family connections, class position, or tribal and religious affilia- 883*
tions.[*] The degree to which the students have accepted the sovereignty of uni- 87
versal norms is reflected in their response to the question: "In general, what will help you most to get ahead, ability or 'pull' (that is, personal contacts or influence, through family or friends)?" Nine-tenths of the students at both secondary and college levels expressed the belief that ability would help them more to get ahead.

Another modern value promoted by the school staffs is that of Ethiopian 873
nationalism. In the elementary schools outside of Addis Ababa, pupils tend to 177
associate chiefly with members of their own tribe and religion. In the post- 178
elementary schools, they inevitably have considerable intercourse with mem- 186
bers of other groups. On the basis of our sample, the ethnic composition of 883*
the post-elementary schools may be estimated as in Table 2. This ethnic [872]
pluralism would seem at first to intensify particularistic sentiments among

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 115]

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[*] This reflects deliberate government policy. Before the occupation, sons of noblemen were segregated at Tafari Makonnen School and received preferential treatment. After the liberation, the Emperor not only discontinued this policy but took pains to eliminate favoritism in the schools to a large degree.

the students. Rivalries and hostilities tend to get channeled along these lines, 883*
particularly along the Amhara-Tigre axis, and petty fights have erupted from 873
time to time among groups of students so divided. The Amhara students, 177
moreover, tend to interpret their numerical majority in school as self-evident 178
justification of their political superiority in the country, an interpretation sul- 186
lenly rejected by non-Amhara students who tend to be more aware of the Amhara's much smaller percentage of the national population. However, the students are regarded by their teachers, not as members of tribes, but as Ethiopians. The school authorities thus act as a countervailing force in behalf of national symbols, and their effect is considerable.[14] While entering students naturally tend to identify in the first instance with their tribes, sixty per cent of the secondary school seniors and seventy-five per cent of the college students questioned about political identifications indicated that they considered themselves Ethiopians before they considered themselves members of tribes.

The teachers also provide practical information of various sorts to assist the 883*
acculturation of their charges. They teach the etiquette of modernity, includ- 875
ing the importance of punctuality and the keeping of promises. The objects 177
and events in their own lives quietly demonstrate to the students much about 178
modern Western culture, while their use of English in and out of class accus- [976]
toms the students to the use of their country's official European language.
Thus, besides promoting respect for impersonal standards and the sense of
Ethiopian nationalism, the teachers fulfill a third extracurricular function of [554]
some importance: that of making the schools a vehicle for social mobility, a [871]
place to acquire that minimum of European habits which is essential for attaining high status in a modernizing society.

The total accomplishment of the teachers, however, falls short of giving the 883*
modern adolescents a coherent orientation to life. The cultural lessons they 871
transmit are neither consistent among the various schools nor closely related 177
to the situation of changing Ethiopia. The organization of education, as of everything else in Ethiopia, reflects the abiding anxiety of the government about permitting any one foreign nation to gain a monopoly in any sphere of activity. Each secondary school and college has heretofore been virtually autonomous, pursuing those policies and teaching those lessons which best fit its point of view, a point of view now guided by British culture, now by American, now by Swedish, now by French, now by Jesuit. As Margery Perham long since observed, this created a situation in which Ethiopian students have gotten "fragments from the experience and ideals of each [nation] without getting the fullest and best influence from any one national tradition."[15]

Another shortcoming of the educational program has been the relative 871
paucity of materials relating to Ethiopian realities. As one Ethiopian educator has written: "School children are at times more familiar with the history of

871 Rome and the life of Abraham Lincoln than with the geography of their immediate community or the history of their own native country."[16] While a certain amount of concentration on remote matters may be essential for introducing modern adolescents to the substance and background of modern culture, it is doubtful whether they are being prepared to relate meaningfully to the society of their adulthood if that society is not made a subject for careful consideration during their schooldays.

875 829 191 Still another limitation on the effectiveness of the teachers stems from a quite different problem, the Ethiopian's ambivalence toward foreigners. This will be overcome with the gradual Ethiopianization of the teaching force, but that cannot be achieved for at least another generation. One area in which this [873] problem manifests itself is linguistic nationalism. English, the official language of all post-elementary instruction, is still regarded as an outsider's tongue in Ethiopia, unlike other African countries where the European language in question serves the native peoples as a *lingua franca;* and many Ethiopians hope that the day will come when it will be replaced by Amharic as the medium of instruction.[17] Due to their ignorance of Amharic or other Ethiopian languages, foreign teachers are rarely able to gain the sort of closeness to their students that promotes the more profoundly beneficial sort of relationship. Because of this and a tradition of suspiciousness regarding foreigners, all but the radically Westernized students maintain a lingering mistrust of the teacher *qua* foreigner.

*883 • 178 The gaps in the socialization of the modern adolescent left by the nature of his teachers and their teaching are filled to some extent by his peers. In this respect, too, modern adolescence contrasts with the traditional pattern: not only has the role of mentor and model been taken over by foreign teachers in place of the parents, but also the modern adolescent has become dependent on his peers to a degree unthinkable in traditional Amhara society.

It has been natural that the modern adolescent turn to those his own age for moral support. However much they may support the idea of his going to school as a means to a higher salary, his parents have little understanding of the new directions inherent in modern education. His foreign teachers are, at worst, preoccupied with their own narrow interests or else, at best, out of tune with the Ethiopian ethos and mentality. Older modernized Ethiopians, who should be the most sympathetic, are usually too preoccupied with their own adjustment problems to pay much attention. His schoolmates thus become his only reliable allies in the battle of growing up.

[561] [573] [572] Association with age-mates is informal for the most part. There have been almost no formal youth associations or clubs in Ethiopia. The teen-age gang, with its sharp boundaries and tight controls, has scarcely come into being. Relations with peers thus takes the form of small groups of friends. More

than half the secondary students questioned, and well over a third of the college 883*
students, stated that the number of their friends was only one, two, three, 178 •
or four. 572

Almost all the students indicated that they prefer close, intimate, and enduring friendships to casual, impersonal, and frequently changing relationships. There is thus something of the traditional *goramsā*'s companion about these relations, in that these boys define their friends as confidants, as individuals with whom they can disclose "secrets" and discuss personal problems. But the modern relationship is much broader, for it also includes such activities as studying together; going on walks; playing athletic games; going to the movies; visiting the brothels; talking about education, life, and the future; seeing the sights around town.

The great sociological significance of these small clusters of companions, or 883*
bāl̄injarā as they are called, is that they play a crucial part in mediating the 178
transition from a childhood that is essentially traditional, despite exposure to 572
certain modern subjects in school, to an adulthood that will be lived essentially 182
in the modern sector. At the same time that they help the newcomer adjust to each local school community, they are helping him adjust to the broader subculture of modernizing Ethiopia—explaining the strange things and ideas he encounters; correcting his behavior, for example, by showing the proper use of silverware at the table; and refining his language, when necessary, from that of the rustic to that of the urbanite. Their creative function is no less important. Through countless conversations, some idle and some intense, they work to interpret and integrate stimuli coming from many sources—from movies; magazines; the example of Europeans living in Ethiopia; the behavior of government officials, as well as from their teachers—and thus form a sort of buffer between the lone adolescent and the various authoritative influences in his life.

Despite the radical changes in the position of the Amhara adolescents described 883*
above—their complete dependence on the government school system, 178
their tutelage under foreign instructors, and their great reliance on age-mates 593
—the traditional pattern of adolescent submission to parental authority still runs strong. Even though most students live as boarders or in rented quarters, they maintain contact with their parents on occasional visits or at vacation time. However far removed, they remain deeply attached to their families and sensitive to the wishes of their parents. How to acquire money to send to their families is often a dominant concern in their lives. Though in most cases the parents can not provide meaningful orientation regarding adjustment to changing conditions in Ethiopia, they do give advice about how their children should behave and try to keep them faithful to traditional norms. The fact

*883 that parents still wield considerable moral influence over the modern adolescents,
178 more so even than their peers, is shown by the figures in Table 3.

593 This persistence of parental influence keeps the Ethiopian adolescent anchored in his traditional culture and accounts in part for a noticeable conservatism among Ethiopian students generally. With respect to such matters as morality, etiquette, family solidarity, and religion, students are strongly inclined to follow their parents' precepts.

While this deep-grained attachment to their parents gives the modern adolescents a sense of stability and security, it is also responsible for considerable
*883
178 strain in their lives. For there are few families—less than three per cent
593 of our sample—in which the students do not remark some significant area of
[561] disagreement between their parents and themselves. The modest steps toward
modernity that Ethiopia has taken have already kindled a smoldering conflict
121 between generations, perhaps for the first time in Ethiopian history. It is
128 against that background of conflict that we now examine the condition in
182 changing Ethiopia of the three main sociological functions of adolescence:
882 preparation for adult work roles, preparation for marriage roles, and integration
into the adult intellectual and moral order.

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TABLE 3

RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF PARENTS AND FRIENDS ON STUDENTS

Extent to Which Students Say They Follow Advice	Secondary School		College Males (per cent)
	Males (per cent)	Females (per cent)	
Of parents:			
Always	46	35	17
Usually	43	60	65
Not often	11	5	18
Of friends:			
Always	19	8	8
Usually	47	61	53
Not often	34	31	39
Number	(396)	(40)	(197)

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Preparation for Work

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182 The most conspicuous function of the secondary schools and colleges in
Ethiopia is to train young people for careers unknown in their traditional

society: to create engineers and mechanics, doctors and nurses, economists and 873
educators. With regard to the familiar occupations of the old order, the 463
schools' task is to engender a new breed of practitioner—farmers versed in 182
modern methods of agriculture, soldiers disciplined and geared to modern techniques, clergy cognizant of ecumenical Christianity, clerks who can type and take shorthand, and government officials with some modern education.

What is most revolutionary is that the schools introduce not only new subject matters for careers, but the very notion of vocation itself—of life work as

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TABLE 4

SOURCES OF FUTURE SATISFACTION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY STUDENTS*

Source from Which Students Expect Most Satisfaction in Life	Secondary School				College Males (per cent)	
	Males (per cent)		Females (per cent)			
	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice
Career or occupation	34	12	30	9	44	17
Improvement of local community	30	27	16	36	22	28
Religious beliefs and activities	13	20	16	21	5	7
Participation in national and international affairs	10	24	13	20	8	26
Family relationships	8	10	20	9	17	14
Leisure-time, recreational activities	5	7	5	5	3	8
Number	(394)		(40)		(195)	

* Based on question 27 in the Gillespie-Allport questionnaire.

something which one *chooses,* trains for in a specific manner, and derives 873 463
satisfaction from pursuing.* This orientation departs radically from the tradi- 182
tional expectation of inheriting the work of one's father as a matter of course. 463
Whereas, as we have noted, the Amhara son traditionally carried on his 178 •
father's work, except in rare cases where there were special reasons for not 593
doing so, only *seven per cent* of the boys in my sample indicated that

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* When asked what they expected to give most satisfaction in their lives, the students most frequently named "career or occupation" (out of six alternatives). When asked what they considered most desirable in choosing an occupation, they named "work that is really interesting" most frequently (out of six alternatives). See Tables 4 and 5. [829]

463 they expected to enter the same occupation as their fathers. This figure is
178 much smaller than that obtained from a cross-cultural study of youth by
593 James Gillespie and Gordon Allport, who found that "approximately a third of the male students in all our samples [a total of 1,168, drawn from the United States, New Zealand, South Africa, Egypt, Mexico, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and Israel] expect to enter the same occupations as their fathers, or ones closely related."[18] In part, the Ethiopian figure simply reflects the preparation for types of work which did not exist for previous generations.

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463 TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONAL CONDITIONS MOST DESIRED BY STUDENTS

Conditions Which Students Consider Most Desirable in Choosing Future Occupations	Secondary School				College Males (per cent)	
	Males (per cent)		Females (per cent)			
	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice	1st choice	2d choice
Interesting work	56	24	63	17	63	18
Job security	19	26	23	11	14	31
Chance to acquire much money	12	11	3	11	10	16
Prestige	7	9	8	17	7	5
Pleasant work companions	4	26	3	30	3	27
Good boss	2	4	0	14	3	3
Number	(325)		(40)		(113)	

463 But since it also represents numerous cases where the boy's occupational
178 interest is a traditional one—where, in other words, one finds sons of soldiers
593 and government officials planning to become farmers, sons of farmers planning to be teachers, and sons of priests and teachers planning to be soldiers and administrators—this figure may be interpreted as indicative of a very general rejection of parental influence with respect to occupational choice.

Parents of the modern adolescents are unhappy about this diminution of their traditional authority, especially so when their children opt for some of the more "outlandish" modern occupations. Their disapproval sometimes takes the form of urging their children to quit school and get married. Often it is expressed in the form of direct criticism of the occupation in question. Nearly two-fifths of the secondary school males questioned about this indicated that their parents did not approve of the occupation they wished to enter. As

might be expected, the incidence of disapproval was highest among the stu- 463
dents of the Gondar secondary school (fifty-eight per cent), whose parents 178 •
are presumably more traditionalist than those of the Addis Ababa boys, and 593
the students of the technical school (fifty-six per cent), whose occupational
interests, involving manual labor and technical skills, are felt to resemble
those artisan pursuits traditionally disesteemed by the Amhara.

Time is on the side of the students. As Ethiopia develops and education 463
spreads, the advantages of prolonged training and modern occupations will 871
become increasingly apparent to the parents. For some time to come, however, 178
their resentment of the dependence of youth on foreigners and Western- 177
educated Ethiopians for occupational guidance will continue to generate social
tensions and impede the socialization process.

The harmonious pattern of preparation for adult work roles found in tradi- 883*
tional Amhara society has been further disrupted under the new school system 178
at at least two points: the point at which occupational commitments are made, 463
and the point of entry into the work force. 87

The modern adolescent is supposed to choose which of several kinds of schools, representing a variety of vocational commitments, he wishes to enter upon successful completion of the eighth-grade exam. Quite often his choice is dictated by wholly irrelevant factors. For example, it may be made on the basis of which of the available schools promises the best standard of living.[10] Or it may be made for him by the school system, for one finds cases where the student's preferences are disregarded and he is placed in whatever school and vocational program happens to be able to accommodate him.

Even when the student's choice is relatively free from such extraneous determinants, however, it is usually difficult for him to make a meaningful decision. Eight grades of a rudimentary curriculum is hardly an adequate basis for choosing from a variety of unfamiliar vocations. So it is "fate" that guides most youngsters into one or another of the secondary school programs. The problem of choice recurs, for a much smaller number, when commitments are again required for entrance into the colleges. At this point meaningful decisions are often made, but perhaps more often they are spun from a skein of bewilderment. One secondary school graduate summed up the situation by saying, "Foreigners frequently ask young educated Ethiopians, 'What do you want to become?' How do we know? This whole business of *choosing* is entirely new to us, and we know very little about the alternatives that we have now. It is all very confusing."

So far the modernizing sector has provided little, beyond vocational pamphlets in the school libraries and an occasional school debate on the respective values of different occupations, to help orient the students on these matters.

883 463 873 Programs of vocational guidance and counseling have not yet been instituted. Students who manage to form clear and definite ambitions also suffer for want of help, if for some reason they have been shunted away from the appropriate training program, or have been deprived of opportunities to prepare adequately for the vocations to which they aspire. Two research findings bear on this. In one study it was found that "few secondary school administrators when questioned are aware of the ambitions and desires of their students," and that less than twenty per cent of the group of secondary school students surveyed felt they had received training "suitable to their ambitions."[20] In my own survey it appeared that fewer than twenty per cent of the secondary school students expect to enter the occupation they actually want to.

*883 178 464 In addition to this discontinuity between childhood experience and the hitherto unknown necessity of making some sort of vocational choice, modern adolescence also involves a sharp break between the experience of post-elementary school and the process of getting on a payroll. Here the Ethiopian youth faces the problems of students everywhere as they leave school for the "real world." In at least two respects, however, his dilemma is more acute than that 557 of his counterpart in Western societies. Because virtually all jobs are controlled by the government, and because the government is still organized along traditional lines, the Ethiopian graduate must suddenly forget the universalistic criteria of school and acclimate himself to the traditional pattern of ingratiating oneself with those in positions of power—a pattern referred to as *daj ţenät*—if he is to gain and retain a decent job. For many graduates there is no machinery that might assist them in locating a job: no job advertisements, employment bureaus, not even effective personnel departments in most quarters.

87 464 The school system itself, however, does manage in certain cases to find jobs for its graduates. For the foreign-educated returnees a special placement board was set up within the Ministry of Education. The locally educated are placed, if at all, by their individual schools, depending on the policy of the school, the resourcefulness of its director, the demands of the market, and current political emphases.

The outlook for graduates of the various specialized vocational programs has been in recent years as follows. A consistently high demand for teachers has assured jobs for graduates of the various teachers training programs. Graduates of the commercial school have been in great demand because of the increasing bureaucratization of government and the slight expansion of commerce. The public health college had great difficulty in the placement of its

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* Since this was written the University's Department of Education has begun to produce a series of career pamphlets for secondary school students.

graduates in the late fifties, but the government's implementation of a pro- 87
gram of public health centers has opened up increasing opportunities for their 464
employment. Graduates of the school of social work have been placed in positions with little difficulty.

On the other hand, in those areas in which the government has shown little or no interest the school authorities have been hard put to find employment for their graduates. This was shown most dramatically in the case of the [illegible]w defunct community development training project at Majete, whose grad[illegible]s were allowed to drift into oblivion due to the absence of an effective [illegible]munity development program in the country. Those who have completed courses of study in agriculture have not been extensively employed by the government because of chronic disorganization and neglect in the Ministry of Agriculture, while lack of capital and know-how has tended to keep them from private agricultural enterprise. Graduates of the technical and engineering schools have been having some difficulty in entering the work force due to the slow pace of Ethiopia's industrial development. Graduates of general academic programs, finally, and those who drop out before completing some course of study, tend to be left to their own devices.

While the modernizing sector, then, has introduced the revolutionary no- 178
tion of vocation and has institutionalized means of training young Ethiopians 463
for modern work roles, it has not yet provided adequate mechanisms either 464
for guiding them into and through the training programs or for employing them properly once they are trained.

Preparation for Marriage

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Conditions of growing up in the modernizing sector have disrupted the 178
harmonious pattern of Amhara adolescence also with respect to entrance into [582]
adult family roles. Conflicts arise both from postponement of the normal age [581]
for marriage and from radically new ideas about the nature of marriage.

The modern adolescent typically expects to marry at an age that is at least 883*
eight to ten years older than his traditional counterpart. While Amhara girls 178
have traditionally married in their early teens, girls in the senior class of 582
secondary school now say they expect to marry in their early twenties. Amhara boys have traditionally married around the age of twenty, but those in post-elementary schools now expect to marry in their late twenties or early thirties.

This drift is due to a desire to attain as much education as possible, and [871)
above all, for the boys, to the precarious economic position of modern adolescents. While living on his father's farm an Amhara boy could marry early with the assurance of having enough land to work to support his family at least at subsistence level. The modern boy who finishes secondary school or

*883
• 178 college, however, has no assets beyond his diploma in most cases. He must
582 wait a number of years to achieve the beginnings of financial stability.

*883 The students' conception of marriage, moreover, reflects a still more pro-
178 found change. They are no longer content to regard the selection of a mate as
581 a matter to be arranged by parents in accord with their own interests and
584 standards. They reject the old-fashioned Amhara marriage in which romantic love plays no part and divorce is common. Most of them insist on the right to choose their own spouses, and they tend to approach that choice with criteria which differ from those of their parents. Instead of following such traditional criteria as good upbringing, family background, and wealth, a number of modern adolescents aspire to find spouses who, above all else, are educated, who share their opinions and beliefs, and who will be good companions. (See
[582] Table 6.) Even such strong aversions as those against tribal and religious exogamy have receded somewhat before the new ideal of marriage founded on romantic love.* The figures in Table 7 are indicative of the diffusion of this ideal as well as of the growth of a sentiment of Ethiopian nationality.

TABLE 6

QUALITIES MOST DESIRED BY STUDENTS IN A FUTURE WIFE OR HUSBAND*

Quality	Per Cent Checking Quality as Either First or Second Choice		
	Secondary Schools		College Males
	Males	Females	
Educated	48	75	41
Shares my opinions and beliefs	44	48	43
Religious	34	25	19
Good companion	25	30	45
Beautiful	15	0	22
Kind and generous	15	13	9
Wealthy	4	2	5
Will impress my friends socially	3	2	2
Number	(385)	(39)	(191)

* Related to Gillespie-Allport question No. 17.

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* Although Amhara men have customarily had sexual relations with non-Amhara women and produce countless offspring from them, the latter have not been considered appropriate choices for marriage, except in very high strata where the marriage served a purpose primarily political.

These changes in the definition of marriage have produced tremendous 883*
tensions and heartache in the relations between generations. Deprived of au- 178 •
thority in the occupational sphere, parents of modern adolescents cling with 58
all the more pride to their traditional rights and obligations in the sphere of 593
getting their children properly married. They often nag their children to leave school and get married while young. They stand determined to select their children's mates. If they do admit some consideration for their children's desires on the matter, they insist that any prospective spouse measure up to traditional criteria. As a result, disagreements between students and their parents revolve around the subject of marriage more frequently than anything else.

TABLE 7 883*
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DISPOSITION OF STUDENTS TOWARD TRIBAL AND RELIGIOUS EXOGAMY

		SECONDARY SCHOOL		COLLEGE MALES (per cent)
		Males (per cent)	Females (per cent)	
Willingness to marry a person of a different religion.	Yes	29	33	60
	No	71	67	40
Willingness to marry a person of a different tribe....	Yes	64	73	84
	No	36	27	16
Number....................................	....	(392)	(40)	(194)

Modern adolescents, however, have by no means wholly rejected traditional 883*
attitudes and sentiments concerning marriage and courtship. Although a 178
number of students say they want to marry for the modern reason of finding 581
personal happiness through a satisfying love relation, many more indicate 842
that they are chiefly inspired by the traditional motives of wanting to beget children. Most of them wish to continue the custom of having large families, the most frequently mentioned numbers of children desired being "four" and "more than six."*

The modern boys still widely share the traditional expectation that their 883*
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581

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* The mean number of children desired by the college students in my sample is 4.23. This figure exceeds those of all the national college groups reported by Gillespie and Allport except Egypt and South African Bantu.

*883 brides be virgin. Related norms greatly restrict their quest for romantic love.
• 178 Since Ethiopian society still expects its maidens to be shy and retiring, and to
581 avoid social relations with boys outside their families, the boys find few
*883 opportunities for getting to know members of the opposite sex. Even in those
834 few situations where sociability between the sexes is publicly permitted, in-
178 grained tendencies to segregate the sexes persist. The most liberal context for such sociability, the University College campus, has witnessed relatively little interaction between male and female students. In spite of their occasional resolutions to act more boldly, the college boys have in the past tended to shy away from the co-eds except during such rare formal events as a college dance or off-campus parties.

*883 This is not to say that modern adolescent males have no opportunity for
836 premarital sexuality. On the contrary, their opportunities in this regard are
178 perhaps better than ever. The proliferation of brothels in Ethiopia's urban
548 centers makes sexual initiation easy, almost a routine event.* Students also
834 frequent these houses for social entertainment, dancing to swing and Latin rhythms, and sipping beer or soft drinks. Thus the continued sanctions against social intercourse in more respectable forms work to sharpen the Amhara dichotomy between decency and sexuality, and leave modern boys with a double standard that separates the marriageable girls from the enjoyable ones.

*883 The idea that marriage should be founded on romantic love has brought
178 greater anxiety as well as hope into the lives of Ethiopian adolescents. This
581 anxiety is due in part to the above-mentioned inhibitions against that easy
584 commerce of the sexes which so facilitates the discovery of a suitable love
[152] object. It also reflects a certain ambivalence toward the new ideal, based on a lingering attachment to the authority of the old system. This was manifest, for example, in the response to a college debate on the topic, "Resolved: that the custom of letting the parents choose a spouse for the children should be maintained," that took place in 1959. Although on anonymous questionnaires *90 per cent* of the college students said they will probably decide whom to marry themselves, and only 3 per cent said the decision would be made by parents or other relatives, in voting on the matter after the debate the students (in contrast to the judges who awarded the negative debaters) publicly declared themselves 42 per cent affirmative, 41 per cent negative, with 17 per cent abstaining.

*883 Anxiety regarding the new conception of marriage, finally, is also con-
178 nected with a new-fashioned fear of divorce. The mind of the modern adoles-
581 cent vacillates between the ideal of an abiding marital relationship based on
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152 * Due perhaps to the greater importance of their peers, sexual accomplishments have now become a frequent topic of conversation and a matter for boasting among modern adolescent boys.

love and the image of the traditional Amhara marriage, likely as not to end in divorce. This sort of concern was expressed in a revealing way in the following statement by a twenty-year-old college student: 883* 581 586 178• [152]

> The main thing I want in my wife is good character. Beauty is not so important. Of course she will be an excellent cook. But mostly I am concerned that she be the *right* one for me; I do not want to get divorced. But you can't really know if she is the right one until after ten years of married life. If after having about five or six children it turns out troublesome, I will have to leave her. A person cannot go on living that way.

In some instances, ironically, this quest for the perfect marriage leads to a rejection of the very institution of marriage itself. Seven per cent of the students questioned indicated that they do not want to get married eventually—either because they "could never afford it," they "would be happier living single," or they just *"do not want to enter a relation that will end in divorce."* Thus at a time when the stability and warmth of family life are needed more than ever, the very possibility of family is doubted. 883* 178 581 589

Some Ethiopian students blame the deteriorated family and an alleged increase in divorce in their country on the impact of Western civilization. True, the introduction of the Western concept of marriage and of the rudiments of a modern occupational system have dislocated the traditional arrangements for marriage; and other related problems, to be discussed in the next chapter, plague the Western-educated elite. But Western civilization has also developed resources to begin to cope with analogous problems in its own societies, and perhaps it is not too soon to acquaint Ethiopia's youth with some of these: for example, the recent developments in man's understanding of the dynamics of marriage as well as more sophisticated conceptions of the ideal and importance of family life in modern society. 581 177

CULTURAL ORIENTATION

A generational conflict manifests itself further with respect to questions of belief, taste, and value. Because of differences on such issues, students and their parents have grown far apart. The more traditionalist of the older generation refer to the modern youth as *ya-sïmmïntaññä shi lïjjotch* ("children of the eighth millennium"); that is, of that corrupt time the Amhara believe will precede the destruction of the world. The latter, in turn, refer to the old-fashioned as ignorant, uncivilized, sometimes even "savage." 561

Yet, as we have been suggesting, this conflict is by no means total. Amhara adolescents are too deeply attached to many aspects of their traditional culture to engage in wholesale rebellion. Because of strict childhood training they remain basically respectful toward their elders. In addition, they often prefer to champion their own traditions in the spirit of a freshly excited nationalism. 883* 561 178

*883 [882] [128] So the orientation of the modern adolescents is a complex one, demanding detailed analysis. In this section we shall discuss data that give some indication of their attitudes regarding religion, science, taste, morality, and politics.

*883 771 • 178 *Religion.*—With regard to a general commitment to religion Ethiopian students today remain in good part tradition-directed. They mention "religion" more frequently than any other matter except success in school as the question on which they are most in accord with their parents. Religious themes are mentioned more frequently than any other in response to the question, "As a parent, what specific lesson will you try hardest to teach your children?"

Table 8 describes the incidence of student adherence to some of the traditional religious practices in Ethiopia. As might be expected, there is a consistent decrease in conventional religiosity as one moves from the secondary to the college level. Perhaps more significant is the extent to which the modern adolescents do remain faithful to the old religious practices, in view of their considerable alienation from the institution of the Ethiopian Church.[21]

795 771 178 Despite its toleration of a few reforms instigated by Haile Selassie, such as permitting women to sit alongside men in some of the Addis Ababa churches and providing occasional sermons in the vernacular Amharic, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church has not yet begun to adjust to the demands of the modern era. It remains rooted in the experience of an isolated peasant civilization, fixed on the past rather than turned toward the present and future. Thus it has neglected the substantial religious needs of the modern adolescents, who are eager for a fresh treatment of the great matters which religion has traditionally interpreted. But when youth today look for spiritual guidance, they find archaic liturgy; and when they look for spiritual inspiration and social teachings, they are told only to fast and observe the other hallowed customs.

883 771 178 It is this state of things, as well as the natural secularization of life in the cities, that has turned a number of students away from religion altogether. Many more, however, have sought to retain some sort of religious life by making new kinds of adjustment themselves. One alternative has been a privatization of faith, making religion a primarily personal matter no longer dependent on the institution of the church. [797] [777] [795] Another alternative has been to adopt one of the Western forms of Christianity through contact with one of the various missions in Ethiopia. In recent years a third alternative has fired

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* In this they have been attracted more by Protestantism than by Catholicism, and for two reasons. The biblical purism and evangelical fervor of the Protestant missions seem best suited to meet their needs for total commitment and reorientation. Catholicism, moreover, is represented to them chiefly by the Jesuit order, whose members have managed two important schools in Ethiopia and many have earned a bad name among students because of their political style.

the imagination of some other students: attempting to reform the Orthodox 883*
Church from within. This has been done within the framework of the 771
Orthodox Students Association, which will be discussed further in chapter 795
vii. 178 •

Science.—Of all the aspects of Western culture to which they have been 883*
exposed, Ethiopia's students have been most receptive to the teachings of natural science. 177
815

TABLE 8

EXTENT TO WHICH STUDENTS OBSERVE TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

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Practice	Secondary School (per cent)	College (per cent)
Follow the fasts:		
All the time	38	16
Most of the time	26	23
Sometimes	27	24
Not at all	9	37
Go to church (mosque):		
More than once a week	9	2
Once a week	59	40
Less than once a week	25	36
Not at all	7	22
Bow to church (mosque):		
Always	28	9
Some/most of the time	50	38
Not at all	22	53
Pray:		
Twice or more daily	64	40
Once a day	22	23
Once or twice a week	6	14
Once or twice a month	5	10
Not at all	3	13
Number	(485)	(195)

They tend to regard it as the most important single benefit which 883*
Ethiopia can gain from Western civilization. After religion, morals, and 177
manners, "science" is the response students give most often to the question: 815
"What specific lesson will you try hardest to teach your children?"

Disagreement on such questions as the nature of solar eclipses, the descent of man, and the etiology of disease is common between the modern adolescents and their own parents. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that [178]
the scientific imagination has yet displaced traditional thought patterns in the minds of Ethiopian students, or that scientific beliefs have fully replaced

*883 "superstitious" beliefs about the world. Concerning this latter issue we are
815 fortunate to have a substantial study carried out by Dr. Edith Lord during
• 178 1956-57—a study of the beliefs of some 1,250 Ethiopian students and
177 teachers.[22]

[125] The subjects of this study were asked to mark as true or false a list of 132 unscientific beliefs commonly held by Ethiopians. These beliefs dealt with nature and devils, health and disease, danger and death. In spite of a measurable trend toward increased disbelief in the unscientific statements as the level of schooling increased, it was found that a significant number of these statements were accepted by a majority both of the post-elementary students and of the Ethiopian teachers. Thus, 56 items were believed by half or more of the 451 secondary students in the sample; 34 items by half or more of the 96 teachers; 9 items by half or more of the 61 student nurses and first-aid workers; and 6 of the items by half or more of the 29 college freshmen. Table 9 shows some of those unscientific beliefs most commonly subscribed to by secondary school students. These particular items are of interest for two additional reasons. The first five of them were among the beliefs held by *a majority of the twenty-nine college freshmen*. The first and the last, moreover, are among those items which showed an *increasing* frequency of belief with an increase in education, from the first four primary grades, through the second four grades, to the secondary level.

TABLE 9

UNSCIENTIFIC BELIEFS ACCEPTED BY SECONDARY STUDENTS

Item No.	Belief	Percentage of Secondary Students Holding the Belief
53	Certain mineral waters can cure stomach trouble by causing a person to vomit worms, sometimes frogs or toads	88
35	There are some skillful persons who can summon the devil at will	87
102	Too much charity leads to madness	74
58	A child will grow better if the nerves are removed from under his back teeth	68
84	If you go into a room which has been closed for a long time, you will be attacked by Satan	57
78	A man who has skill in stopping rains must not eat or drink while he is performing the ceremony to stop rain, or he will be unsuccessful	64
	Number	(451)

[125] In my own questionnaire, administered three years after Dr. Lord's re-

search and only to the highest grades of secondary school and college, three 883*
questions regarding unscientific beliefs were included. In a pilot study of 815
sixty secondary school seniors and juniors, 42 per cent held the belief that "a 178 •
person can be made sick by the evil eye of a *budā*," and 33 per cent believed 177
that "too much learning results in madness." To the one question asked of 125
my entire sample: "Do you believe that some learned *dabtarā* can cause rain to fall or stop?," 16 per cent of 500 secondary and 7 per cent of 200 college seniors and juniors said "Yes."

This persistence among the educated youth of traditional beliefs which run 883*
counter to the consensus of modern scientists has been attributed by Lord to 815
the inadequacies of the Ethiopian school system. This is as might be expected, 871
inasmuch as most Ethiopian teachers have had relatively little education 178
themselves and the curriculum has necessarily been somewhat improvised and 177
incomplete. Officials of the Ministry of Education have labored to overcome these deficiencies, and certain changes were in fact made in consequence of Lord's study which aim at combating the more dysfunctional of the prevailing superstitions.

It seems likely, however, that certain irrational dispositions are also in- 121
volved here, dispositions to maintain the unscientific beliefs in spite of im- 815
provements in teaching methods and materials. One would predict this on the 178
basis of general sociological understanding of the consequences of rapid social 177
change. The disruption of the traditional belief systems brought about by the sudden dissemination of scientific beliefs inevitably creates insecurity, and a common reaction to such insecurity is to cling with increased tenacity to some of the old-fashioned beliefs which are closely identified with the traditional culture.[23]

One area in which this defensive "revivalism" can be observed in Ethiopia 178
is that of medicine. Many Ethiopians who have received modern secondary 75
education maintain that Western medicine, while useful in many cases, repre- 815
sents only one possible approach to the problem of sickness and health.[24] 177
Thus, fifty-seven per cent of the secondary students questioned asserted that traditional Ethiopian medicines are effective all or most of the time, although such therapies include the eating of rancid butter to cure malaria or drinking holy water to cure serious functional disorders. Dr. Lord herself has reported an episode which throws much light on the psychology of this reaction:

> An Ethiopian colleague, a former teacher, warned me against drinking water in a certain provincial town on penalty of my catching malaria. He was challenged thus: "You are one of the better educated persons in Ethiopia; don't you know the cause of malaria?" He quickly, and eruditely, gave all the known scientific facts about malaria. Then he added, "You people from the United States (and the United Nations) think that this (the scientif-

178 ically established cycle) is the only way to catch malaria. We Ethiopians
815 know better. We know that one can *also* catch malaria from drinking the
177 water in places where the Anopheles breed."[26]
[75]

The ambivalence toward Western science represented by this statement and by the persistence of analogous attitudes among many educated Ethiopians undoubtedly brings the individuals in question a degree of security that would be lost were they to abandon the traditional, unscientific belief system *in toto*. Perhaps a more solid sort of security could be derived from a program of education which not only imparts scientific information and attitudes, but also educates people to adapt themselves to the changes which the introduction of science involves.

*883 *Taste.*—In matters of taste, Ethiopia's modern adolescents range from ex-
177 treme traditionalism to extreme Westernism, with most of them preferring
178 both traditional and European or American patterns in varying proportions.
[262] Of food the students tend to prefer the traditional varieties, most popular of
which are *doro waṭ* and *ĭnjarā*. Among Western foods they are fondest of
pastries and Italian *pasta*. On the other hand, they are more inclined toward
[272] Western beverages than Ethiopian ones. The most popular Western beverages
[273] are, for the secondary students, soft drinks, and for the college students, beer;
among Ethiopian drinks they prefer *ṭallā* first and milk second.

*883 With regard to their manner of eating, the students' taste is traditional in
264 that most prefer to eat nowhere but within the home, and to eat with their
177 hands rather than use silverware; but it is Westernized in that most prefer
178 eating at their own individual places rather than all together with others out
of a common *ĭnjarā* basket. Opinion is most divided on the matter of exchanging *gurshā*, a morsel of food which one places in another's mouth. The slight majority who reject this old custom do so because they find it "noisy," "childish," "unsanitary," or simply "out of fashion"; while those who still enjoy it do so chiefly because it "expresses affection."

*883 On questions of dress it should be noted that traditionally the Amhara have
291 sentimentalized their going barefoot as well as their national costume. But
177 because of the practical advantages of wearing tailored clothes at work and
178 using shoes, and perhaps still more because of their high prestige in the
modernizing sector, virtually all of the students prefer the European fashion in these matters. On the other hand, with respect to women's wear and the sort of dress to be worn on holidays, the great majority opt the Ethiopian *shammā*.

*883 In their aesthetic interests the students' taste varies considerably according
517 to the medium. With regard to poetry and music, Ethiopian forms are pre-
53 ferred to Western ones, while Western forms of painting and dance are more
177 popular with them than Ethiopian. Poetry stands as the most appreciated of
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Poetry stands as the most appreciated of 883*
all traditional forms of expression, and nearly two-thirds of the secondary and 538
half the college students state that they compose Amharic verse themselves, on 517
occasions ranging from public celebrations to private moments of great joy or
sorrow. This is as might be expected in view of the tremendous importance
of poetry in traditional Amhara culture (see chapters vi and vii). Painting, 883*
on the other hand, has played a rather inconspicuous part in Abyssinia. (Its 532
genuine achievement in the high culture, the often remarkable Ethiopian 517
miniatures, is frequently repudiated by modernizing Ethiopians for being 178 •
too "backward.") Those students who do prefer Ethiopian-style paintings explain their preference on the grounds that they find them more intelligible
and closer to Ethiopian life, and stress their value as reminders of Ethiopia's
past.[28] The majority who prefer European-style paintings offer primarily [177]
mechanical reasons; they find them more "efficient," "systematic," and "accurate"—more "up-to-date."

In response to a question on their favorite type of foreign music, the stu- 883*
dents gave a wide variety of answers, ranging from "Oriental" and "religious" 533
to "Rose, Rose, I Love You" and "Mozart." By far the most frequently men- 517
tioned musical preference was "classical" (20 per cent). This was followed by 177
approximately equal percentages of preference for American popular songs;
jazz and swing; rock 'n' roll; and Sudanese music. Of foreign dances, the 883*
most popular are the waltz and the tango (17 per cent each), followed at 535
some distance by rock 'n roll, cha cha cha, and jitterbug. In their movie pref- 517
erences, finally, historical (17 per cent) and educational (12 per cent) films are 177 883*
the favorites, followed by war, detective, and adventure films. 546

One other area of consumption should be discussed in this context: the use 517
of cigarettes. To the tradition-minded Amhara smoking symbolizes all that is 177
objectionable in Western culture, while to some of the modern adolescents it 883*
symbolizes the excitement and "life" of modernity. The number of these latter 276
is not really very high, at least not among those still in school; but it is note- 177
worthy that emphatic rejection of smoking by most of the students is based
primarily on the rationalistic arguments that it is injurious to health and
wastes money, rather than on the traditional argument that it is sinful and
counter to Christian custom. The most violent reactions of any, however,
were aroused by the question: "How do you feel about women smoking?" [562]
In the secondary school sample to which this question was posed, disapproval
was practically unanimous, and the comments included "makes me ashamed,"
"it is scaring," "I could choke her to death," and "worse than hell itself."

A few minor differences in taste appear in connection with differences in 883* 177
sex and school attended. The female students in our secondary school sample 178
show a greater partiality to native foods than do the males, and, on the other [562]
hand, greater interest in Western music and dance. Peculiarities in the sub- [262]
[533]
[535]

*883
177 cultures of different schools account for a few other minor variations. Thus,
• 178 for example, preference for Scottish dance is expressed chiefly among students
[535] of a school run by a British staff; the only kind of foreign music preferred by
[533] students of the Theological School is Sudanese music, that is, the kind most
[276] similar to Ethiopian music; and the University College, most urbane of the
Ethiopian schools, is the only one where a majority of respondents indicated
that they enjoy smoking.

*883 Of all the differences, the most conspicuous is that between the secondary
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TABLE 10

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AESTHETIC PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS

Area of Consumption	Percentage of Students Who			Number
	Prefer "Traditional" or "Ethiopian" Forms	Prefer "European" or "Foreign" Forms	Indicate No Preference	
Dress for women	85	15	0	(700)
Food	80	16	4	(700)
Cigarettes*	71	10	19	(700)
Dress on holidays	70	26	4	(700)
Poetry	67	26	7	(700)
Music	62	35	3	(700)
Manner of eating†	40	58	2	(700)
Dance	38	56	6	(700)
Drink	24	56	20	(700)
Painting	23	67	10	(700)

* "Like to smoke" versus "do not like to smoke."

† Combines responses on "*gurshā*" and eating in common or at individual places, which were practically identical.

*883 school students and the college students. For in each of the areas discussed
177 above in which traditional or Ethiopian patterns were set alongside European
[184] or foreign patterns, *the move from the secondary level to college level was accompanied by a decrease in preference for traditional patterns.*

If now we overlook these differences and calculate the total response, we obtain the profile shown in Table 10, which provides some idea of the range of variation in the students' taste with regard to items from Ethiopian and foreign cultures.

*883 *Morals.*—The moral values reinforced during traditional Amhara adoles-
577 cence are by no means rejected during modern Ethiopian adolescence, but
178 their significance is somewhat attenuated due to the new conditions of life in

the government schools. The weakening of family controls by the new school 883*
environment has slightly reduced the importance of loyalty to kin in the 577
students' scheme of things, and has significantly reduced the moral authority 178 •
of religious customs. A third sphere of norms—respect and obedience toward [571]
elders and persons of authority—is maintained by the hierarchical school [561]
system, officially headed by the Emperor himself. However, the ambiguous 883*
status of foreign teachers and their frequent inability or unwillingness to play 875
the traditional authoritarian role tends to weaken this, for the possibility of 577
informal, even joking, relations with foreign teachers gives Amhara students 177
their first taste of a more relaxed relation to authority figures. (Unprepared 178
by any other experience for such a relationship, their reaction tends to be one 571
of exploiting the permissive teacher as much as possible while at the same
time losing respect for him.)

Finally, the expectation of physical stamina and aggressiveness in the 883*
Amhara *goramsä* is carried over into the school setting but with definite 577
modification. It prevails in the feeling that one must not tolerate insults or be 152
cowardly. It also persists in altered form in the new pattern of athletic activi- 178
ties instituted by the schools. On the other hand, the greater camaraderie expected among schoolmates means that aggression must also be carefully controlled. An indication of the psychological difficulties to which the crowded yet sociable conditions of school life have given rise appears in response to the question: "What is the worst thing that could justifiably be said against you?" The most frequent sort of answer to this question relates to unchecked aggression: "Quick to anger," "quarrelsome," "ill tempered."

Of the new moral values inculcated by the school system, some of the main 883*
ones appear to be self-development via education; honesty; sportsmanship; 871
and social responsibility. [577]

Ethiopians often speak of the "value" (*tiqem*) of education, meaning thereby the path to a well-paying job and a higher standard of living. But one would be mistaken to suppose that this explanation exhausts the meaning that education has for the modern adolescents. The freeing of their imagination and the exercise of previously unknown intellectual capacities prove themselves thrilling experiences for each new class of students. And their most preferred pastime is "reading," their most popular films are educational ones. A number of students spontaneously declared, when asked about the real reason they go to school, "to learn about the world" and "to learn about humanity."

In the traditional culture of Abyssinia, learning was highly valued, to be 883*
sure. But its task was to produce a class of literati capable of transmitting the 871
hallowed beliefs and symbols. Education for the sake of inquiry as such or for 178
personal development was never permitted in its program. If the value of

*883 this new sort of education exists but dimly in the minds of the older students,
871 that is largely because the school system has made grades and diplomas the
• 178 end of scholastic activity.

*883 The fact that the value of truth is to some extent institutionalized in the
577 schools—at least in the demand for correct answers to examination questions
178 —gives honesty a novel importance for the modern adolescents. It does in fact
871 appear that "honesty" is the most highly valued of the six character traits
presented in the questionnaire. (See Table 11.) Numerous teachers, however,
report that the students tend to prevaricate on every convenient occasion.
This tendency is the product of a tradition in which the culture hero is not
George Washington, who "could not tell a lie," but Alaqā Gabra Hānnā,
master of deceit, and of a life outside the classroom in which equivocation
and deception are the rule. The effort of Ethiopian students to shake the
legacy of wax and gold and incorporate the more austere ideal of truth for
truth's sake is fraught with pathos. Some of them have frankly conceded
that the task belongs to another generation, by naming "honesty" as the
thing they want their children most to have that they did not have.

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TABLE 11

QUALITIES PREFERRED BY STUDENTS AS REPRESENTING THE BEST KINDS OF CHARACTER

Quality	Per Cent Checking Quality as Either First or Second Choice		
	Secondary School		College Males
	Males	Females	
Honest	65	73	86
Polite	27	30	18
Smiling, sociable	26	43	28
Patriotic	22	10	19
Kind, generous	21	10	12
Humble, modest	10	15	21
Number	(390)	(38)	(190)

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Another ideal which the Ethiopian students have adopted—slowly, but with growing success—is that of sportsmanship ~~or fair play~~. In Amhara culture the goal, not the manner of fighting, is what is important. The government school system, however, has taught students to play fairly in accord with

fixed rules and to respect their opponents. Until a few years ago, the imper- 883*
fect acceptance of these norms was shown by the frequent fights between 577
opposing school teams following soccer and basketball games.' But grad- 178
ually a new tradition of athletic activity has been building up in the schools, 871
and with it the related norms have started to gain greater acceptance.

Still another value that the school experience has promoted is that of social 883*
responsibility. Most students are very grateful to the government for having 641
provided them with schooling and related benefits, and they feel a keen 577
obligation to show their gratitude by serving their country. They have also 185
become conscious of the great needs of their people for economic and social
development. In Amhara society, service was expected in behalf of the fam-
ily and, except for mass levies in time of warfare, usually stopped there. The [593]
modern adolescents are still mindful of their obligations to their parents and siblings, but have now included broader ideals of social service in their moral orientation. When asked what they expect to bring most satisfaction in their lives, the students named "improvement of local community" more often than any other category except "career or occupation." (See Table 4.) When asked what they would do with a million dollars, more than a third answered in terms of purely social enterprises, such as building schools and hospitals, helping the poor and orphaned; and many others indicated private enterprises with specifically social purposes, such as improving agriculture and building factories to provide employment.

It is difficult to determine how deeply the value of social responsibility has been internalized. In their public declarations, at any rate, the students wax eloquent in propounding ideals of good citizenship. They urge themselves to prepare for introducing modern ways to the uneducated; to return to the villages, integrate themselves with the old society, and lead them gently to better ways; to fight discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and social class; to solve the problem of corruption and bribery in the government; and to promote national solidarity.

Politics.—The Amhara adolescent has little occasion to develop specifically 883*
political attitudes, since his customary political world has been coterminous 66
with subordination to legitimate local and national authorities, and defense of his country against invaders. Unless he was the son of a nobleman involved in struggles for power, there have rarely been any political issues to engage his attention.

A host of issues, domestic and international, have by contrast been thrust upon the modern adolescent. Yet in comparison with students from the other countries of Africa and the Middle East, his political orientation is relatively undeveloped. Ethiopian students at regional or international gatherings of students have in the past tended to feel somewhat out of place, for the polit-

In these attitudes one may note the persistence of such traditional valua- 883*
tions as the esteem for power, the stress on religion, and the concern about 829
polite and dignified behavior, alongside such modernist valuations as the 178 •
esteem for civilization (*selṭānē*) and science. With regard to the emerging (177)
world power of Africa, however, the students have been rapidly coming to 883*
reject the traditional Abyssinian viewpoint, which looks with disdain upon 829
the Negroid peoples of Africa as racially and culturally inferior. 178
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As recently as a decade ago, a group of Ethiopian college students responded with ridicule and evident disdain to an illustrated ethnographic account of some East African tribes. But in the late 1950's, due to the growing

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TABLE 13

ATTITUDES OF ETHIOPIAN STUDENTS TOWARD THE "BIG THREE" POWERS

Classification of Comments	England (per cent)	U.S.A. (per cent)	U.S.S.R. (per cent)
Positive	32	59	47
Negative	37	19	26
Neutral	11	5	6
No answer	20	17	21
Number	(640)	(700)	(662)

prominence of the African independence movement and the decision of the 883*
Ethiopian government to take more interest in African affairs, the pan- 829
African sentiment began to invade the heretofore aloof highland plateau of 178
Ethiopia. The attendance in Ethiopian colleges of students from other African 186
countries and the growing number of pan-African meetings in Addis Ababa have promoted this trend. Consequently a number of Ethiopian students now follow with growing interest the developments in other African countries, and not a few indicated that their identification with Africa as a whole was stronger than their identification with Ethiopia. All but 8 per cent of the 700 students questioned: "What do you think about Africa?" had some response that showed concern, whether sympathy for African independence and getting rid of the Europeans (28 per cent), or sensitivity about Africa's "undeveloped" and "uncivilized" state and its need to work hard (33 per cent), or pride and confidence in Africa's resources and future (24 per cent).

So deeply rooted a sentiment as prejudice against Negroid Africans cannot quickly be willed away. It does seem, however, that the emergence of the

*883 new African nations is proving to be an effective agency for reducing such
829 prejudices among the students. The broader political identity afforded by
186 pan-Africanism may in turn be promoting a more genuine national feeling
• 178 among the younger educated Ethiopians, a feeling of solidarity that begins
to encompass all the ethnic groups in their land.

*883 Still another sphere in which the Ethiopian students have had some room
829 for the development of political values has been the study of history. The
students were therefore asked to name the persons in Ethiopian and in world history whom they most liked and disliked, and to explain why.

The three most liked figures in Ethiopian history were Haile Selassie, mentioned by 36 per cent of the respondents; Tēwodros (30 per cent); and Menelik (16 per cent). Named much less frequently were Yohānnes (mostly by Tigre students); military heroes of Menelik's day, and of the resistance during the Italian occupation; and church figures, especially Abuna Peṭros (the great Orthodox martyr of the occupation).

*883 The reasons given for naming Haile Selassie include the wide variety of
829 respects for which his reign has been praised. He is liked for uniting Ethio-
643 pia, supporting education, fighting for the country's freedom, introducing
modern civilization, and generally "helping the country." The reasons given extend to expressions of very personal attachment, such as "he gives me education," "he supplies everything," and "he is my guardian."

The reasons given for liking Tēwodros or Menelik best are more circumscribed, and they are balanced by a number of other responses in which these two emperors are named as the most *disliked* persons in Ethiopian history (Tēwodros, 7 per cent; Menelik, 4 per cent). Tēwodros is liked chiefly because of his bravery and his attempt to unite the nation, while he is disliked because of his cruelty. Menelik is liked chiefly because of his defense of the country at Adowa and his efforts to modernize Ethiopia and introduce education; and he is disliked for having sold parts of the country to Europeans. Yohānnes is mentioned about the same number of times in both categories (2 per cent): positively, for his courage in battle and his Christian zeal and, negatively, for his intolerance in persecuting non-Christians.

*883 Lïjj Iyāsu (11 per cent) and Ahmad Grāñ (8 per cent) are the most
829 disliked figures in Ethiopian history. They are associated with specific of-
fenses: Iyāsu with being an "incompetent ruler," "encouraging Islam," and "chasing after women," and Grāñ with burning churches and massacring Christians. Three other persons in this category are Sultan Ibrahim (5 per cent), for selling the port of Assab; Dajāzmātch Haile Selassie Gugsa (4 per cent), for fighting on the side of the Italians in 1935; and Yodit (2 per cent), the legendary queen who is said to have sacked Aksum in the tenth century.

As many as 44 per cent of the students failed to name anyone they dis- 883*
liked in Ethiopian history. This may be attributed in part to their meager 829
knowledge of Ethiopian history, perhaps still more to their fear of expressing themselves honestly on such a point even in an anonymous questionnaire. But doubtless another reason was that presented by the 2 per cent of the students who wrote: "[I dislike] none; all did good."

If the responses on Ethiopian history are analyzed with respect to the qualities or achievements of the men concerned, we find that military virtue —expressed as "brave," "defeated many enemies," or "fought for Ethiopia"— is mentioned far more often than any other (27 per cent). In second place are actions related to the modernization of Ethiopia, and the third most frequent category is that of unifying the nation. The most frequently mentioned negative categories were anti-Christian actions (burning churches, converting to Islam), cruelty, treason, and selling Ethiopian territory.

A different pattern of response is apparent in the comments on world historical personages. The interest in military prowess is still there, but not as prominent (19 per cent). It appears chiefly in the preference for Napoleon and, occasionally, for Alexander the Great. Themes of national unification and modernization occur very rarely. It is the general category of humanitarian qualities and achievements that dominates these responses (40 per cent), expressed variously as "freeing the slaves," "promoting equality," "working for peace," showing kindness or generosity, possessing wisdom or creative genius. Thus it is that Abraham Lincoln stands out as the most admired figure in world history for the Ethiopian students (22 per cent), and that following him, Napoleon, and Peter the Great, Mahatma Gandhi stands in fourth place.

Responses concerning the most disliked figure in world history are consistent with this tendency to transcend the sentiment of militant nationalism. The main charges against the villains of world history have to do with cruelty, slaughter, provocation of war (including, of course, the attack on Ethiopia), and despotism, while vices related to betraying one's nation are scarcely mentioned. The names which dominate these replies are Hitler (22 per cent), Mussolini (21 per cent), Nero (8 per cent), and Stalin (2 per cent). It appears, then, that the study of world history may have the effect of strengthening the humanitarian side of the students' political orientation by exposing them to a different set of ideals and models.

THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF MODERN ADOLESCENCE 883*

The pattern of adolescence described in this section came quickly into being 871
and has already undergone some substantial changes. It is, in effect, the pattern 178 •
of the 1950's. The educational system before and just after the occupation was, structurally, an extension of the old pattern of schooling sons of noble-

*883 871 • 178 men and outstanding commoners in the vicinity of the royal court. But with the importation of hundreds of foreign teachers, the establishment of an extensive system of secondary schools and colleges, and the provision of economic support for thousands of post-elementary students, a real structural change came about. Although the school system remained completely subordinate to the throne, it introduced a number of processes that had a dynamic of their own.

*883 121 178 As we have seen, these new socialization processes have subjected the modern adolescents to many sorts of conflict and strain. They have been placed in conflict with their parents, and hence within themselves, on the basic issues of work and, particularly, marriage. They have been subjected to the simultaneous appeal of traditional and modern patterns in virtually all aspects of culture. They have been forced to make choices in numerous areas, while their traditional counterparts have customarily been prevented from making any kind of choice at all.

It might seem that such a situation would breed a troubled generation, distraught and disoriented, knowing what we do about the psychological hazards of rapid culture change. And indeed, among the modern adolescents of the fifties, one might find classical cases of anomie and identity diffusion, boys who confess, "Nothing seems worthwhile to me . . . I am confused, being brought up as I was on the traditional beliefs without questioning and then suddenly being forced to ask questions," or, "The problem of choosing the work I should go into is my only real problem right now, but because of it I find it hard to make decisions about anything. If this suffering is the price of freedom, I am not sure it is worth the price."

Such cases, however, were the exception, not the rule. Most of the students were working hard to get ahead in the world or enjoying their newly acquired freedom and camaraderie. Almost all our respondents had ready answers concerning the sort of work they want to go into, and what they would do if they could have any wish granted. [828] Comparing themselves with their elders, they presented a positive self-image. They regarded themselves as more "civilized," "well built," and "generous" than their parents' generation, albeit somewhat lazier and less polite; and in comparison with Ethiopians a decade older, saw themselves as "better educated," "more clever," "more adventurous," and better able to "enjoy life." Nearly all of them (92 per cent) said that they felt either "enthusiastic" or "hopeful" about their [181] personal future. So one could characterize the Ethiopian post-elementary students of the fifties as relatively buoyant, clear-headed, self-confident, and enjoying their situation of culture contact and change far more than suffering it. How may this be explained?

[643] One great source of their strength was a sense of dependence on the Emperor. As founder of the Ethiopian school system, Haile Selassie has

appeared to the students as the source of their new goods; of their learning, 883*
health, and well-being. Because of a feeling that "he supplies everything" 121
and "he is my guardian," students of all grades have been among the most 178
sincere and enthusiastic supporters of Haile Selassie. So their adoption of 643
Western patterns has from the outset been legitimated by the highest traditional [177]
authority, and the harshness of the culture clash has been softened
by the symbolization of both tradition and modernity in the Imperial Person.
Here the traditional pattern of "functional deviance" re-asserts itself. The 883*
adolescent rebels against the traditional demands of his parents, but expends 121
that deviant energy on behalf of legitimate symbols of the national society. 178

Related to this was a strong sense of national purposiveness. *Agarēnennā* 883*
negusēn tammrē iredālhu ("Having studied, I will serve my country and 121
my king")—this was the motto of most Ethiopian students in the forties and 641
fifties. The conspicuous needs of their country provided clear goals in terms 178
of which students felt they were preparing themselves.

Still another motive force was the need for personal justification. The many 883*
students who in a sense deserted their home villages or families in order to 121
spend years in school carried with them an ambition eventually to show the 178
folks back home that they were right after all. This involved the conviction 871
that going to school was the right, at times the righteous, thing: a blind faith that simply by continuing along the road of education they would make good in the world and return home some day as a sort of hero. Here, too, is an echo of the old deviant pattern: the renegade returning home, after many years, as a successful churchman or warlord.

The economic situation, finally, was encouraging for students. It seemed [464]
for many years that advanced training, including study abroad, would be available for whoever qualified, and that the demand for educated personnel was so great that the job opportunities for students would be endless.

By 1961, however, all these sources of adolescent morale—royal legitima- 883*
tion, national purpose, personal justification, and economic opportunity—had 121
been to some extent undercut. Some of the changing circumstances have al- 178
ready been referred to. The effect of the rebellion of December, 1960, and its 871
aftermath was to weaken the tie between Haile Selassie and the post-elemen- 643
tary students. With his moral authority somewhat undermined, the students could no longer use him to symbolize a conflict-free transition to modernity. Nor could they any longer count on him to "supply everything" indefinitely: in the summer of 1962 the Emperor announced the immediate suspension of room and board benefits for the students of the University College.

The students' outlook has further been rendered less sanguine by the con- 883*
fusion attending the political crisis of the sixties. They no longer feel the 121
keen sense of national purpose, to serve "country and king." Their ideals in 178
this regard were already weakening before the rebellion by virtue of increased [641]

*883 awareness of the political realities in the Ethiopian government. They had
121 also begun to doubt the transcendent efficacy of the educational process itself
• 178 after observing the behavior of those educated Ethiopians who went before
[871] them and inevitably became their ideals. The violation of various traditional
[183] and modern norms by the latter, and their evident demoralization, raised
many questions in the minds of the students.

*883 Finally, the students were made more anxious by a general constricting of
121 opportunity. Increased numbers in the school system meant a steady intensi-
178 fication of the competition to gain and hold on to a place in secondary school
871 and college, particularly since 1959. The rapid filling of jobs by the educated
464 youth and steadily growing numbers of unemployed youth began to create
anxieties about finding work in the future.

*883 From the viewpoint of the modern adolescents, then, a very supportive and
121 stimulating environment in the fifties has changed to a somewhat threatening
178 and confused environment in the sixties. It is in this decade that Ethiopia's
leaders of the future, that tiny fraction of one per cent of the population who
[873] reach secondary school, are coming to experience adolescence as a real
[162] normative crisis. At a time when, in the highly modernized society of the United States, observers like Friedenberg charge that the adolescent condition is becoming obsolete—that scope is no longer afforded the young person for exploration and discovery of an authentic self[28]—in the transitional state of Ethiopia this condition is being thrust on the youth. The decisions they make now, the identities they forge, will largely determine the extent to which reason and creativity will have a place in Ethiopia's future.

*883 The effort of the Ethiopian government to provide a modern education for
871 some of Ethiopia's adolescents illustrates a principle discussed in another
121 context by Karl Mannheim, namely, the characterization of youth as a latent
178 sociological resource which must be mobilized when any social system seeks
to change itself. It is a resource analogous to the latent energy reserves which are available to biological organisms when they must make a fresh adjustment to their environment.[29] Thus far the effort to mobilize the resources of Ethiopia's youth in behalf of modernization has proceeded chiefly through a pattern of increased *differentiation:* establishing a structure of secondary socialization separate from that of the traditional structures and thereby transmitting new beliefs, skills, and values to the youth. As yet, relatively little has been done with respect to the problems of devising modes of *integration* commensurate with these new differentiated patterns. The analyses of this chapter suggest the presence of what might be called "integration gaps" on at least three levels. On the level of the individual personality, there is the problem of synthesizing the various aspects of traditional and modern culture which have been transmitted to Ethiopian adolescents through diverse sources. Inasmuch as the external supports which cushioned these conflicts in the fifties are no

longer so secure, the adolescent individual has been thrown more on his own. 883*
He can only be helped to work through these conflicts by a transformed edu- 121
cational program, one which educates for self-education and seeks to en- 178 •
lighten students concerning the complex realities of economic development 871
and culture change. On the level of relating youth to a modernizing occupational system, there is the problem of guiding young people into and through the relevant educational programs and helping them to find appropriate work roles once trained. On the level of planning for the whole society there is the additional problem of relating the number of individuals being trained in various fields at any period to the priority requirements of a national development program.

This last issue raises questions which for the most part lie outside the scope of this book. Yet there is one point concerning the orientation of Ethiopian students which is of immediate relevance: the disjunction between the aspiration of modern-educated Ethiopians to live in Addis Ababa and work in a government office, and the nation's needs for trained workers in more directly productive fields and for those who will work in the provinces. For at the same time that Ethiopia's youth are being trained in modern skills, they are being exposed to modern pleasures; and these—the enjoyment of modern amusements, the company of other educated people, and the excitement of proximity to centers of national power and international commerce—are concentrated in Addis Ababa. At the same time that they are being educated with modern beliefs, they are being primed for a new kind of social mobility; and this channel is concentrated in the governmental bureaucracy—the nesting ground of Ethiopia's new elites. Conflict between these new interests and the nation's deepest needs, endemic in all transitional societies, poses an integrative challenge of the highest order.

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THE OLD AND NEW ELITES

121 The disjunction between traditional and modernizing sectors that character-
177 izes the socialization of adolescents informs most aspects of contemporary
178 Ethiopian society. A modern institution of Western inspiration has nearly
everywhere been superimposed upon traditional forms, and as yet there has
been relatively little interaction between the two.

[433] In the economy, subsistence production according to traditional techniques
prevails throughout all Amhara areas. Production for national and international
markets is funneled through separate channels: coffee lands and a
few tobacco farms in the southern provinces, specialized commerce in a
dozen or so provincial centers, and a small number of factories dependent
mainly on non-Ethiopian management and, frequently, capital. In the legal
[671] realm varied forms of customary law remain authoritative for much provincial
litigation, while civil, criminal, and maritime codes based on French
and Swiss ideals have been enacted as the law of the nation. The governmental
[64] structure is similarly bifurcated, between local authorities who govern
in the traditional manner, albeit with reduced powers, and a ministerial
[795] system and parliament based on European models. In the case of religious
[794] institutions there remains a wide gulf between the orientation of the Orthodox
churches and that of such Western-inspired formations as the Theological
College and the Orthodox Students Association.

121 This sociological dualism comes to a head in the system of social stratification.
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cation. Since the mechanism of stratification ranks all the members of a 121
society according to the value placed on their qualities and performances by 56
that society, the stratification system of a society is its most inclusive frame- 178 •
work of social order. Here too, however, conflicting value orientations are 181
embodied in more or less distinct status hierarchies, and it is no longer pos-
sible to find status evaluations which are shared throughout the society. It is [571]
in the composition and relations of the elites that the value conflicts in Ethio-
pia today are most explicit, and in their mutual adjustments that the move-
ment toward new forms of integration is most likely to be manifest.

The traditional infrastructure of Abyssinian society was itself relatively 565
stratified. Highest in status were the landowning peasants, the older and 554
wealthier of whom merged imperceptibly into the lower stratum of the
nobility. Next in order were the peasants of various situations who did not
own land: sons waiting to inherit land from their parents, tenants paying
rents in kind to some landlord, and agricultural laborers attached as retainers
on the estates of wealthy peasants, nobles, or churches. Below them were the [463]
statuses of Abyssinians who led a more mobile sort of existence, such as
weavers, minstrels, common soldiers, and beggars.

The trading class was broadly divided into two ranks, that of the mer- 565
chant (*naggâdê*) whose caravans brought goods from afar, and that of the 554
small-scale peddler (*shaqâtch*). The wealthier Abyssinian merchant was 441
accorded very high status, comparable at times to that of the nobility. If an 463
Arab, Armenian, or Muslim Abyssinian, however, his status would be [186]
tainted by that disesteem felt for all outside the ethnic pale. The peddlers as
a class were in a low status, comparable to that of the weavers and minstrels.
Below these were metalsmiths, potters, and tanners, who were sometimes 565
low caste Abyssinian artisans, sometimes Falasha or Gurage tribesmen. Low- 567
est in status were the slaves, captured in wars or raiding expeditions from 554
the Negroid tribes in the west (Shanqalla) and north (Baria and Kunama), 463
and from the Kaffa and other Cushitic groups in the south. Freed for a
generation now, such people still work as household servants and retainers,
or as laborers in the towns.

Such were the classes which performed the drudgery. They produced 565
sufficient surplus to sustain a fairly extensive, if not opulent, leisure class,
which ministered to the more general political and cultural needs of the
society. The feudal nobility and the clergy represented the paramount values [181]
of warfare and religion and shared responsibility for the maintenance of
legal order. Together with the emperor, to whom they were normally subor-
dinate, they commanded the resources and respect of the Abyssinian people
and set standards for their behavior.

565 • 178 463 [701] During the reign of Haile Selassie, the infrastructure of Ethiopian society has become more differentiated. A large standing army, an air force, and a small navy have been recruited and trained by foreign military missions. The modernization of transport and communication has produced a sizable class of semiskilled operatives—truck drivers, airline employees, telephone operators, typesetters, etc. The expansion of government has produced a legion of clerks. In the towns tertiary occupational roles, like salesmen and barbers, have come into being, and the establishment of factories has engendered a small industrial labor force.

All such people tend to differ from the traditional lower classes in their relative enthusiasm for *selṭānē* ("civilization"). Still more enthusiastic are those who have had more intimate and prolonged exposure to the fruits of *selṭānē:* domestic servants in *faranj* homes; students of the secondary schools and colleges; Imperial Bodyguard troops who served in the Korean campaign and recently in the Congo; and highland Eritreans, whose experience under sixty years of Italian colonial administration has rendered them far more modernized than people of other provinces.

178 571 554 565 Similarly, the reign of Haile Selassie has witnessed the emergence of new elite groups. A "new nobility" of government officials and urban plutocrats has taken place beside the old. In addition, a nascent intelligentsia has attained a precarious high status, resting mostly on the esteem of students, some military officers, and resident Westerners. The integrative dilemma of Ethiopia today has more to do with conflicts among and within its various elites than with tribal enmities or masses in revolt.*

643 571 565 Hovering over these four groups, kindred with each but superior to all, has been the personality of the present emperor. Indeed, the history of Ethiopia in the last four decades has for the most part been the story of Haile Selassie's efforts to direct and control the destinies of the old and new elites. The considerable success with which he has done this is a tribute, not only to his own remarkable manipulative skills, but also to the majesty of the office which he possesses. The position of *negusa nagast* has traditionally monopolized the highest reaches of the Abyssinian system of social stratification; constituting, as it were, an elite of One.

THE TRADITIONAL ORDER

643 *The Lofty Throne*

The emperor comprises an elite in the original sense of the word, for to the Ethiopians he is Elect of God (*seyuma egziābhēr*) according to the
——— conventional Ge'ez honorific.

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* Although, as was suggested earlier, tribal and religious differences *may* generate new integrative crises in the future.

> with his numerous following. In the South it is the same and we heard that 175
> Dejasmatch Balcha . . . ruling thousands of square miles and no one knows 631
> how many subjects with a hand of iron, pays no taxes, no tribute, no share 565
> in the upkeep of government. It is common talk that he has been summoned 642
> to Addis Ababa upon more than one occasion and has sent back the reply: 643
> "If you want me, come down here into Sidamo and get me."[58]

The most that Rās Tafari could do to realize his political ambitions then was to work patiently within the existing structure, attempting whenever possible to fill the posts of provincial governors with men of his own.

After his coronation, Haile Selassie continued to be faced by considerable opposition from provincial lords. The governors of Tigre and Gojjam were particularly troublesome, and some nobles from those regions joined their lots to the Italian cause during the occupation. Not until the restoration was Haile Selassie able to effectuate policies which would strip the old nobility of their autonomy once and for all.

Three major innovations of the years after 1941 accomplished this end. 175
One was the establishment of a standing military force under the Emperor's 178
direct control that rendered the existence of separate regional armies un- 565
necessary and possessed a capability clearly superior to that of any force a 631
rebellious lord might muster. This included the national army, trained for 701
a number of years by a British mission; and the Imperial Bodyguard, reestablished after the liberation on a new and expanded basis. These troops monopolized the modern weapons in the country and the limited air power, later developed into a separate air force. In a short time there appeared a new class of military officers, trained with modern techniques, and living as salaried employees of the government. The traditional function of the noble as military commander was thus made obsolete.

Second, under a governmental decree of 1942 a new fiscal system was set up 175
under the Ministry of Finance. In this system the peasants have been obliged 178
to pay a fixed quota of taxes in money, for which they are given a written 651
receipt (*ḳārnē*). These taxes are collected by employees of the Ministry of 652
Finance and transmitted directly to the provincial capitals or to Addis Ababa. 565
This has been a popular reform among the peasantry, who are no longer 631
required to submit arbitrary amounts of goods and labor to their district rulers. For the nobility, however, it means that their legitimate income is restricted to what they produce on their own lands, the rents they receive from their tenants, and—if they hold office—to what they receive from the government as a monthly salary; though in practice it continues to be supplemented, in many cases, by bribes and illegally imposed fees. Thus, they can no longer support a significant number of followers.

175 Finally, by reorganizing the provincial administration through the bureau-
178 cratic machinery of the Ministry of Interior, the power and prestige of
631 regional appointments have been reduced. The authority of the central gov-
642 ernment has been enhanced by redrawing the provincial boundaries so as to
cut across, in many cases, what were traditional administrative regions. Governors at all levels have been made ordinary employees of the Ministry of Interior, with assistants and secretaries provided by the Ministry, who serve as a constant check on their activities. Earlier in his reign, Haile Selassie deprived the great provincial governors of the right to order capital punishment and of the prerogative of conferring lesser titles.

178 Stripped of their military functions, large revenues, and other means of
565 building up their positions, members of the most important noble families
631 have had no alternative but to submit totally to the sovereign authority of
642 Haile Selassie. This has meant, in most instances, their relegation to posts of
646 high prestige but little consequence: diplomatic posts abroad and, more com-
monly, the senate. Established by the Constitution of 1931 as the upper house of parliament, the senate was to consist of members "appointed by His Majesty the Emperor from among the Nobility (Mekuanent) who have for a long time served his Empire as Princes or Ministers, Judges or high military officers." The institution was re-affirmed in the revised Constitution of 1955, and has provided, as one of its continuing functions, an outlet for dignitaries with too much prestige of their own to be trusted with administrative positions or permitted to reside in their home regions.

565 Many lesser nobles have remained in the provinces with appointments as
631 regional governors and judges. Because of the shift of political authority to
693 Addis Ababa, they tend to feel forsaken and dispossessed. They regard the
578 behavior of those who occupy high governmental posts in Addis Ababa as
selfish and corrupt, and view with no little bitterness the fact that youngsters
with college degrees earn a great deal more than they. (A subdistrict gov-
[465] ernor, for example, earns Eth$50 per month, while those with an A.B.
automatically start any government job at Eth$450.)

178 Nevertheless, these lesser nobles continue to comport themselves in the
565 aristocratic manner of the old nobility and retain their high status in the
554 eyes of the local populace. However modest their resources now—and many
continue to enjoy quite sizable holdings of land—they are proud of whatever titles and offices have been given them. Though their part in the national
[571] political structure and status system is not so weighty as that of their fore-
bears, they remain the only fully accepted secular elite in the provinces. It is they who issue the day-to-day commands to the people, and they alone for whom the peasantry has unflinching respect. Short of a brutally totalitarian program that is willing to ignore the sentiments of the mass of tradition-

directed peasantry, and suffer the consequences, no dynamic program of 178
agricultural and social development can take place in Abyssinian areas that 565
does not enlist the active cooperation of the local *bālābbāt* and *shum*.* 554

The Decline of the Clergy

Although the church was instrumental in bringing Rās Tafari to power— 178
by relieving the nobles of their oath of allegiance to Lĭjj Iyāsu—it was as a 643
whole not sympathetic to his policy once he began to rule. Foremost cham- 795
pions of tradition, the clergy viewed with suspicion Rās Tafari's interest in 793
modern education and other reforms. So pronounced was their conservatism that his weekly *Berhānennā Salām* found it newsworthy to report the fact that the clergy of one important provincial church were actually reading the Addis Ababa newspaper each week.[87] He was wise to act gingerly at
first, limiting ecclesiastical reform to such matters as publishing religious [797]
texts in Ge'ez and Amharic, and encouraging the work of foreign missionaries.

In the past three decades, however, changes of many sorts have had the effect of reducing the degree of independent authority which the clergy traditionally enjoyed. These changes included the achievement of independence from the Alexandrian Patriarchate; the weakening of the church under the Italian occupation; subjection of church administration to the central government; and competition from the secular government schools.

Rās Tafari initiated the policy of seeking independence from Alexandria in 1929, when he secured the investiture of five Ethiopian bishops. This gave indigenous clergy, for the first time, the right to ordain priests and deacons, although they remained subordinate to the Egyptian archbishop. In 1950 an Ethiopian bishop, the *eçhagē*, was consecrated as archbishop; and in 1958, culminating Haile Selassie's patient and skillful negotiations, complete autonomy from Alexandria was achieved.

The attainment of ecclesiastical independence has heightened the prestige 178
of national church officials in Ethiopia. It has brought about a re-organization 795
of the national church hierarchy, in which fifteen bishops now hold office, 793
one for each of the fourteen provinces, and one in Jerusalem. At the same time it has reduced the effective freedom of the clergy as a separate status group. Deprived of the external source of legitimacy which the Egyptian *abuna*
formerly provided, the clergy are now entirely subordinated to the power of [643]
the Emperor. This condition was formally articulated in the Constitution of
1955, which made the election and appointment of archbishops and bishops [842]

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* A potentially significant medium of communication between them and the central government is the Chamber of Deputies, which since 1957 has brought popularly elected notables from the provinces to Addis Ababa.

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795 "subject to the approval of the Emperor" and gave him "the right to promul-
793 642 gate the decrees, edicts, and public regulations of the Church, except those
643 concerning monastic life and other spiritual administrations."

The general position of the church had already been weakened by the
648 events of the Italian occupation. Italian policy resulted in the destruction of
795 many church buildings and the massacre of numerous monks, including those
793 of the hallowed monastery of Dabra Libānos. Of the national leaders, the
[792] Egyptian *abuna* was out of the country from 1937 on; two of the bishops were put to death, including the much venerated martyr, Abuna Pēṭros;* and the remaining two compounded the demoralization by openly supporting the invaders. One of these went so far as to anathematize resistance fighters and forbade Ethiopian priests to give Christian burial to those who died as patriots. In some areas, moreover, it is said that the local clergy lost much prestige by welcoming the invader with open arms.

178 Haile Selassie thus had a much stronger hand in his dealings with the
795 clergy when he returned from exile in 1941. The next year he issued a decree
793 which sharply restricted the perquisites of the local clergy. Their landed
[643] properties were no longer tax free, but now carried the obligation to pay taxes
[651] at the normal rate into a central church treasury. The church was deprived of temporal jurisdiction over its ordained and lay members, including the authority to inflict fines, and was denied the right to corvée labor from peasants living on their lands. (In practice these latter restrictions of authority are frequently ignored in the provinces.)

178 The development of a nationwide system of government schools, finally,
871 has broken the clergy's monopoly of educational facilities. Wherever govern-
658 ment schools have invaded traditional Abyssinian regions, the clergy tend to
793 be defensive and resentful. The specific issues have been the decreased prestige of certain traditional religious subjects, which are not taught in these schools, and the comparatively lower income of church teachers. Thus, a full-
[465] time teacher of reading attached to a monastery may receive Eth$15 a month from the central church treasury, whereas a government school teacher in the same area teaching the same subject may earn Eth$150 a month.

793 Despite all these blows, the clergy still retain much the same prestige as
178 ever in the provinces. Their influence over public opinion is considerable, and
[554] has been a major factor in discouraging families in traditional Christian areas
[871] like Manz from sending their children to government schools.† Despite
[658]

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* A statue of Abuna Pēṭros has been raised in the center of Addis Ababa. His fate has been
[538] celebrated in the verse drama by Makonnen Endālkātchaw, *Ya-dam Demṭs*, translated into English as *The Voice of Blood* by Endālkātchaw Makonnen.

† When the Ethiopian government is ready to inaugurate a major program of provincial education, it should not prove difficult to overcome this opposition. A number of provincial priests, with whom the author has discussed this matter, have signified their willingness to serve as

recent restrictions on their income, it remains considerable. It is conservatively 793
estimated that they possess at least fifteen per cent of the arable land in 178
Ethiopia, and their general inertia with regard to agricultural reform remains (923)
a significant conservative factor.

In the modernizing sector, the position of the clergy has been much more 178
vulnerable. The traditional forms of erudition and piety seem to bear little 795
relevance to the intellectual and moral needs of the modernizing elements. 793
The church's reputation for hostility to change further alienates them from it. But it is by no means certain that the church's position will only decline with the passage of time. Ethiopia will be profoundly susceptible to the appeal of traditional revivalist sentiment as the strains attendant on modernization increase; and by its publication of two monthlies, since 1947, the church has already shown, albeit in a limited way, its capacity to employ modern media for traditionalist purposes. On the other hand, if the tiny band of Western-educated church leaders succeed in promoting some degree of modernization in the church, through institutions like the Theological School and the Orthodox Students Association, the clergy may yet play a constructive part in the social and moral life of transitional Ethiopia. It remains to be seen whether its leadership will be effective enough to move the traditionalist clergy to make those adjustments necessary for survival as a respected status group in the modernizing sector.

The New Men of Power

After curbing the independent power of the *makuännent,* Haile Selassie 178
was careful to prevent others from taking their place in the political structure, 565
determined as he was to consolidate in his own hand all the powers they once 554
wielded. As a result of his centralization of government in Addis Ababa, 642
however, a new group of men have gained pre-eminent status at the national level. We may call this group the "new nobility": "new" because of their development of an urban style of life, and because their influence as an elite is largely directed to the modernizing infrastructure, and "nobility" because of their perpetuation of the traditional hierarchical image of a superior and
privileged status group. The core of this status group consists of government [645]
officials with the ranks of minister, vice-minister, and assistant minister, who function essentially as a personal administrative staff for the monarch.

As observed above, Tēwodros clearly saw the need for creating a new class 195
of nobles, freed from regional interests and acting solely according to the 178
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elementary instructors in the government schools, and at salaries much lower than the better [178]
trained Ministry teachers. The presence of just one or two priests in these schools would eliminate [793]
the traditionalist opposition to them that is now so strong. The situation may be compared to that [871]
in Ceylon, where the opposition of Buddhist monks to government schools was eliminated by [658]
incorporating them as teachers in those schools.

175 royal will. A solid foundation for such a class was not possible, however, until
178 the central government had been sufficiently stabilized and expanded. These
565 conditions began to be met under Menelik, who established Addis Ababa in
642 the last decade of the nineteenth century and in 1907 created a number of
645 ministries. Housed in buildings inside the palace compound, the ministries were initially regarded as little more than an ornament to dress up the imperial court. Although men of some stature, like Afa Negus Nasibu and Fitāwrāri Hābta Giyorgis, were named to the posts, the offices themselves did not acquire much prestige. It was no great matter when, five years after the death of Menelik, the ministers were turned out of office by a group of military officers at the instigation of Rās Tafari and sent home to their provincial estates.

175 After becoming emperor himself, however, Haile Selassie revived and en-
178 larged the ministerial system. Since the restoration, it has expanded into a
645 complex bureaucratic structure. In addition to some sixteen ministries, a
647 number of specialized government agencies have been formed, and the military and judicial hierarchies and the diplomatic corps have been considerably expanded. The rapid growth of the central government in the past two dec-
[652] ades is reflected in its budgetary expenditures, which went from about US$10 million in 1942 to an estimated US$110 million in 1962.

178 The growth of this governmental machinery has provided a new basis for
647 elite status in Ethiopia. Mobility channels now run in terms of appointments
571 in the government bureaucracy. The periodic announcement of appointments
554 by the Emperor has become the focus of public interest in Ethiopia since the
565 liberation. Every new list of appointments provides the occasion for intense gossip and *de rigueur* congratulatory parties at the homes of the favored.

178 The new class of high governmental functionaries under Haile Selassie may
565 be regarded as a transitional elite: partly traditional, partly modernizing.
571 With regard to basis of recruitment, values represented, and style of life, the new nobility present, on the one hand, a direct continuation of the old nobility; and, on the other hand, many features novel in Abyssinian society.

178 To some extent recruitment of members of the new nobility was not a
565 creation of new dignitaries, but rather an absorption of members of the old
[646] nobility into the new political organization. The recruitment of *makuānnent* into the senate, which after all is an organ of the central government, may be taken as an ambiguous instance of this. Some others were given important posts in the civil and military administrations. These include members of the princely families of Shoa, Tigre, Wag, Lasta, and Gojjam; the Bakere clan, royalty from the Galla province of Wallaga; and scions of the *makuānnent* who were important in Menelik's day or before, members of aristocratic clans which go by the names of Bēzā, Mojā, Sofanē, and Addisgē. Such persons are likely to have been awarded the old military titles for purely honorific pur-

poses. They have been led to renounce extreme particularistic ambitions, 178
thanks to marital connections, intimidation, the lure of new benefits, and a 565
degree of nationalism, but to some extent they remain spokesmen for regional
and para-dynastic interests.

Men who did not belong to the old nobility were recruited into the new 178
nobility on the basis of two criteria, loyalty and ability, with loyalty clearly the 565
more important of the two. Some men from very humble backgrounds have 554
been thus raised to the highest governmental positions through their "loyalty"
to the Emperor, manifested in great part by their readiness to inform on the
words and deeds of others and their obsequious and flattering manner. These
have normally not been given the traditional military titles but only the titles
of their office. In contrast with the carry-overs from the old nobility, still
known as ***masāfent*** and ***maḳuānnent,*** these men have been called ***bāla-selṭān***
("holders of power"). They have included a number of men who were [648]
active in the fight against the Italians, either through the Hagara Fiqer ("National
Patriotic Association," a group organized in 1935 to promote Ethiopian
unity and combat Italian propaganda) or as patriotic fighters in the resistance.
The Emperor also promoted to high position some men who collaborated
with the Italians, relying on their earlier record as an insurance against latter-day
disloyalty, and using their antagonism against the patriots as a check
against excessive ambitions of the latter.

On the other hand, the new nobility includes those who, whether from high [555]
family background or not, are so placed because of outstanding ability. This
consideration is no longer primarily a question of military ability, but of
competence in dealing with technical modern subjects and with foreign diplomats.
This group may be equated with the older generation of European-educated
Ethiopians. The categories of adjusted aristocrats, ambitious parvenus,
and intellectual bureaucrats have thus constituted a latent subdivision
among the new nobility; and tensions have from time to time been expressed
along those lines.

Despite the elaboration of modern governmental structures under Haile 178
Selassie, the dominant principle of the social order has been that of royal 64
sovereignty. The entire staff of government officials has been the direct sociological
descendant of the traditional court retinue. This was conspicuous in [175]
the titles given by Menelik to a number of the original ministers: ***Afa Negus***
for Minister of Justice; ***Azāzh*** for Minister of Palace; ***Bajirond*** for Treasurer;
and ***Ṭsahāfi Te'ezāz*** for Minister of Pen. These and other court titles remain
in use today. The primacy of the court over all other functions appears in
periodic audiences at the palace, when all high government officials and other
notables are expected to pay their respects no matter what business may be
pending in their offices. The chief value embodied in the status group of the
new nobility as a whole has been that of loyalty to the sovereign.

178 565 661 So long as they remain loyal, the Emperor has tended to let members of the new nobility help themselves to the spoils of office. Some of them retain the view that public office is a private possession, a reward from the emperor rather than an obligation to the nation or people, and that it is, therefore, appropriate to use governmental position primarily to help one's relatives, inflate one's ego, and multiply one's wealth.

178 565 556 [241] [455] For the new nobility, however, wealth is no longer measured primarily in terms of land and cattle, but of money. If they own land, it is of interest chiefly as a source of income, and they tend to prefer using it for cash crops like coffee and *çhat* (a narcotic plant sold in quantities to Arabs) than for the traditional grains and pulse or for experimental crops. They prefer to speculate in real estate rather than to increase the output of their farmlands. Indeed, because of the heightened prestige of money, many officials have been grateful—or would be grateful—for the opportunity to leave government service and become entrepreneurs. They feel very close to that small number of Ethiopians outside the government who have acquired much wealth through commercial enterprise, and who may also be included in the status group of the new nobility.

178 565 556 472 [175] [648] Commercial entrepreneurs came into prominence on the Ethiopian scene in the 1920's, when monopolies in alcohol, matches, salt, and tobacco, as well as trade in coffee and skins, enabled a small number of Ethiopian families, Christian as well as Muslim, to accumulate wealth. Such people became prisoners of their wealth during the occupation, since they felt obliged to collaborate with the Italians in order to protect their privileges. Many more Ethiopians have profited from the modest economic activity in the country since the liberation, although most of Ethiopia's trade remains in the hands of Arabs, Greeks, and Armenians (at least nominally). Their social level approximates that of the higher government officials. They are expected to pay their respects at court along with the *makuānnent* and *bāla-selṭān*. They [662] are often related to high government officials, and attempt to make use of their relatives in office to help them secure commercial advantages. Above all, they share the same style of life.

178 565 369 177 [556] As an urban group, the new nobility enjoy a style of life notably different from that of their predecessors who lived on mountainous estates and in army tents. Even if assigned to provincial posts, members of the new nobility tend to maintain homes in Addis Ababa. They have been quick to incorporate the more conventional urban Western forms of conspicuous consumption. Automobiles and chauffeurs, expensive European clothes, modern houses, Scotch whiskey, and Western-style banquets and dances have become the common ingredients of their subculture.

178 565 554 At the same time, traditional symbols of prestige are still in evidence. The

The households are staffed with numerous servants and retainers, who make certain, 178
for example, that the lord does not work in the garden or carry a package 565
into the house from his car. Expectations of this sort of attendance are carried 554
with the new nobility wherever they go. Similarly, members of the new [357]
nobility are frequently followed about, or waited for, by young relatives and [557]
other aspiring young men, who hope to establish a sort of civil master-retainer
relationship and thereby secure a position, promotion, or loan.

The new nobility also attempts to instill in its children the refined manners 178
and reserve of the old noble subculture. Some of the wealthiest have 565
retained the tradition of private education, in its modern counterpart of sending [867]
their children abroad for secondary school or to private schools in Addis [871]
Ababa. They would like to control their children in the old fashion, but because
of growing cultural confusion have in many cases assumed a more permissive [855]
stance. Thus their children increasingly run about freely, ignore
traditions, and exhibit less fastidious manners.

Owing to their small numbers and the fact that they meet one another so 178
often—at the palace and at social events like weddings—the members of the 565
new nobility tend to be well acquainted with each other. They seem conscious 57
of their status as a privileged stratum but do not form a solidary group. They divide into strongly competitive cliques, a division that itself tends to dissolve into the anxious struggle of each to maintain or improve his position at the expense of the others. The chief way to accomplish this has been to report something incriminating about another person—above all, something that impugns his loyalty to the Emperor. The consciousness of the new nobility has been dominated by the fear of arousing the Emperor's displeasure. The proximity of the throne—a phone call can summon anyone to report to the palace within ten minutes, reason unspecified—makes this a more formidable sanction than in previous generations.

How has Haile Selassie been able to prevent the new nobility from acquiring 178
that relative autonomy of status and self-esteem which the old nobility 565
formerly enjoyed? Why is it, despite the burgeoning of a new "power 643
elite," that the question most earnestly asked by thoughtful Ethiopians and foreign observers for the past several years concerns a probable future "power vacuum"?

Sensitive to encroachment on his "absolute" authority by anyone else, Haile 178
Selassie has kept his officials in a state of weakness through the strategy of 631
his appointments. In this he has been inspired by the traditional methods of 64
Abyssinian rulers who periodically assigned offices to different men through 565
the process of *shum-shїr.* Haile Selassie's policy has been to rotate officials in office every one or two years, in some cases after six months. This has prevented officials from acquiring a significant following in any one position. At the same time it has made certain that none of them will undertake any

178 631 64 565 program not supervised by the Emperor, since any official's budding projects tend to be undone by his successor, whether because of personal vendetta, orders from the Emperor himself, or simply difference of approach. Thus has Haile Selassie been able to make sure that no one besides himself demonstrates any sort of leadership that might be attractive to the public.

At the same time his appointments have been made in such a way as to insure a balance of power—or impotence—favorable to his absolute control. By consistently appointing enemies to adjacent positions he has built in checks upon the behavior and sentiments of his higher officials. He has relied on mutual jealousies and conflicting ambitions to cause each to report anything incriminating he can find on the other. When appointees in the same branch of government have shown undue co-operation and friendliness, he has at times provoked friction between them.

In addition to the checks and balances of the *shum-shĭr* system, the Em-
peror has made use of an extensive intelligence system to keep watch over
those in office and out. Not only the operations of the regular security depart-
[625] ments of the Ministry of Interior and the police, but also some of his closer
advisers have had their own personal networks, financed by moneys diverted
from various government departments.

178 565 656 472 Other measures have been used to check the independence of businessmen. Money has been arbitrarily taken from them by the imposition of fines, confiscation of property, and through requests for contributions for charitable causes. A few private entrepreneurs who have been too successful have been forced into government service. Licenses have been revoked, in some cases given to foreigners rather than to prosperous Ethiopians. Dividends from commercial enterprises have been withheld, or given to others whom the Emperor favored. (Rather than appear unduly wealthy, some Ethiopian investors have preferred to use Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs as the nominal heads of their enterprises.)

178 Due to their relative proximity to the Emperor, their patronage powers,
565 their wealth, and in some cases their family background, the members of the
554 new nobility command considerable deference, particularly in Addis Ababa.
[177] Their Westernized style of life (itself modeled to a great extent on the Em-
peror's habits) has set new standards for modernizing Ethiopia. At the same
[829] time they are the objects of much stereotyped hostility. The people in the
country, and the commoners of the towns, regard them as oppressive and un-
sympathetic. Their logic often runs: "The big men around the court are no
good; only the Emperor is for us." The intellectuals see them as reactionary,
selfish, and corrupt. The massacre of some fifteen members of the new nobil-
ity as the final act of the abortive coup d'état in 1960 was an expression of this
latter judgment.

178 565 643 662 The chief advantage of the new nobility—their relative enjoyment of im-

perial favor—has also been their great dilemma. Those who have been con- 178
scientious in seeking to carry out their proper responsibilities have been torn 565
by the need to do what they regard as improper in order not to incur the [643]
disfavor of the sovereign. Those with narrowly opportunistic motives have [662]
been rendered no less uneasy by the need to counter the offensives of their
enemies at court.

This dilemma and the related "immorality" is a natural consequence of Ethiopia's attempt to begin modernization under a traditional despotic authority. The behavior of the new nobility that is so bitterly attacked by the intellectuals will continue to reproduce itself until the process of modernization renders it obsolete—until the specialized standards which control economic and governmental activities have been firmly institutionalized, with controls that operate independent of expressions of loyalty to the sovereign.

Standards of competence have been more firmly institutionalized in the 701
case of a special group among the new men of power—members of the mili-
tary profession. The officers corps should in fact be considered as an elite [571]
group in its own right, in view of its distinct status and functions as well as
the size and political importance of Ethiopia's security forces. The regular
armed forces number nearly thirty thousand; there are also an estimated [625]
twenty thousand men in the police force and an unknown number in the
recently reactivated territorial armies. The number of men with the rank
of major or equivalent and above is thus probably close to a thousand.

Ethiopian military officers are recipients of the special esteem their country- 701
men have always felt toward men of war. They have also acquired prestige 554
from the military's efforts to defend and liberate the country during the
Italian period and more recently for their backstopping of Ethiopia's claims
on the Somali border. They have at the same time been objects of an under-
current of civilian hostility, based on the feeling that they are "parasites" and
doing nothing positive to enrich the country. Their style of life lends itself
readily to provoking the latter sort of objection. While dissatisfaction over [578]
income on the part of non-commissioned military personnel has been a major
source of tension in Ethiopia during the past decade, the perquisites of higher
officers compare quite favorably with those of their civilian counterparts.
They have been given substantial salaries—and in addition, free housing, free
cars, and servants and retainers drawn from the rank and file. Keeping in [571]
mind his particular need to insure the loyalty of the military elite, the
Emperor has furthermore presented personal gifts to individual officers
directly from time to time.

As a result of intimate contact with European and American personnel 701
who have trained them in Ethiopia, experience abroad as trainees or in United 648
Nations military missions, and the emphasis on rationalization inherent in
the modern military profession, members of the military elite tend to be

571 [443] than those necessary to perform their jobs. They do not attempt to maintain and build personal libraries, though there are a few exceptions to this. The three small bookstores in Addis Ababa offer only the most insubstantial fare.

571 538 [214] Nor, finally, have more than a handful of private individuals taken upon themselves the charge of a scholarly or literary calling. Although Marcel Cohen heralded the birth of a printed literature in Amharic as early as 1925,[28] writing is still not very important on the Ethiopian scene.* The output of original books and pamphlets in Amharic averaged less than fifteen a year over the past two decades. The presses and bookstores distribute Amharic publications indifferently at best. Much of the literary impetus produced by the desire of many Ethiopians to write, and the obvious need for good writing that would address itself to the intellectual demands of the present generation, has been sapped by economic, political, and cultural factors.

571 538 214 [213] [656] The economic factors include the high cost of printing; the diminutive market; and the absence of publishing houses. If an author wants to be read, he must normally pay for publication himself. Those who cannot must either find a patron in the Crown—frequently a highly lucrative arrangement—or resort to mimeographic duplication, or else remain unpublished. The censorship system and anxiety about spontaneous expression of any sort which has been fostered by prevailing political conditions constitute additional obstacles to literary development.

571 538 [199] [192] The paucity of serious writing has been the result no less of prevailing cultural conditions. The low intellectual level of his potential audience, the absence of channels for criticism, and the dearth of precedent make it difficult for the Ethiopian writer to determine good standards of writing. The confused state of Amharic, owing to regional variations and the absence of consensus on neologisms and loan words for expressing modern concepts, poses many problems on the level of sheer vocabulary. The temptation to get into print quickly, if the financial and political barriers can be hurdled, exceeds the temptation to work long and hard on an opus of quality. The desire to pontificate frequently eclipses the quest for understanding.

571 Those conditions which have inhibited the growth of Amharic literature—poverty, governmental reluctance to provide sufficient freedom and support, the newness of the modernizing culture, and the motivational level of the intellectuals themselves—may be viewed more broadly as responsible for the relative barrenness of Ethiopian intellectual life as a whole. Insofar as these conditions change in the coming decades, a radical change in the quality and organization of Ethiopian intellectual life may be expected. As a sociological

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[178] [212] * This is no longer due, however, to the negative attitude toward writing as such which was discussed in chapter iii. That traditional inhibition has been largely removed—primarily, it seems, by the postwar requirement that all legal accusations and court proceedings be set down in writing.

phenomenon, however, the intellectuals are already unmistakably in evidence, 571
and if one contrasts them as a social stratum with the new nobility their outlines become readily visible.

The new nobility came into being in consequence of Haile Selassie's policy 178
of political *centralization*. The status of its members rests on their possession 565
of political influence, measured partly by the strength of their personal follow- 554
ings but primarily by how close they are to the Emperor, and on the Western- [642]
ized style of life made possible by wealth acquired through political office, [177]
rents, and commerce. Its ascendance as a status group may be located approx- [556]
imately in the decade after 1945, the year in which failure of a revolt in Tigre
Province marked the end of attempts to assert provincial claims inspired by
allegiance to members of the old nobility. The decade was marked by rapid [642]
growth of the factors supportive of centralized government and the new [647]
nobility: expansion of the bureaucracy, strengthening of the national military [701]
force, and economic advance.* [433]

The intelligentsia, by contrast, has come into being in consequence of Haile 178
Selassie's policy of technical *modernization*. The status of its members rests 571
on their possession of secular Western education, status differences within 554
the group depending on the academic degree attained and the prestige of 871
the school attended. The development of the intelligentsia as a counter-elite has its beginnings in the present decade, beginning around 1955, the year of the jubilee celebration of the twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Emperor's coronation. This was a lavishly contrived affair which, occurring at about the time that the first sizable group of postwar college students had returned from abroad, accentuated in their minds a sense of alienation from the *ancien régime*. The present decade is marked by dramatic increase in the number of Ethiopians with college degrees and secondary school certificates, and in the general prestige of education as such in the country. For, it will be remembered, in the late forties the government found it necessary to pay families to get them to send their children to school; whereas by the late fifties, there were far too many applicants for the available places.

The pattern of recruitment of members of the new nobility has been con- 178
tinuous with important elements of the traditional social system. It rests on 565
the belief in the sanctity of the emperor and the legitimacy of his unlimited [643]
political authority, and the practice of emperors sometimes to raise to high position men of low background who were *ipso facto* more trustworthy. The personnel of the new nobility, moreover, have in a number of cases been drawn from members of old noble families.

By contrast, the formation of the intelligentsia represents a break with the 178
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* Due largely to trade in coffee, whose export value climbed more or less steadily from Eth$17 million in 1947 to Eth$123 million in 1957. [439]

178 571 [177] [871] past. The intellectuals are the product of a secular school system which is, as we have seen, a structure foreign to Abyssinian tradition. Their members are drawn from all parts of Ethiopian society, and in almost no cases consist of Western-educated members of the old group of literati, the *dabtarā*. The question of their integration into what has remained an essentially traditional social system has thus been Ethiopia's main sociological dilemma during the present decade. We shall return to this question after considering the composition and general situation of the intellectual class.

571 463 [464] Whatever his line of work, the Ethiopian intellectual tends to be employed by the government, since employment opportunities in the private sector are still extremely limited; and where such exist, the government has often claimed priority over the intellectual's services by virtue of its having educated him. Many of the intellectuals work as public administrators, in the middle echelons of the government bureaucracy, with the titles of "assistant," "director," and "director general"; and there has been a growing tendency [895] to appoint them in the higher levels, especially since 1961. Hundreds of them now work as teachers in the elementary and secondary schools,* and some six dozen teach at the college level. A small but growing number are employed as physicians, medical workers, engineers, and legal advisers in various government institutions. Still another group works in the small communications field—on the staffs of the various newspapers, the patriotic monthly *Menen*, and Radio Addis Ababa. The small group holding jobs outside the government works as engineers and bureaucrats in industrial firms, as employees of the Ethiopian Air Lines, or have small commercial or agricultural enterprises of their own.

571 871 With respect to interaction among the intellectuals, however, the most important distinction among them has been the place where they received their education. Here we may speak of two main groups: those who received part of their education abroad, the "foreign-educated" or "returnees"; and those who received all their education in Ethiopia, the "local-educated" or "locals."†

The Returnees

Close to two hundred Ethiopians studied abroad prior to the Italian occu- [177] pation. Since French was then the official European language in Ethiopia, familiar with in more industrialized societies. Nor is there any disposition to improvise improvements with what facilities are available. Little attention is paid to the condition of offices, for example, which are normally located in dark, drab, depressing rooms. Furthermore, the operating procedures of Ethiopian administration are bound to frustrate those who have been conditioned to more rationalized systems of organization. Departments frequently operate with ex post facto budgets. Filing systems are hopelessly archaic. There is virtually no public consciousness of the importance of work *time*. 571 466 [47] 571

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* About forty-five hundred Ethiopians, of varying levels of educational attainment, were teaching in government schools of all types in 1960–61, according to the Ministry of Education school census for that year.

† This term is used as a neutral descriptive category, free from any negative connotations it may have acquired when first coined by the returnees. More recently, the West African term "been-to" has been incorporated into Amharic for referring to the returnee.

> Ethiopian persons are not geared to a timetable. I have to keep telling myself: "This is how we do it here." Seeing a ten-story building go up in a month, grass and all—that is not for here. . . . I get most annoyed when I cannot finish some matter as promised. Not wanting to reveal the name of my colleague or superior who is holding up the action, I have to make up excuses. Eventually I run out of excuses and this bothers me. . . . Sometimes I get angry and say: "I have given my word to someone, and must have the matter ready today; please sign it." And am told: "Oh, well, don't rush things so." 466 805

Work relationships have frequently exasperated the returnees. There has been little inclination to give technically competent employees proper jurisdiction over the personnel in their departments. Technically uneducated superiors have tended to make unrealistic demands—for example, requesting an immediate report on a complicated question that requires weeks to prepare. On the other hand, they have tended to assume that their age and experience are equivalent to the technical knowledge of the foreign-trained, so that technically warranted projects have been casually dismissed because they do not strike the fancy of the superior. 571 466

The returnees have not been so despondent about these conditions which, after all, could be changed—than they are about the apparent futility of trying to change them. Older employees are quick to resent alterations in the accustomed order. 571 466 178 829

> My efforts to reform are opposed by most of the men who run the [postal] system now. Some of them have been working there for forty years or so, and they want to keep things just the way they were when mail came in on camels, because they have always done it that way.

Such resistance to change at the workaday level is tacitly supported by those in the upper echelons of authority—the new nobility. In them the returnees have found their main antagonists and from them have received their most painful lacerations. [565]

The *shamäggelotch*, or "elders," as they are termed by the intelligentsia, have by no means presented a solidary front in opposition to the young modernizers. On the contrary, the attitude of the new nobility toward the 571 565 178 829

571 returnees has generally been sympathetic, and some of them have been quite
565 helpful to individuals or groups of students during their hard pressed days
178 as students abroad. The situation of action, however, has kept their degree
[829] of support of the returnees to a minimum. Three patterns of elder-returnee
relations can be discerned: (1) The elder is concerned above all to maintain his position and, hence, to defend himself against any encroachment on his power on the part of younger people. This type has resorted to the various techniques of court politics—false rumors, libelous accusations, etc.—in order to check the influence of the returnees and have the more reformist among them transferred to less favorable positions. (2) The elder believes that if anything is to be accomplished in Ethiopia, it must be done by the educated young people, but he must be cautious in supporting the latter, for fear of getting into trouble at the palace himself if he offends any entrenched interests. Even when a returnee has been able to get the support of such a man for some reform, he may find when the time for implementation comes that his supporter has been transferred and left no commitment in writing for his successor. (3) While generally sympathetic to the returnees, this type fears the rashness and inexperience of youth and feels itself threatened by the prospect of being displaced. His apprehension is not aggressively expressed, but tends to take the form of discrediting the returnees by blaming them for every possible mistake. Whether due to the antagonism, caution, or ambivalence of the new nobility, the returnees have found relatively little effective support for their projected reforms. The ministers typically have shown them a progressive face and just as often have pursued a stagnant policy.

571 Vocational malaise and ideological uncertainty thus reinforce each other.
581 The cycle of frustration is complete when we consider the marital problems
584 of the returnee, which revolve about the difficulty of getting to know poten-
178 tial spouses, financial handicaps, the changing definition of marriage, and
[562] latent warfare between the sexes in the modernizing sector.

571 Except for a small number of returnees whose marriages have had to be
584 arranged ones because of political considerations, the foreign-educated men,
834 and a few of the women, are determined to choose their own spouses. Getting
178 to know a potential spouse, however, remains a difficult matter. The traditional mores prevail with regard to social relationships between the sexes. A girl who goes out with boys is *ipso facto* presumed to have a bad character, and many of the girls in whom a returnee might be interested are not permitted to go out by their parents. There are few places where a young man and woman can go together and have privacy. Those who attempt to follow the Western custom of dating have been embarrassed.

585 The cost of marriage presents another obstacle. The quality of housing that
511 a returnee aspires to for his potential family is far beyond his means in the
571 present-day economy. Other assumed necessities—an automobile, expensive

furniture, etc.—are equally burdensome investments if the returnee does not 571
possess them. Furthermore, the traditional large wedding is still expected in 585
most cases. In the city this involves an enormous expense—as much as 511
Eth$2,000-$4,000—which often puts the groom in debt for several years.*

There are many returnees for whom these factors are excuses more than insuperable 571
obstacles, or who frankly prefer the extended bachelordom made 582
possible by the greater freedom of the modernizing sector to an uncertain
match. If, as frequently is the case, they would marry only an educated wife, [581]
they may be discouraged by the shortage of educated Ethiopian women; or
beset by too much pride, if coming from a humble background, to ask for the
hand of an educated girl who is likely to come from an upper-class family.
They may be victims of the cycle of antagonism that has developed between [578]
educated men and women in Ethiopia, the former attacking the latter for demanding
too much in the way of material things and being only superficially
modernized—"half-baked"—and the latter indicting the former for preferring
foreign girls and unjustly neglecting Ethiopian women.

But the root of the problem is often deeper (leaving aside, for this discussion, 581
characterological factors). It is entwined with a basic insecurity about 178
the whole idea of marriage in the transitional atmosphere of contemporary 177
Ethiopia. Perhaps nowhere in the minds of the returnees do traditional and 571
modern norms stand in such delicate counterpoise as with regard to the question
of the sort of wife one should marry and the proper type of relation to
have with her. Should he prefer the traditional woman, modestly dressed and
inconspicuous, or the Western ideal of a sexually attractive female? Should he
have a wife who stays at home all the time, or one whom he takes along to
social gatherings? Should he have a wife with whom to share interests and
discuss problems, or one to order about and keep in her place? The returnees
have normally been attracted by the Western marriage pattern while abroad,
but it is so out of place in the Ethiopian context that many are troubled by the
prospect on return. The foreign-educated man feels he should have an educated
wife, but he also feels threatened by a woman who is independent,
especially if she is holding a job. Such ambivalence adds an additional dimension
of vulnerability to the returnee's position.

In sum: the conditions of life receptive to a modernizing intellectual 121
stratum have not yet been established in Ethiopia. The personal frustrations 571
of the returnees are an inevitable consequence of their being the bearers of 177
modern culture in a traditional oligarchical order—especially one that has 178

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* A new custom has developed in response to this problem. It has become the practice in some
offices for sheets of paper to be circulated prior to a wedding in the ministry or agency where [178]
the groom is employed. Co-workers write the amount they wish to be deducted from their
salaries in their behalf. Most recently, modest weddings have started to become respectable.

121 been affected by modernizing agents for but a relatively brief period and in
571 a relatively diluted fashion. The beliefs and values which the returnees
177 acquired while abroad concern national development, technical competence,
178 and individuality, while the norms of the social structure in which they must
live are based on the values of loyalty to monarch, ascribed status, and
authoritarian relations.

121 Of many possible types of response to such a situation of strain, four are
571 common among the Ethiopian intelligentsia. These we may designate by the
177 terms Opportunism, Withdrawal, Reformism, and Rebellion. With reference
178 to the three variables of commitment to modern goals and norms, acceptance
of existing authorities, and the distinction between "activity" and "passivity,"
156 these patterns may be represented schematically as in Table 14.[59]

TABLE 14

MODES OF ADAPTATION OF ETHIOPIAN RETURNEES

	Commitment to Modern Values	Acceptance of Existing Authorities	"Activity"
Opportunism	−	+	+
Withdrawal	+	−	−
Reformism	+	+	+
Rebellion	+	−	+

Opportunism is the mode of adaptation in which the returnee's commitment to modern goals and norms is eclipsed by his passion for status, power,
[554] and income. He differs from the traditional aspirant for high position in
Abyssinia in that two of his status qualifications are novel—residence abroad,
and a university degree—and above all in that the pursuit of his personal goals entails a *renunciation* of nationalistic ideals and universalistic standards which were nurtured while abroad. For some opportunists this is no real problem: their study abroad was all along essentially a façade to be used in advancing their careers. But for the others the process of becoming an opportunist is a gradual one and attended by chronic self-recriminations, as the returnee finds himself compulsively agreeing with his superiors and flattering them on every occasion, and performing actions primarily for the sake of advancement rather than for the sake of doing a job well.

> It is impossible to go on pursuing progressive principles indiscriminately. I sometimes see my friends doing things now which we used to condemn

> when we were students abroad together. I wonder at times if I am losing sight of my principles altogether.

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Withdrawal is the solution of those who have retained their principles at the expense of being effectual in action. The routes of escape are varied. One way is transferring attention to problems outside the country—to international relations, problems of pan-Africanism, or the gossip about London, Paris, and New York.

> To me the independence of all African nations is more important than the progress of Ethiopia.

Some spend their energies in convivial relations with resident Westerners (diplomatic and technical assistance personnel, foreign businessmen) or in the traditional rounds of family visiting. Quite a few returnees lose themselves in card-playing or chess whenever they can, and a number have taken to heavy drinking. Often the returnee who withdraws shows no "symptoms" other than a general constriction of his life into narrow work routines and creature functions. At the same time he may be experiencing a fairly acute sense of estrangement.

> Our generation is not really living. We are not "engaged." The simple weaver—most of the people in this country—are "engaged." We are not; we live from day to day. When I leave work I go to the Ras Hotel or somewhere else. I don't want to go home, there is nothing there for me. I have nothing to work for. I have no family, nor any interest in saving money.

The third type of response, Reformism, involves the attempt both to maintain principles and to be effective in action under the existing political order. This alternative places great demands on the personality system and might well be designated as the pattern of "moral heroism."

> What we lack today is proper organization. In default of organization, we are forced to rely on morality.

The reformist returnee serves his country according to universalistic standards even though these norms are scarcely institutionalized; even though, in other words, he is likely to be criticized and even punished for maintaining standards in the face of demands by superiors and relatives to do otherwise, or for solving problems in a rational manner on his own initiative. Yet if he is officially disregarded or censured, his efforts do not go unnoticed by the patriotic modernizing elements of the population who, in a covert, informal system of communication, tend to establish severe judgments on the "bad guys" and the "good guys," and to idolize the latter as potential leaders.

In the case of Rebellion, finally, the attempt is made to be active in the pursuit of modern goals but in a spirit of basic alienation from the existing

121 authorities. Except for a very few eccentric individuals who have seemed
571 oblivious to the dangers of speaking out their criticism of the status quo in
177 public, this has in the nature of current circumstances necessarily involved
• 178 clandestine activity. Returnees have been involved in small conspiratorial
156 groups since the mid-fifties. The December, 1960, coup d'état has been the
[669] most ambitious rebellious project to be acted out so far. Similarly motivated
[668] activities have included the duplication and distribution of subversive literature, and the formation of small groups as groundwork for an eventual political party.

Our data do not permit reliable estimates of the frequency of these different modes of adaptation among the returnees. It is important to note, however, that individuals often change from one mode to another in the course of their experience after return and that many follow more than one pattern at the same time. It is unlikely that the total number of returnees oriented primarily as rebels has ever exceeded two per cent. Most of them move in and out of phases of Reformism, Withdrawal, and Opportunism, depending to a large extent on the accidents of their appointments. A more concrete picture of their experience may be suggested by the following case study, that of a Western-educated Ethiopian who went from a phase of Withdrawal to one of Reformism tinged with Opportunism.

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The Adjustment of "Haile": Case Study of a Returnee

October, 1958. Haile has recently returned from four years of study in a Western country. He speaks very critically about the state of things in Ethiopia. He is particularly upset by the prevailing inefficiency, the lack of industriousness, and the interminable procrastination (*Ishi naga*).

January, 1959. Haile seems deeply depressed. The ministry in which he has been placed affords him no opportunity to work effectively and the job he has bears no relation to what he was trained for. He has withdrawn more into himself, but to all outward appearances plays perfectly well, with great self-assurance, the role of the Amhara bureaucrat.

July, 1959. Now Haile is working in a different ministry, in a job somewhat more closely related to his training. He appears to feel productive and useful now, and his criticism is constructive. For example, he frequently compares the situation in the United States and Ethiopia, to show how the same sort of problem can be solved more readily in the U.S. because of its greater facilities. Though Ethiopia's comparative handicaps frustrate him, he talks of plans for the development of Ethiopia with some enthusiasm. . . . Haile complains of an

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829 the Amharic phrase *ya-kantu weddâsê zaman*—"the era of futile flattery."

121 For, whatever other aspects of modern culture they have identified with,
571 the locals and returnees are seized with the promise of its first principle: dynamism.[62] Should they join forces, among themselves and with each other, they might create the effective intelligentsia which is indispensable for realizing this dynamism in action. They would play complementary, and equally necessary, parts; the locals contributing their greater drive and closeness to traditional society, the returnees their broader perspective and skepticism toward simplistic answers and total reforms.

There are numerous obstacles to such a progressive development. Some of them represent the persistence among the intellectuals of a number of traditional pan-Abyssinian characteristics which inhibit both the exercise of creative leadership and the capacity for solidary action. The traditional context of these characteristics will be discussed in the chapters which follow. The most conspicuous obstacle, however, has been the manner in which the Ethiopian government has sought to integrate the intellectuals in the social system. This is the subject to which we now turn.

771 *The Role of the Government*

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[181] In the hierarchy of values which sustained the traditional Abyssinian social order, that of the transcendental religious orientation represented by the Orthodox Church may be said to have held the paramount position. This is the sense in which, as has so often been remarked, religion has been Abyssinia's only truly unifying factor throughout the centuries. Religious charisma transferred from foreign sanctuaries—the mythical Ark of the Covenant brought from Jerusalem and the archbishop periodically imported from Egypt —provided the ultimate source of legitimacy in the society, upholding the authority of a sacred Christian monarch, church-defending warlords, and a numerous and functionally differentiated clergy. It so penetrated the social
[794] system that the basic unit of Abyssinian civil life was in fact a religious one, the parish.

643 In retrospect it would seem that the most profound aspect of Haile Selassie's
181 accomplishment has been to dislodge the transcendental religious value from
178 highest place and to replace it with the system-integrative value of loyalty to
771 the emperor.[63] His mission has been above all a secularizing one. To accomplish it he has had greatly to increase his political and economic resources; but insofar as his regime has been accepted, and not based exclusively on sheer power—which to some extent is certainly the case—the paramount value in Ethiopia under Haile Selassie has become loyalty to the emperor as a symbol of the whole society. The autonomous significance of the church has been reduced; its extra-Ethiopian source of charisma has been cut off, and its func-

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tion has been more closely than ever tied to the service and support of the 181
Crown. 178 771

The system-integrative value was not only subordinate to transcendental 178
religious values in the traditional order, but it was also in competition with 181
the separate instrumental orientations of the feudal lords. This introduced the 643
chief instability of the traditional system. Commitment to the separate goals 642
of the feudal lords chronically competed with that of loyalty to the emperor; 631
and after the calamities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the former decisively gained the upper hand. With the ascendance of the system-integrative value under Haile Selassie, accordingly, the semi-autonomous status of feudal nobles could no longer be tolerated, and their powers and functions were sharply reduced.

In their stead, but as arms of the emperor and living symbols of allegiance 178
to him, a new nobility was established as the focus of national power and 181
prestige. New goals were pronounced for the system as a whole, but inte- 565
grative considerations of loyalty remained decisive: no system goals were pur- [085]
sued which threatened to disrupt the internal security of the regime. Finally, 178
a generation of young men was trained in skills that would provide sufficient 181
technical competence to provide amenities and façades to edify the emperor 571
and his courtiers as well as to increase the nation's military strength, standard 871
of living, and international prestige. The integrative strategy in dealing with educated Ethiopians has consistently been one of exploiting their skills without permitting the values represented by them—technical competence and national development—to be fully actualized; to make them, in effect, appendages of the court just as much as the new nobility.

Haile Selassie has sought to do this by maintaining a paternalistic relation- 178
ship with the intellectuals. Government pronouncements stress that whatever 643
advantages Ethiopians have had by way of education have resulted from his 571
personal generosity. The Emperor has sought to make visible his paternal 871
solicitation and bounty, for example, by visits to various secondary schools and colleges, and by sending them baskets of fruit on occasion. He has personally conferred the diplomas to all graduates of the University College. Similarly, Ethiopian students who have returned from study abroad have normally been expected to have an audience with the Emperor, in which their occupational plans are discussed and they are given some fatherly advice from the throne. The following excerpts from typical audiences of this nature were reported in the *Ethiopian Herald*.

[A speech by a returnee]:

> Your Imperial Majesty!
>
> I feel honoured and privileged to speak on behalf of my fellow students expressing our deep gratitude to Your Imperial Majesty. . . .

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> Thanks to the untiring endeavour of Your Imperial Majesty in the field of education, we now have not only elementary and secondary schools throughout the country but also different higher educational institutions providing the youth of our country with higher education. Besides this, competent students are selected and sent abroad for specialization, as a result of which the number of Ethiopian students in foreign countries is increasing. Those of us who are now standing before Your Imperial Majesty are only a few among those who have been given such an opportunity. . . .
>
> Your Imperial Majesty's struggle is to enable Ethiopia to benefit from the advantages of modern education in order to improve the standard of living of Your people so that Ethiopia will play adequately its part in the international community. Consequently, the public services that are rendered in the reign of Your Imperial Majesty are enormously great compared with the past. This can be seen easily by the number of ministries and other government agencies established by Your Imperial Majesty. . . .[64]
>
> [A reply by the Emperor]:
>
> We have been deeply touched by what you have said on behalf of the returned students. From you, We expect devotion to your country and your Emperor. . . . Endeavour to profit your country from the fruits of your education. Men are in great need today. It is not enough to be labeled as "man"—one must be worthy of the name by being of use to the community. This is the real test of education.
>
> You must get in intimate touch with the cultural heritage of your country. Familiarise yourselves with the modes of life from which you must have been estranged naturally by your absence. You must endeavour to purge yourselves gradually of alien influence in your daily lives, and so God help you.[65]

This sort of paternal relation has served not only to promote the loyalty of his educated "children" but also to check mild cases of dissidence. Grown men with sophisticated technical training who may have voiced some critical sentiments have been called in for mild reproof: "Why have you behaved thus? Did We not always bring you fruit and other things when you were at school?"

Such a policy was no doubt viable when Ethiopians with secondary education numbered in the hundreds, but it becomes increasingly implausible as the Emperor's family of educated youth multiplies into thousands. No less relevant to its long-run futility is the fact that knowledge, unlike wealth and political position, is an inalienable possession. Their knowledge gives Western-educated Ethiopians a kind of independence of the Emperor that is lacking in most of the new nobility, and that perhaps may be compared to the private armies of the feudal lords or the power of excommunication held by the church. It was awareness of this that prompted one returnee to say: "The Emperor will have to learn that our education is not a plaything he can turn on or off as he pleases."

But this gentle, paternal control has been backstopped by more rigorous 643
sanctions. Censorship controls assure that anything that is published is highly 571
flattering of the government. Intelligence networks keep intellectuals from 656
speaking their minds and developing them through open exchange with others. Associations have in general not been permitted to form, or else have been saturated with government informers. Coupled with these repressive [557]
measures has been the policy of making appointments dependent on the extent to which one curries favor with the Emperor directly, or one of the new nobles who is high in favor at a given time. The intellectuals, no less than the new nobility, have been kept in line by *shum-shĭr* and *divide et impera.* "We have been kept from acting," said one remorseful returnee, "by fear and the sweetness of office."

In the political order sustained by the rule of Haile Selassie, the paramountcy 571
of loyalty to the imperial government as a value has precluded the ascendance 578
of values of national development and technical competence, values it is 643
the peculiar burden of the intelligentsia to bear and assert. In this situation a [181]
vicious cycle of mutual mistrust has developed between the government and the intellectuals. Although the articulation of standards and the expression of criticism are important functions of intellectuals, the Emperor has tended to regard all expressions of criticism which reflect on the government, which is his personal government, as expressions of filial ingratitude at best, and at worst as signs of subversion. The intellectuals, in turn, have accepted this definition of the situation and have tended to assume—after some disheartening experiences in the course of the fifties—that is was not plausible for them to express criticism in a framework of basic loyalty to the regime. Distrust fed distrust, and antagonism mounted. The abortive coup d'état of December, [669]
1960, was but the most outspoken and violent expression of this.

This growth of antagonism to the government has seeped down among the students. The feeling has become increasingly widespread among students at home and abroad that genuine service to the nation and the performance of technical functions are incompatible with a loyal and secure existence under the present regime. Thus, one student in a Western country said in 1961: "I am afraid to return to Ethiopia. I fear that I shall either lose all my principles, as so many of my friends seem to have done, or that I shall end up without a job or in prison."

ETHIOPIA'S DILEMMA

Haile Selassie has often proclaimed his devotion to a program of modernization. 121
His personal achievements in this direction have been substantial: the 643
establishment of much modern bureaucratic machinery, the institution of a 178 [647]
parliament and electoral procedures, a mild degree of industrialization, and, [646]
above all, the provision of a modern secular education for thousands of young [666]
people. [871]

121 people. He has been the procreator of much of what demand for moderniza-
643 tion now exists in the country, although the Italian colonial administration
178 must also be credited for a certain amount of this demand. By the fifties,
however, the growth of the demand of modernization had become self-sustain-
(181) ing, if only in a relatively small part of the population. At that point Haile
Selassie was unwilling, or at least unable, to take the next step, to raise na-
tional development higher in the societal value hierarchy than loyalty to the
[571] Crown. Thus, a traditional oligarchy has been maintained, in which the
development of a self-respecting modern intelligentsia has been effectively
restrained and its decisive ascendance as a new elite has been prevented.

121 The paramount sociological problem in Ethiopia in the coming decades concerns whether or not this pattern will be broken. There is no guarantee that it will be. It is highly thinkable that the opportunists among the intellectuals will be absorbed into the new nobility and that a new oligarchy will entrench itself and maintain its exclusive position by increased repression.[66] The number of young people being given secondary and college education will continue to be limited to a diminutive percentage, and the deeply rooted sentiments of the mass of the population for a regime of traditional oligarchy will not be offended. Economic development will proceed at a snail's pace, and what additional wealth is produced will flow into the pockets of a small minority. One possible outcome of such an eventuality would be that the modernizing infrastructure of the society would grow increasingly restless, culminating in a revolution which installed a modernizing oligarchy.

Alternatively, modernizing forces already unleashed in the country may gather momentum and sustain a gradual breakthrough of the new order. If one were to credit the reports of many who have spoken with the Emperor at first hand, this would be his desire. But far more than imperial approval of a distant ideal is required for it to become reality. Two conditions, above all, would be essential. One is that the systematic, if unwitting, demoralization of the intellectuals would have to be ended. Some sphere would have to be created in which universalistic standards have full sway, in which a modernizing intelligentsia can maintain and develop standards and transmit them to younger elements. The most obvious way to do this would be through a university which, by guaranteed financial support, independence from political pressures, and determined operation at a high standard, could provide the Ethiopian government and people with the technical and executive intelligentsia needed for effective modernization, and could provide an environment in which a corps of "custodians of the public good," loyal to the regime but free to express criticism, might be developed. The program for such a university was carefully drawn up by the planners of the Haile Selassie I University. It remains to be seen whether the opposition which muffled that program shortly after its inception, in the spring of 1962, was motivated primarily by

at social gatherings in the course of discussions about nearly any subject. One 691
cannot but conclude that the Amhara litigate to a large extent because for 182
them it is an intrinsically pleasurable activity. At times, in fact, the forms of [517]
litigation are acted out as in a game. *Teṭāyaq,* for example, analogous to the [524]
Western process of cross-examination and a beloved feature of traditional [695]
court procedure, is sometimes practiced at parties though it has been out- [178]
lawed in modern courts.[10] Two men will face a "judge" and try to bedevil each other with sly questions and preposterous claims. The content of the dispute is of no matter; it may be sheer nonsense.

Amhara litigants are ingenious at expressing themselves. They do so with 155
gestures, intonation, and timing that achieve considerable dramatic effect. 537
They are delighted to perform at the slightest provocation. The following 691
incident, recorded during a morning at court in Manz, illustrates that dimen- 695
sion of Amhara litigation which consists of the inherently gratifying expression of oral aggression:

> The defendant had been accused of plowing the plaintiff's land without permission. In fact, however, the plaintiff had given the defendant previous permission to plow there—in front of a group of elders who testified accordingly. The judge therefore ruled against the plaintiff. The plaintiff said he would appeal this decision, because the permission he granted had not been registered in the governor's office and, besides, he had some other complaint to bring against the defendant.
>
> At this point someone in the audience rose and said: "That is all. The judge has ruled against you, and the case is finished." Whereupon the plaintiff told this speaker that he should keep quiet, that his speaking out was against the law, that he had bothered him when the case was tried before a lower level judge previously and should bother him no more. Instead of hushing up, the speaker left his position against the wall and stood next to the defendant, asserting that he would speak in behalf of the latter.
>
> The plaintiff then accused this man of talking out of turn. The judge acknowledged this accusation and called for witnesses. Instantly half a dozen or more men jumped to their feet, eyes bursting with excitement and pride as before a battle, and volunteered to witness against the speaker. One by one, with a great show of oratory, they said their pieces against the man who had spoken out of turn. More than once the judge had to urge these witnesses to stop talking after the evidence had been presented. By this time the substance of the original dispute seemed to have been completely forgotten.

Oral Ambivalence

Much as the oral zone is favored by the Amhara as a center for positive 155
gratifications, both of the passive-receptive and the active-aggressive sort, such

symbolize communal solidarities by the forthright assertion of individual 121*
claims and grievances. 181

In virtually every instance of a consideration of communal projects or 156
needs that the author observed or heard of, the dominant characteristic of the 157
discussion was a vigorous and uncompromising assertion of individual claims. If it was a question of allotting spaces in a new marketplace, each discussant was vociferating that the portion allotted to him was insufficient. If it was a question of securing more land for various communal purposes, the various property owners involved orated against contributing a square foot unless reimbursed at some preposterous figure. If it was a scene in court or a police station, everyone with any personal grievance, real or imagined, felt it perfectly proper to interrupt at any point and give vent to his opinion. If it was a question of rebuilding a ravaged church or constructing a road, personal disputations undermined all efforts toward communal action. If it was simply a ceremonial occasion, the peaceful setting one might have expected was shattered by the airing of private disputes.

> Today a new church building was dedicated. It was built to replace one that had been destroyed more than two decades ago by the Italians. People from all over the area made the journey to attend this celebration. All night long and well into the morning the priests and *dabtarā* sang and danced, accompanied as usual by sistrums and drums. Later in the morning, after the church had been officially sanctified, everyone was assembled in the open space in the church compound to listen to some verses composed in honor of the event by one of the local *bālābbāt*, a man who had been a key figure in getting the church rebuilt. He had scarcely finished reciting his poem when a woman in the audience spoke up in anger, arguing that the new church would involve more taxes and in some way would affect her property rights adversely. While he was trying to pacify her, others interrupted and began airing grievances of their own. What was to have been the climax of an occasion for the expression of communal solidarity ended as a bedlam of argument.[10]

The one area in which communal sentiments have seemed fairly strong 121*
among the Amhara has been in connection with the pursuit of outlaws. It is 181
customary—in some Amhara districts, at least—for the local inhabitants to 156
band together in informal posses when threatened by the presence of one or 157
more *shĭftā*, or "outlaws." Yet even here, in his attitudes toward the *shĭftā*, 674
the Amhara reveals an ambivalence regarding the maintenance of civil order 627
and security. [829]

The term *shĭftā* had, in former times, primarily a political connotation. It 121*
referred to someone who rebelled against his feudal superior and was applied 674
only to persons of relatively high status.[11] More recently the term has been [178]
vulgarized and broadened to include any sort of outlaw in the rural areas. In

objects of manipulation, their own creative energies will go unused. Only 121* when their personal aspirations can be linked with co-operative endeavors or 178 collective projects will their participation be sufficiently motivated to draw forth new sources of energy.

The traditional approach, moreover, does not take into acount the available intelligence of the population. It neither takes advantage of the understanding of immediate problems possessed by those concerned nor responds to their pressing needs and interests. The result is failure to make improvements in areas ripe for change, and antagonism or frustration of the elements of the population involved.

Given the relative ineffectuality and unresponsiveness of traditional methods of mobilization, and the new demands for concerted action unleashed by the process of urbanization and the growth of modern aspirations, it is natural that new forms of association should emerge to fill the sociological vacuum. That these new associations have been late in coming merely reflects the tenacity of traditional habits and institutions, as well as the reluctance of the government to permit the formation of groups which might have any sort of political or parapolitical ambitions. But during the past decade, and particularly since the rebellion of December, 1960, a variety of novel associational forms have come into being or have significantly diffused throughout the country. These associations may be described under three general categories: (1) formal associations of indigenous inspiration, (2) formal associations of foreign inspiration, and (3) informal associations.

Formal Associations of Indigenous Inspiration

Eddĭr.—Probably the oldest and most widely diffused of the modern associations in Ethiopia, the *eddĭr* is a form of welfare institution. Its functions 747 178 are primarily to help defray the cost of funerals; to assist families in the event of the death, illness, unemployment, or imprisonment of their breadwinners; and to help in the case of loss due to fire. Members of an *eddĭr* are obliged to contribute to a common fund and to attend the funerals of other members. (Twenty-five cents a month is not an uncommon payment, although in rural centers the contributions are often solicited only in time of need.) The institution is said to have originated among the Gurage and to have become more [177] widely adopted during the Italian invasion, when many people who were killed had no relatives to bury them. Since then *eddĭr* have been established in towns all over the country, fulfilling the vital functions which were performed by kin in the traditional countryside. They are organized on a territorial basis, in villages, towns, and city quarters; on an ethnic basis, as among the Dorze and Wollamo peoples; and even on an institutional basis, as among the employees of some government ministries. Often considerable moral pressure is exerted on townsfolk to become members—the threat of having no one

*121 156 181 selves as a strong progressive force in the national life. This is due, we suggested in the previous chapter, to a basic passivity related to the orality syndrome in Amhara culture. The considerations raised in this chapter seem no less relevant. The egoistic disposition and organizational laissez faire characteristic of traditional Amhara society affect no less their capacity for progressive action by inhibiting the uses of solidarity.

*121 156 181 571 The atomism of the Ethiopian intelligentsia has been a conspicuous feature of their condition since they came into being. It is manifested in the basic distrust in their orientation toward one another as well as toward the rest of Ethiopian society. The regret of not being able to trust one's close friends is one of the more frequently heard confessions from their lips. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that this reflects the attitudes and customs of traditional Amhara culture as much as it does the alleged saturation of the society with informers. That so few modern-educated Ethiopians have dared to break out of the vicious circle of distrust by daring to establish solidary relationships and to circumvent the prevailing fears and stagnation by establishing organizations of some sort is an illustration of the fact that, however much they may give lip service to the ideals of nationalism and populism, their hearts are primarily attached to winning new increments of prestige and income; in brief, to becoming director-generals.

*121 • 178 181 571 Yet the total picture is by no means only one of atomism and stagnation. Some of the energies needed for Ethiopia's development can be, and have been, obtained by extending the traditional principles of domination and respect for authority into new areas of activity. Successful innovations in rural sanitation or agricultural practice, for example, have come about when local big men have been convinced of the desirability of the change and have then pressured the populace, by means of their authority and prestige, to implement the new measures. While the traditional authoritarian approach may for some time to come be the most ready method of mobilizing energies for social development, it alone cannot meet all the organizational needs of changing Ethiopia. One reason is that its effects are not continuous. To a large extent it depends on the whim and the physical presence of the relevant authority figure. It is common experience in Addis Ababa that particularly pressing problems are neglected for a long while, until the Emperor turns his attention to them; the matter then will be busily attended to for the moment, but is likely to be forgotten again when pressing matters turn the Emperor's attention elsewhere. This pattern is the model for most activity throughout the society where responsibility for specific problems is not carefully institutionalized.

*121 178 Another shortcoming of the traditional political pattern is that it does not tap the potential energies now dormant in the population. Insofar as the mass of the people remain passive, involved in the developmental process only as

747 come to one's funeral is particularly potent—and the transactions of the *eddĭr*
178 are strictly governed by elected officers.[39]

Equb.—The *equb* is a form of savings association in which weekly or
454 monthly payments of a fixed sum are exchanged for the privilege of receiving
178 a large lump sum at some point in the life of the group. In addition to provid-
[571] ing a means of forced saving, the *equb* offers a basis for sociability when the
members come together to make their payments and are provided with food
and drink. Like the *eddĭr,* the *equb* is believed to have originated among the
[177] Gurage, and acquired wider popularity following the Italian invasion when
many people needed large sums of money for rebuilding homes and purchasing livestock. The mode of operation of an *equb* has been described in the *Ethiopian Observer* as follows:

> A person desiring to start an Iqub will discuss the matter with his friends; if they agree a meeting will be called to discuss the rules and regulations of the proposed new society, and in particular the amount of money to be paid by each member, the frequency of payment and the time and place of meeting. A president, or dagna [literally, "judge"], and a money collector will be elected from among the most respected and reliable members of the group.
>
> The President then asks every member to bring one or two guarantors who will be responsible for payment in case of default for whatever reason it may be.
>
> On the appointed day all the members assemble and the secretary will call the roll. Any member unable to attend is expected to send his subscription in time. The specified sum is then handed by every member (or substitute) to the President. Any latecomer will be fined according to a pre-arranged schedule, this money being kept by the President until the end of the Iqub, when it is used for the common enjoyment of the members. The collected funds are drawn by lot, the winner receiving the total subscription of all the members. The lottery is normally effected by the members writing their names on small pieces of paper which are then placed in a hat, a blind-folded non-member then drawing out the name of the winner.
>
> After each draw, the winner is disqualified from taking part in further lotteries, but continues to pay his fee until every member has drawn his share. If he fails in this duty his guarantors have to pay.
>
> When all at length have been rewarded the time has come to set up a new Iqub.[40]

Equb have been established by members of virtually all low- and middle-income groups—clerks, merchants, servants, peasants, policemen. Their rapid increase, in response to the growing importance of money in Ethiopia's economy during the past two decades, represents a significant growth of the capacity for voluntary formal organization in the modernizing sector.[41] 454 178

Māhebar (*Regional Associations*).—A type of formal association which has 575
sprung up in Addis Ababa in recent years, becoming popular for the first time 185
around 1960, is known as the *māhebar*. While its name is taken from the tra- 178
ditional Orthodox fraternal association, in aims and organization it is different [794]
from the religious *māhebar*. While the latter is devoted to honoring one of the saints and is convened primarily for feasting and sociability, the modern *māhebar* is organized on the basis of territorial or tribal bonds and is concerned with problems of social betterment. The first *māhebar* of this kind was established by the Gurage in the fifties.* Thereafter, the idea spread to mem- [177]
bers of other groups, and Addis Ababa residents originating in Gondar, Tigre, Harar, Manz, Tagulat, Fitche and elsewhere began to form *māhebar* of their own. The basic idea behind all these *māhebar* is to make some contribution to the welfare of the provinces through projects voluntarily financed and organized by fellow-countrymen living in the metropolis. These projects have included construction of roads, schools, and hospitals; supplying books for schools; and provision of facilities for assisting inhabitants of the provinces who come to the city. Members of the various *māhebar* convene weekly or biweekly, usually on Sunday in the vicinity of one or another of the Addis Ababa churches, to discuss their projects and make their financial contributions.

Formal Associations of Foreign Inspiration

Student Associations.—The Orthodox Students Association was founded 575
in 1958 by a convention representing all the colleges and some of the second- 794
ary schools. Its successful establishment was due in large part to the efforts of 178
an Indian Orthodox minister who at the time was one of the Emperor's private secretaries. There is some evidence that an earlier spontaneous effort to form such a group in the early fifties was checked by the government. Members of this association have been concerned with adapting the activities of the church to contemporary needs. They criticize the established church for its use of a dead language, excessive ritualism, and lack of teaching; and have proposed that the Orthodox Church should institute Sunday schools and

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* The Gurage *māhebar* remains in a class of its own, with respect to size, wealth, and ambitious- [171]
ness of program. The Gurage have also pointed the way to using the *māhebar* form in a way that transcends the narrow tribal or territorial passions which it has thus far tended to canalize. This has been done through the establishment of another, project-oriented *māhebar* concerned solely with building a road from Alam Gana to Wollamo Soddo, whose membership includes Galla and Wollamo as well as Gurage. This association has already collected well over a million dollars, and has completed the construction of a bridge. It is headed by a capable Gurage army general and its activities and collections are reported regularly in the Addis Ababa press.

575 cultivate a missionary spirit in order to reach the non-Christian peoples of
794 Ethiopia. The association sponsors weekly religious services, featuring hymns
178 in Amharic and talks in Amharic on religious and moral questions, and
publishes a monthly journal. The Orthodox Students Association stands out as the first nationwide voluntary association in Ethiopia. It holds an annual convention which draws some three hundred students from all parts of the country.

The Ethiopian College Students Association was established in 1960 after some years of patient maneuvering by officers of the various college student governments. It attempts to represent the interests and needs of students vis-à-vis the government and to handle relations with international student organizations.

A number of student clubs have appeared from time to time within the framework of the colleges. One of the most popular and productive of these has been the Ethnological Society of the University College, founded in the early fifties by a Polish member of the college staff. Over the years it has produced several issues of an ethnological bulletin. More recently, under the framework of the new university, dramatic and choral groups have been established as well as groups like the Education Students Association and the Economics Students Association. Graduates of some of the secondary schools and colleges, moreover, have formed a small number of alumni associations.

467 *Labor Unions.*—Although Ethiopia has for some time been a paying mem-
178 ber of the ILO, the government has until recently strongly opposed the estab-
[177] lishment of unions in the country. Nevertheless, due to the encouragement of
labor representatives from Western and other African countries, as well as to the courageous efforts of a number of Ethiopians, several unions have at last been established and have won some degree of recognition from the government.* Trade unions were first attempted among employees of the Franco-Ethiopian Railroad and in Eritrea.[42] They now include employees of a num-
[357] ber of factories. Even household servants have formed associations that estab-
lish minimal conditions which members are obliged to demand from their employers.

814 *Professional Associations.*—The Ethiopian Teachers Association, with a
815 large paper membership but scarcely any activity, was the only professional
875 association in Ethiopia prior to the 1960 rebellion. If one may generalize from
178 the frustrated attempts of Ethiopian doctors to establish a medical association,
it would seem that the government was attempting to discourage groups of this sort as well as trade unions. Since 1961, however, the picture has changed.
[759] There now exists not only a medical association, which publishes its own

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* A law establishing a legal basis for labor unions was enacted by the Ethiopian parliament in 1962.

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journal, but also an engineers' association, a college teachers' association, and 815
an Ethiopian writers' association. Earlier attempts to establish an organization 875
of lawyers have not yet reached fruition. 178

National and International Service Organizations.—A final group of formal 759
associations consists of those which include non-Ethiopian nationals as well as 575
Ethiopians in their membership and which carry out welfare services of 747
various sorts. The Ethiopian Red Cross, the Ethiopian Women's Welfare 178
Association, the YMCA, and the Rotary Club of Addis Ababa have been active for more than a decade. More recently, the International Christian Fellowship was formed with an eye to discussing ways of translating Christian principles into social action, and the Social Service Society has broken new ground in the welfare field with its ambitious program of relocating and rehabilitating Addis Ababa indigents.

Informal Associations

Another significant sociological development since the 1960 rebellion has 575
been the blossoming of what might be called "mutual confidence groups." Al- 178
though the public climate remains somewhat tense and generalized suspicion still prevails, a step has been taken away from the complete atomism of the pre-rebellion era. These groups consist of numbers of friends, bound by such factors as kinship, common ethnic background, relationships formed during study abroad, and occupational ties. Perhaps the most important single bond underlying these groups derives from friendships formed during the crucial experience of attending secondary school together. While for the most part these groups carry out no organized activities or structured discussions, they do provide a context in which any of the issues of the day can be discussed with fairly complete frankness and without fear of reprisal.

There are some progressive Ethiopians who would like to see these groups become the nuclei of action groups and political parties, even on an overt basis. The prevailing view among them, however, seems to be that this is as far as they can go under the present regime.

The efflorescence of voluntary associations in Ethiopia during the past half 121*
dozen years constitutes a remarkable thickening of the fabric of Ethiopian 575
society. It may be seen as a vast, unconscious process of arousing and co-ordi- 178
nating energies to meet the novel realities of Ethiopia's current historical situation. What relationship to this collective process have the individualistic features of Amhara character and society which were discussed above?

It may be observed that in virtually none of the cases cited above were the 121*
Amhara the initiators of the associational forms in question. The territorial 177
and "project" *mähebar* were introduced into Ethiopian life by the Gurage; so, [575] [454]
as far as present evidence indicates, were the *eddïr* and the *equb*. The labor [747]

*121 The labor movement, limited as it is, has been in the hands of Eritreans on the one hand,
177 and primarily non-Amhara workers in the south. Student associations have
[467] been formed chiefly at the instigation and under the aegis of foreign staff members; though here, as with the professional associations, modernized Amhara have sometimes played a leading role.

*121 Once the new associations had been introduced, the Amhara like other
177 Ethiopians were quick to adopt and expand them. Their participation in these
• 178 new associations, however, has been affected, as might be expected, by the intrusion of traditional behavior patterns. Three examples of such behavior patterns come readily to mind.

*121 (1) While the *equb* is conceived as a kind of credit union and as a focus
452 for communal sociability, the *co-operative* sentiment tends to be lacking
454 among members of Amhara *equb,* at least those of which the author has any
178 knowledge. For example, in case of dire need, an *equb* member who desires the lump sum out of turn may be forced to *buy* the amount from the weekly winner, sometimes by forfeiting as much as ten or twenty per cent of the amount. By capitalizing on the crises of others, some enterprising *equb* members are able to sell their successful claims several times. Furthermore, in the early years of their existence, *equb* were frequently faced with the problem created by members who won the money early in the cycle, left town with the money, and did not return to pay their later installments. This difficulty has been met to some extent by the requirement of securing one or two guarantors for each person who enters an *equb,* but problems of this nature have led to altercations that have brought many *equb* members into court.

*121 (2) The behavior of members of Amhara territorial *mähebar* is essentially
178 that of a traditional social or civil gathering. The big men are seated in places
575 of honor; the rest of the people stand quietly by. After a protracted period of
794 exchanging greetings and milling about, the crowd listens respectfully while one or more of the big men makes a statement, and perhaps exchanges a few words with the group's secretary; and then the gathering disbands. Although the *mähebar* is organized with respect to the attainment of specific goals, the substance of the meetings is instumental to a very slight degree. The assembly rarely involves a meeting of minds to discuss an issue or a common problem, or to work out a program of action; but exists primarily as an occasion for the resonance of primordial sentiments by virtue of shared territorial attachments.

*121 (3) In all associations, finally, certain traditional characteristics which are
571 incongruent with the optimum conduct of groups come to the fore. This is no
156 less true of the modern-educated than of the traditionals. Members fail to come on time to arranged meetings or neglect to come altogether.[*] They

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[*] The *equb* has attempted to check this pattern by imposing fines on members who come late.

19. Thus, an eighth-grade student in Manz explained the popularity of the Jimma Agricultural School by saying, "The boys all want to go there because it is run by the Americans, and a school run by Americans means that everything is done right—food and clothes are properly distributed, and so on." 883* 178 463 87 829
20. Shack, *op. cit.*, p. 417. 113
21. In response to a question on their attitudes toward the priests, sixty juniors and seniors of Tafari Makonnen Secondary School replied as follows (1959): 40 per cent were unequivocally proclerical; 22 per cent were ambivalent, expressing awareness of both good and bad elements in the clergy; and 18 per cent were primarily anticlerical, calling the priests "incompetent," "opposed to modernization," and "not supported by the people." (The rest were no answers or noncommittal.) 883* 771 178 829
22. Edith Lord, "The Impact of Education on Non-scientific Beliefs in Ethiopia," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XLVII, Second-Half (May, 1958), 339–54. 113
23. Cf. Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), chaps. vii and xiv.
24. Cf. chap. iii, p. 89, and note 19.
25. Lord, "The Impact of Education on Non-Scientific Beliefs," typescript version, pp. 6–7.
26. A sophisticated expression of this approach to Ethiopian painting has been published by an Ethiopian student in France. Cf. Berhanu Abbaba, "La peinture éthiopienne: point de vue d'un Éthiopien," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, II, No. 1 (1961), 160–65.
27. For a brief account of this historic event cf. Lipsky *et al.*, *Ethiopia* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962), pp. 210–12.
28. Edgar Z. Friedenberg, *The Vanishing Adolescent* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959).
29. *Diagnosis of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), chap. iii.

CHAPTER 5: *The Old and New Elites*

1. C. Conti Rossini, "La regalità sacra in Abissinia," *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni*, XXI (1948), 12–31.
2. A. Vasiliev, "Justin I (518–527) and Abyssinia," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXXIII (1933), 67–77; *Justin the First* (Harvard, 1950), pp. 299–302.
3. A. Caquot, "La royauté sacrale en Éthiopie," *Annales d'Éthiopie*, II (1957), 205–19.
4. F. Alvares, *The Prester John of the Indies*, ed. C. F. Beckingham and G. Huntingford (2 vols.; Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1961), I, 122.
5. "The Chronicle of the Emperor Zara Yaqob," *Ethiopia Observer*, V, No. 2 (1961), 153.
6. J. Varenbergh, *Studien zur äthiopischen Reichsordnung* (Strassburg, 1916), p. 3.
7. James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile* (5 vols.; Edinburgh, 1790), III, 237.

632
621 *A Gondar Ward*. Gabrael *sebeka* lies on Gondar's
eastern flank, and is typical of those wards which are
not given over entirely to *talla* sellers or tradesmen.
[241] Until liberation, it was occupied by *risteñas* and cul-
[423] tivators of *timene* and church lands (*riym*). During the
[178] last three decades, the ward's character changed greatly,
[795] as domiciles for out-landers were built on its fields,
[342] and many of its erstwhile peasants took up employment in
[463] the town. Today, the ward contains 198 residents. Ten
[161] of its forty-four households are headed by Gondar-born
632 people; of these, five were born in Gabrael *sebeka* it-
621 self. The remaining household heads are a) Amhara from
592 other parts of Begemder (sixteen households), from Gojam
(five households), and from Wollo (five households); b)
Tigreans (three households); c) local Agaw (two house-
holds); d) Shoans (four households); and e) Šankella
(one household). On the average, the ward's adult resi-
dents who were not born in Gondar have lived fifteen
[241] years in this *sebeka*. With the exception of three house-
[793] holds which still depend exclusively on farming, and
[463] two local priests (sharing the Mass with priests residing
in an adjacent ward), the ward's residents are supported
by occupations which depend upon daily contact with
[463] people of many other *sebekas*. In brief, seven household
heads are policemen, thirteen hold other government em-
ployment, five work as *zibañas*, eight as wood cutters,

12:Young E-4,5 (1966) 1971 MP5 Amhara MP5
Begemder

*767

743 A government hospital, located on the edge of
177 Gondar provides the most important non-traditional therapies. Most townsfolk regard hospital therapy with considerable apprehension, because of its strangeness and of numerous apochryphal tales describing its
*757 therapies. Nevertheless, the Amhara does not dispute the
177 power of Western medicine, at least regarding some
• 178 ailments. This respect is largely explained by the demonstrated successes of Western medicine, and the fact that, operationally, it coincides with certain traditional
*[192] notions of what powerful therpies should be like. In particular, the violent introjective mode associated with the most commonly experienced of hospital therapies, *merify* (injection), is regarded as consistent with notions of strong therapies. Moreover, the practitioner of Western medicine, like powerful traditional healers, is characterized by a general mastery over an extensive disease domain, through abstruse sources of power. Western therapy is not in general well integrated into traditional medical beliefs, but tends to be considered mainly from a pragnatic perspective. Thus, hospital therapy is a likely choice for ailments against which it has repeatedly demonstrated successful cures and against which traditional healers are predictably less successful. Conspicuous here are abscesses, ulcerations, and other superficial but potentially serious infections,

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177 known as kusil and ibac. In addition, Western therapy
178 is sought for ailments which are serious and chronic, but
for which traditional cures offer a poor prognosis or only palliatives. For these ailments (in particular, leprosy, kuntina; chronic coughing, yisaal bašiyta, including tuberculosis, yilib bašiyta; and a variety of stomach ailments, yihod himem and migaña), Western medicine is believed to offer prognosis equal to that of powerful traditional non-secular therapies, but not necessarily superior to them.

The injectionist's therapy is considered a variety of Western medicine. Injections are provided in the town's single pharmacia and by a handful of free-lance injectionists. All offer the same therapy, injection with what the client believes to be a uniform medicament, generally unidentifiable beyond "merify".[19] Injectionist therapy is favored for primary syphilis (kitin) and "fevers" (weba).

*278 The town herbalist's foremost traditional competi-
*759 tors are the weak debtera and the balazar. The relative
632 concentration of these therapists in towns is indicated
by the following: In Tikurmidir and Lemmariet, there

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[19] Most often, it is penicillin.

*793 869 sident student by familiarizing him with the network of churches, monasteries, and academies which constitute the stations along which the student will progress once he leaves his natal parish.

*[192] The completion of psalter (dawiyd) is frequently considered a sign of the student's readiness to be tested by the local bishop (abuna) for certification as a deacon. The boy is fifteen or sixteen by this time, and the recipient of church fields in return for his performance in the Mass; with his marriage a few years later, he becomes a priest. The boy bent on a debtera career generally waits until he has been certified a deacon, since this is considered a prerequisite for enrollment in his first debtera school.

*793 869 621 593 166 With the exceptions already cited, a man is certain to oppose his son's departure, since, sentiment aside, the boy's move usually represents a significant economic loss. When he leaves his natal parish, he does so secretly, journeying to a distant debtera, in order to conceal his new residence from his father. Thus, he begins his debtera career without kinfolk or friends to protect him, without resources to meet his subsistence needs.[23]

[871] [178] [369] [23] Since liberation, government (secular) schools have offered an alternative to an ecclesiastical education pursuant to government employment. The effects of this have been limited, however, since only an estimated 3% pass beyond the eighth grade (ESA 1965:198). In addition children of townsmen and non-Amhara are disproportionately represented in these classes.

*787
539 tious occupations, journeys and marriages (thus paral-
75 ling information also given in the kokob text).

Appendix D provides illustrations of medically relevant information which can be obtained from awdunigist texts.

*787 In the main, a debtera acquires awdunigist texts
*278 individually, just as he collects digams, kitab recipes,
*755
*793 and herbalist therapies.[30] Awdunigist repertoires there-
539 fore vary in comprehensiveness from debtera to debtera.
*787 Moreover, "definitive" versions of awdunigist texts are
539 unknown; whatever their common origins may have been, ex-
• 178 tant texts are probably unique products of many adventi-
437 tious deletions and additions. Deletions are most likely when texts are transmitted from seller to buyer. At that time, details are sometimes withheld by the seller, in order to secure additional payments, or as a bond

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[30] Over the last three decades, the accessibility of awdunigist texts has been affected by the publication, in Asmara, of a collection of these texts. Most are in Amharic, but perhaps a quarter are in Ge'ez entirely or in part. Although many debteras demean these texts, they are in fact used, particularly by "weak" debteras. Public illiteracy, ignorance of the book's existence, of where it can be obtained, of the precise manipulations it requires, together with the limited utility its contents hold for the layman, and the fear of putative satanic associations have prevented its diffusion to the debtera's public, however.

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against continued services from the buyer. This practice occurs, in fact, in the transmission of all categories of _debtera_ works. For example, while relating therapeutic information, the seller may indicate that he has omitted an ingredient, or he may identify it with an ambiguous or obscure nomer. Should the would-be purchaser subsequently fail to satisfy the owner, the incomplete therapeutic notation must be deleted from the text. On the other hand, _debteras_ frequently add information to texts, first inserting it as marginalia and then, once its efficacy has been accepted, including it within the text when recopying or transmitting it.